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PREFACE
There is not a single interesting theory
that agrees with all the known facts in its domain.
— Paul Feyerabend: Against Method
I promise nothing complete;
because any human thing supposed to be complete,
must for that very reason infallibly be faulty.
—Herman Melville:Moby-Dick, or The Whale
This book was originally supposed to be about nonhuman animals.
When I started working on it as my PhD thesis in 2012, I planned
on arguing that self-consciousness isn’t restricted to the human spe-
cies. To this end, I wanted to discuss various new insights in the fields
of cognitive science, anthropology, neuroscience, and ethology. The
idea was to thereby show that some nonhuman species—like bonobos,
dolphins, elephants, or magpies—can become aware of, and think con-
sciously about, themselves. But the more I read and the more I reflec-
ted, the more I asked myself the question: ‘What is self-consciousness
anyway?’ This was the push that literally sent me down the proverbial
rabbit hole.
I realised that I needed to knowmore about self-consciousness itself
before I could seriously ask the questionwhether some nonhumans can
become aware of themselves. So, I read up on what analytic philosoph-
ers had to say about self-consciousness. But instead of things getting
clearer, I was driven even further away from my original question and
closer towards the so-called ‘problem of de se beliefs’: How do we have
to characterise the type of belief in which a subject thinks about herself
and potentially realises that she’s thinking about herself and not some
other thing? It seems that there’s something quite special in grasping
that you’re thinking about yourself. Just remind yourself of the myth-
ical Narcissus seeing his own mirror image, Winnie-the-Pooh finding
his own footsteps, or King Gilgamesh learning of his own mortality.
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The question of de se thinking used to be—and still somewhat is—
a hot topic in analytic philosophy of language and mind and gyrated
around two influential papers by John Perry (1979) and David Lewis
(1979). Trying to understand this problem and the proposed solutions,
I developed the suspicion that something important was missing. The
theories elaborate on the potential general logical structure of these de
se beliefs; e.g. how they differ from and relate to beliefs about other
things. But they didn’t explain how subjects come to understand that
they’re thinking about themselves in the first place. And this curious
way of getting in touch with yourself is exactly what makes self-con-
sciousness special. If I wanted to understand how nonhumans can
become aware of themselves, I had to find answers to the question:
What’s going on when a subject thinks about herself in this peculiar
de se way? What’s special about thinking about yourself ?
My focus thus shifted from the enigmatic question concerning the
nature of self-consciousness to the more concise, narrow, and previ-
ously staked out one of these unique de se thoughts: mental states
which are always and necessarily about whoever is thinking them. And
by doing so, I soon came to realise that there’s a certain structural re-
flexivity which I wanted to understand better. When I think that I’m
typing, this thought seems to be about myself no matter what. There’s
no way I’m thinking about some other person when I’m thinking in
the de se way. How’s that possible?
Unfortunately, the usual suspects in the literature didn’t seem to ad-
dress what perplexedme themost—that subjects can grasp that they’re
thinking about themselves at all. They rather started from the premise
that this just occurs and now has to be distinguished from other types
of thinking. Hence, I became somewhat frustrated with the overall
technicality and obsession with theoretical details that’s prevalent in
the academic discussion of the problem at hand. I asked myself: Can’t
we explain the distinctiveness of de se thinking from a less technical
point of view? Can’t we show the general problems of the pertinent
academic literature without struggling with all the small quirks and
minute differences between the various theories on offer?
Now, as you might have guessed, this book is an attempt to give and
justify an affirmative answer to both these questions. As such, the over-
all structure of the book is more akin to a philosophical journey than
the more usual series of arguments, reconstructions, objections, and
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minute refinements. In a way it represents my own odyssey through
the topic of de se thinking and my various encounters with authors,
ideas, and crucial insights. The aim is thereby to provide the reader
with an impression of how the problem initially unfolded, to show
which theoretical foci and decisions lead to which approaches, and to
illuminate the problems that these approaches face and have to over-
come. And, of course, to sketch out and defend the solution I think is
most worthwhile in the end.
Despite the complexity of the debate and themany articles that have
been written about technical issues, minute improvements, and new
small differentiations, I set myself the goal of illuminating this very
narrow and seemingly insignificant problem in a way which tries to
remain as non-technical as possible. Therefore, I decided to sidestep
certain questions of detail which distinguish the various theories on
offer. Rather, the goal was to identify general strategies which are em-
ployed in the debate and show the general problems such strategies
face. Furthermore, I wanted to give an impression of how we even
end up with these strategies, where they originate from and why they
were deemed worthwhile or doomed.This more pedagogical approach
might be somewhat unusual. However, it follows from my conviction
that important philosophical points can bemade perfectly well on such
a general level and that great attention to technical details brings rig-
orousness on the cost of losing sight of the original question.
By looking at the bigger picture, I had to abstract from the finesse
of the accounts that have been developed over the last 40 years. But,
of course, we’ll naturally encounter several specific theories and quotes
from important authors despite my subscription to a more relaxed and
less academic style. These encounters will give us the opportunity to
get a better picture of what we’re dealing with and also learn some im-
portant lessons. Moreover, they’re aimed to indicate that I didn’t just
pull the discussed strategies out of my hat. Admittedly, the conversa-
tion with these other philosophical theories will be somewhat naïve.
I intentionally gloss over some of the details of these accounts. And
this again sometimes has the air of an exercise of building strawpeople.
However, I invite you to rather understand my discussion of the per-
tinent literature as a way of illustrating and motivating the general
strategies that emerge in the philosophical exchange. My interest is
decisively not in showing the infeasibility of one specific theory or
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another. I’m much more interested in kinds of advantages and prob-
lems of these more general structures. As a result, I don’t intend to
dismantle opposing theories for good but I rather try to clearly point
out their weak spots and problematic aspects—which can then poten-
tially be overcome by their proponents.
The general dialectic and methodology of the book thus amounts to
the following: We start from the simple fact that subjects oftentimes
think about themselves in the special de se way. This way of thinking
has some quite general characteristics which distinguish it from other
types of thinking. We can identify and illuminate these characteristics
by helping ourselves to the multitude of philosophical theories and
insights which have been produced over the last twomillennia—where
we’ll gladly focus on the last fifty or sixty years.
In the course of this, we’ll also encounter strategies which have been
executed by different philosophers in order to solve the problem of de se
thinking and to explain what’s special about our ability to think about
ourselves. These strategies again need to be outlined in some way or
other. It’s sensible to do this by taking some representative theory or
author as a template against which we can develop the strategy fur-
ther and indicate its most important insights and problems. Such a
template and gross generalisation comes with the problem of not do-
ing full justice to the advocate of a certain theory. Nonetheless, I’m
confident that there’s some merit to paying this price.
Most importantly, the lessons we learn from this exposition of at-
tempts to solve the problem at hand can ultimately be used to illustrate,
compare, and contrast the solution I prefer. Our journey through the
universe of unsuccessful attempts will teach us not only what doesn’t
work, but also what’s essential to any good account of de se thinking.
In this way, we’ll end up with the account that I will try to defend
and make as compelling as possible. My own solution to the problem
takes up an old insight that has been quite prominent in phenomen-
ology and so-called ‘existential’ philosophy. Building upon this, the
book tries to integrate it with the learned lessons which originate in
the more analytic style of doing philosophy from which we started.
What’s this solution? It starts from describing subjects as the origins
of their world: they perceive and act from a certain privileged position
in space which they themselves occupy. After all, much of what we see
and do is put into relation with ourselves. We see the snow-covered
preface xvii
mountains that we want to climb in summer. We see our friend that
we want to hug. Now, getting into touch with the origin of our world
is tantamount to getting into touch with ourselves. And thus, de se
thinking finds its beginning in the fact that we’re first and foremost
origins. We are living bodies, perceiving and acting subjects. This also
somewhat explains the cryptic title of the book. The fact that subjects
are origins of thought and action is the key to understanding the pe-
culiarity of de se mental states.
As already mentioned, this idea is in no way new. It can probably be
traced far back to idealism and transcendental philosophy influenced
by Kant or Hegel and of course to phenomenologists and existential
philosophers such as Husserl, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. Recently,
similar accounts have been developed in the philosophy of mind un-
der the headings of pragmatism, embodied cognition, and enactivism.
These are all sources that inspire and illuminate my own account. This
is why I don’t intend to claim to have invented a brand new and pre-
viously unknown idea. Rather, my goal is to put certain perspectives,
strategies and problems into relation to each other which have pre-
viously been mostly discussed independently. As such, the approach
defended in the book is much more a previously overlooked solution
to the problem of de se thinking than a new theory altogether. On the
one hand, it shows how we have to arrive at this more phenomenolo-
gical insight even if we start from the dry desert of analytic philosophy.
On the other hand, it incorporates this insight into the analytic debate
in a way which hopefully enriches and irrigates it.
Now, after the scope and style of the book have been elucidated, is
the opportunity to give a more detailed overview over all the chapters,
the general arguments, and important claims that will define its con-
tent. The main story is divided into four chapters. In the first chapter
Being in the mirror, I will introduce the phenomenon of de se thinking
and develop a conceptual andmethodological frameworkwhichwill be
used in the remainder of the book. The history of philosophy is intim-
ately tied with the ability to think about ourselves. From Plato’s quest
for self-knowledge to Kant’s necessity of the ‘I think’; fromDescartes’s
Cogito argument to Camus’s Sisyphus. Several of these sources provide
us with a better understanding of the ability to think about ourselves.
In the course of this voyage, we’ll come across a number of characterist-
ics that are connected to de se thinking: its semantic reflexivity, the con-
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nection to self-knowledge, or its necessity for intentional action and
behaviour. One of the most important methodological desiderata fol-
lows from this list: Any proper account of first-person thinking should
be capable of accommodating these features in some way or other.
From this general introduction and initial theoretical setup we then
start to test the waters and look at some of the more prominent ap-
proaches to de se thinking. How do they emerge? What’s their main
general claim?What are their advantages and problems? And can they
do justice to the characteristics of de se thinking? We start this sur-
vey in the chapterDivide and conquer where we’ll familiarise ourselves
with one influential family of approaches. This family is heavily influ-
enced by the idea that our mental states can be characterised by some
proposition—a kind of abstract picture of how the world could be—
which we’re related to in believing or desiring. For instance, a subject
believing that it’s going to rain on Sunday entertains a ‘picture’ of the
world where it rains on that particular day. Accordingly, her belief is
true if that picture is accurate and it indeed rains on the day in question.
Unfortunately, such a simple picture isn’t suitable for our thoughts
about ourselves. Due to the innate reflexivity and dependency on the
context—one and the same de se belief corresponds to quite different
propositions when entertained by different subjects—we’ll shift the
focus to so-called two-dimensional theories. These are designed in the
spirit of the propositional family but with some extra features. Very
generally, they hold that our beliefs have to be analysed in terms of
two distinct logical steps: one of them being sensitive to the context
of the mental state. The chapter will explore three different ways of
developing this idea: the linguistic, the conceptual, and the functional
approach. I will illuminate the benefits and problems of these different
strategies and ultimately argue that the most important puzzle piece is
missing. They all fail to explain how subjects can come to realise that
they’re thinking about themselves.
What do you do when your hopes for salvation are thwarted by
one camp? You turn to the other. In the subsequent chapter, Back to
the primitive, we’ll discuss the main opponent to the idea that men-
tal states should be characterised by some proposition. Rather, this
strategy claims that we should focus on the kind of property that’s in
play in a given belief, supposition, desire, or intention. So, when I
think that I’m sleepy, we should say that I simply ascribe the prop-
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erty of being sleepy to myself. And if I think that you’re sleepy I’m
simply ascribing that same property to you. This property theory of de
se thinking was designed specifically with our thoughts about ourselves
in mind. It even goes as far as claiming that any mental state we have is
ultimately a thought about ourselves. Why? Because in any case, we’re
ascribing a very complex property to ourselves. Even if you believe
something about the weather, you’re ultimately believing that you’re
living in a world where it’s windy, rainy, warm, or cold. We’ll see that
this way of painting the conceptual landscape comes with certain prob-
lems. Most importantly, we run the risk of losing sight of what makes
proper de se thinking special. While the propositional theories weren’t
able to fit the de se way of thinking into their picture, this new property
theory overshoots the target. I’ll argue that proper de se thinking is re-
lated to a very special kind of self-ascription. More precisely, we have
to identify a type of self-ascription which is primitive—which doesn’t
depend on some other kind of knowledge or belief. This way of self-
ascribing a property is what forms the basis of de se thinking and has
to be sharply contrasted from other types of thinking. Unfortunately,
the classical property theory doesn’t deliver this result. Hence, we’ll
have to abandon it for a more feasible alternative.
The lessons from the two previous chapters set up the story for the
grand finale. After having argued that two-dimensional theories can’t
explain how subjects come to think of themselves in the peculiar de
se way, our examination of the property theory taught us the neces-
sity of some primitive form of self-ascription. Naturally, if we accept
the necessity of this primitive kind of self-ascription, we better explain
its nature and how it can serve as our required basis of de se thinking.
This is the goal of the fourth and final chapter Origins. Here, I’ll ex-
plicate the proposed solution and defend it. The argument starts with
a characterisation of what’s called egocentric space. Subjects think about
the objects in their world primarily from their own first personal per-
spective. And this amounts to them putting these things in relation
to themselves. For instance, I’m thinking of the glass as being to the
left of me or I realise that I can’t see Mount Fuji from here. This kind
of thinking is intimately tied to a subject’s capabilities for action. Ba-
sically, the argument is that for a subject to be capable of interacting
with all the glasses, mountains, people, or animals around her, she has
to think about them egocentrically.
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How does this relate to primitive self-ascription or de se thinking?
This is where the concept of the origin comes into play. In the chapter
I’ll argue that a subject takes up a very special position in her egocentric
thinking. She’s the phenomenological and behavioural centre of her
world. She occupies the central place from where she experiences the
world around her and herself. And at the same time she acts upon
the objects in the world from that centre. Following the title of the
chapter, I call this the origin—which is further characterised by the
concept of the lived body.We’re all subjects who engage with the world
through our lived body—the thing with which we see, feel, walk, talk,
cry, love, or stumble. In the argument this lived body plays a crucial role
since it enables these primitive self-ascriptions which we’re after. By
experiencing the world through the lived body we at once take certain
properties to be instantiated in ourselves. We wouldn’t try to get up if
we didn’t think that we’re lying in bed. We wouldn’t grab a beer if we
didn’t think we’re thirsty—well, we could, but you get the point. From
these arguments and considerations we can develop the theory that
de se thinking is always rooted in some ascription of a property to the
lived body. The lived body is inherently—through it being the origin
of our thought and action—given to a subject as her own. By ascribing
a property to that lived body it inherits this first-personal aspect and
explains why de se thinking is so peculiar.
Once the concepts of egocentric space, the origin, the lived body,
and the favoured theory of de se thinking is adequately explained and its
necessity properly argued for, we’ll connect it with the starting point of
our journey. I’ll explain how such a way of framing things does justice
to the characteristics of our ability to think about ourselves. In that
context we’ll see that it’s not so easy as we might expect and that—
following the mottos for this book—more work needs to be done.
We’ll see how the defended account deals with various types of de se
thinking and, more importantly, some problematic objections. This
will show us both the virtues of the account and its pitfalls and limits.
These four chapters form the principal line of argument. We can
summarise it in the following way: De se thinking has several charac-
teristic features which aren’t present in all instances of thinking about
yourself but are at least potentially realised. As such, any feasible ac-
count needs to explain the potential for these features. Neither the two-
dimensional accounts—stemming from the idea that mental states
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can be characterised using the notion of a proposition—nor the prop-
erty theory—claiming that we self-ascribe a property in thinking—do
full justice to the phenomenon at hand. Instead, we have to take the
concept of primitive self-ascription as the basis for all de se thinking.
Primitive self-ascription, in turn, is ascription of a property to the lived
body.The lived body is constituted through a subject’s assumed possib-
ilities of interaction with the world. Therefore, only subjects as lived
bodies are capable of thinking about themselves in the de se way. This
is what’s required to grasp that you’re thinking about yourself.
As you will see, the arguments and dialectic of the book aren’t al-
ways as straightforward as one would expect on the basis of this con-
cise précis of the overall argument. Rather, it oftentimes takes on an
almost meandering way of exposition.This is partly deliberate because
it represents the way the academic discourse has developed. Original
thought doesn’t always follow the straight line of hindsight and to un-
derstand the development of certain answers it might be necessary to
tailgate the twisting and turning path. Otherwise, we’ll often be left
wondering: ‘How did we get here?’ Understanding certain theoretical
choices and failures is easier when we grasp their emergence. Because
of this swerving dialectic it might be helpful to have a list of important
claims that are endorsed throughout the book:
• Thinking about oneself in the de se way doesn’t require a self-
representation.
• There’s both unconscious and nonconceptual ways of de se think-
ing and thought in general.
• The ability to think about oneself consciously and explicitly has
its origin in cognitively simple abilities such as the unconscious
grasp of the lived body.
• Thinking in the de se way isn’t the same as self-consciousness.
• Thinking is possible without language.
• Subjects are constituted through their lived bodies.
• In the foundational cases, the lived body is not represented in
thought.
• Thinking in the de se way is possible due to the subject’s ability
to primitively self-ascribe properties.
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Moreover, there are some claims which you might think I endorse but
on which I choose to remain neutral or even explicitly don’t defend.
The following list collects some of these claims:
• Self-knowledge is special.
• Self-knowledge isn’t special.
• Reasons for action are always facts.
• Self-representation is impossible.
• There’s no adequate two-dimensional account of de se thinking.
I hope that these lists of claims and non-claims will help to illu-
minate and put into perspective the arguments in this book. However,
there is another part of the book which I hope is illuminating to the
more academically inclined reader: The main part of the book is fol-
lowed by an appendix. Sometimes, during the main story, you’ll come
across references like this: (A.3.2). As mentioned, part of the goal of
this book is to make it as accessible as possible—even to people out-
side of the debate or academic analytic philosophy in general. This is
why it uses almost no footnotes and introduces even fairly well-known
philosophical concepts in an undemanding manner. Sometimes, how-
ever, I feel the urge or the necessity to say something more about a
topic without interrupting the flow of the argument. The appendix is
the arena for these conceptual and argumentative excursions. This is
where I might clarify certain ideas in a more formal or technical way
in order to make my claims more precise. I also point towards interest-
ing or important relations with the academic literature. As the main
story uses only few references to other people’s work, it’s sometimes
necessary to show some understanding of and sensitivity to the work
done by others. So, whenever you see such a reference and you’re in-
terested in what I have to say about it check the referenced section of
the appendix for some additional information.
Finally, I’ll use the following typographical conventions through-
out the book: Whenever I’m talking about a sentence that expresses
a thought, intentional state, or mental state, I will put the sentence
in quotation marks. On the other hand, when I want to talk about
the underlying expressed thought without committing myself to any
kind of linguistic connotation I’ll put the (closest) sentence that is usu-
ally used to report the thought in italics. And whenever I’m talking
about a proposition I’ll put the proposition into chevrons. Sometimes
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I’ll write out the propositions more colloquially and sometimes more
formally. So, I’ll talk as if the sentence ‘The leaf is green’ reports the
subject’s thought The leaf is green. The subject believes that the leaf is
green. And the proposition that’s expressed by the sentence is <that
the leaf is green> or <the leaf, being green>. Of course, I’ll use italics
for emphasis throughout the book as well.

1
BEING IN THE MIRROR
Here Narcissus, tired of hunting and the heated noon, lay
down, attracted by the peaceful solitudes and by the glassy
spring. There as he stooped to quench his thirst another
thirst increased. While he is drinking he beholds himself
reflected in the mirrored pool—and loves; loves an ima-
gined body which contains no substance, for he deems the
mirrored shade a thing of life to love. He cannot move,
for so he marvels at himself, and lies with countenance
unchanged, as if indeed a statue carved of Parian marble.
Ovid:Metamorphoses: Book 3, 407
Self-consciousness is oftentimes used as a defining criterion and
a prime example of what makes us human—almost our conditio hu-
mana. In this manner, we elevate ourselves from other beings through
our supposedly unique ability to consciously think about ourselves.
However, right there in our midst, Ovid’s Narcissus is an epitome
of the tragedy that often accompanies self-consciousness. The myth
demonstrates the deep chasm that comes with the possibility to con-
sciously think about oneself. Indeed, only once Narcissus is self-con-
sciously marvelling at himself does he realise his terrible predicament.
If only Narcissus wouldn’t have known himself, he might not have
suffered the direful fate of needing to commit suicide to escape from
his prison of self-consciousness.
This is but one example where our ability to self-consciously think
about ourselves comes at a price.Others are aplenty: we think ourselves
too stupid or smarter than the rest and even sometimes wish we were
someone else.Without being able to consciously think about ourselves
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in this way, we wouldn’t suffer from being self-conscious about our
weight, our desires, our actions, our personalities. Hence, even if our
ability to consciously think about ourselves were a gift for our human
existence, it’s also a bane—as so often: there ain’t no such thing as a
free lunch.
Sure enough, self-consciousness can also be a virtue. Only through
our ability to consciously think about ourselves are we capable of build-
ing complex societies—founded on justice, laws, and politics—and
grasping our own role and position in such a society. Only self-con-
sciousness allows reflection onwhat kind of personwewant to be, what
goals we do and don’t want to pursue in life. And finally, it’s tightly
connected to our understanding of what it is to be someone else. The
possibility of serious and earnest empathy might only arise in concert
with our appreciation of ourselves as vulnerable beings in the midst
of other vulnerable beings—an impossible achievement without self-
conscious thought about oneself. So, it’s no miracle why we hold our
ability to think about ourselves in such high regard despite some of its
undesirable consequences.
But self-consciousness doesn’t just imply some practical adversit-
ies. It also produces the most serious philosophical problems. For in-
stance, without self-consciousness, we would be incapable of grasping
our cosmic insignificance and there wouldn’t be the dreaded possibil-
ity of suicide—a perspective on self-consciousness that’s perhaps most
pronounced in what’s commonly called existentialist philosophy. Of
course, this doesn’t imply that every self-conscious subject is in danger
of killing itself. Even Sisyphus, fully aware of his futile purpose in
life, doesn’t contemplate suicide—au contraire, we must imagine him
to be a happy person (Camus 1955). This is because self-conscious-
ness doesn’t just present us with the vacuity of our own earthly lives;
it also allows us to give our lives purpose and meaning. Nonetheless,
without self-consciousness the fundamental question of the meaning
of life would never have been contemplated.
But what is self-consciousness? What’s special about it? How do
we distinguish thinking about oneself from other kinds of thinking?
These questions form the cornerstones of this book. It’s an attempt to
understand what’s special about our ability to think about ourselves
and explain what distinguishes it from thinking about other things in
the world. I want to know what’s involved in our ability to think about
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ourselves and how we can best explain the peculiarities of these special
kinds of thought.
Let’s approach these delicate questions by first distinguishing dif-
ferent varieties of thinking about oneself. That’s important because we
sometimes aren’t remotely aware of the fact that we’re thinking about
ourselves. Think of the first woman in space: Valentina Tereshkova.
Imagine she’s reading the newspaper headline: ‘First woman in space
just turned 80’. As a consequence, she thinks to herself: the first wo-
man in space just turned 80. Now imagine further that she isn’t at the
height of her cognitive abilities early in the morning and doesn’t re-
member that she herself was the first woman in space. So, in one sense,
she’s thinking about herself. After all, the person she’s thinking about
is Valentina Tereshkova—herself. But in another sense she isn’t really
thinking about herself because she doesn’t realise that she herself is the
first woman in space—she’s not aware of the fact that she’s thinking
about herself.
Or take another well-known case: you got lost in the woods and
are running in circles trying to find a way out. You come across your
own footprints in the mud. And now you mistakenly think that the
footprints were made by someone else and hence think to yourself:
Someone was here. Of course, it’s yourself you’re thereby thinking of.
After all, the mysterious ‘someone’ is you. But again, you don’t realise
this. Rather, the fact that you continue to follow the footprints shows
that you’re oblivious to the fact that you’re running in circles.
Winnie-the-Pooh provides an illustrating example of this oblivious-
ness. He and Piglet find themselves in the predicament of mistaking
their own footprints for someone else’s when they attempt to find a
woozle by following its footprints (Milne 1926). What they don’t real-
ise is that they’re following their own footprints and mistakingly be-
lieve they belong to a woozle. So, when they think about the inexistent
woozle—e.g. when Winnie-the-Pooh tells Piglet ‘The woozle went
around that tree’—they’re really thinking about themselves without
realising it. It’s Winnie-the-Pooh who went around that tree.
On the basis of these examples we can introduce an important dis-
tinction between three different varieties of thinking about oneself.
The first kind is onewhich doesn’t imply that the object of your thought
is in fact yourself—it’s a mere stroke of luck. When you think Someone
was here, it theoretically could’ve been anyone. Maybe in a different
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possible world the footprints were in fact produced by a woozle. This
kind of thinking can be characterised as thinking about something or
other having certain properties. And as luck would have it, it happens
to be yourself who instantiates the relevant properties. In the same
sense Valentina Tereshkova’s instance of thinking The first woman in
space just turned 80 is of that type because someone other than her
could’ve been the first woman in space. Maybe there’s a possible world
where you’re the first woman in space and so in that world she would’ve
been thinking about you. This kind of thinking is usually called de
dicto thinking about oneself. You’re thinking about something or other
which happens to be you without necessarily realising that it’s you
you’re thinking of.
What’s important for this kind of thinking is that the way you’re
thinking about yourself is via some description or other.WhenValenti-
na Tereshkova thinks of herself as ‘the first woman in space’ she’s us-
ing a description that could potentially be satisfied by any object and
which only happens to be satisfied uniquely by her in our possible
world. And—other things being equal—whether she’s thinking about
herself in thinking The first woman in space just turned 80 or someone
else doesn’t change the nature of her thinking. In any of these cases
she’s identifying the thing she’s thinking about by the description ‘the
first woman in space’ which can pick out a number of things.
However, sometimes you think about yourself in a more direct and
specific waywithout at the same time realising that it’s you you’re think-
ing of. The case of the amnesiac illustrates this in a formidable way.
Imagine Alpha, an amnesiac, standing in front of a mirror, seeing her
reflection and thinking at first to herselfThatwoman is tall. She doesn’t
realise that she’s standing in front of a mirror and thus doesn’t realise
that she’s thinking about herself. For the moment, we have a classical
case of de dicto thinking about oneself. Now Alpha isn’t your usual
amnesiac. She’s very capable of recognising faces and people and put-
ting the right names to the right faces. So, after a moment, she realises
that the woman in themirror is Alpha—an old acquaintance she some-
how remembers—but she doesn’t recognise herself. Subsequently, her
thought changes and she now thinks Alpha is tall.
This new kind of thinking is different from de dicto thinking because
she now doesn’t think about something or other which satisfies some
description. She’s now thinking about something very specific: a par-
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ticular thing which couldn’t be something else. Alpha is Alpha in all
possible worlds, whereas the woman in the mirror could be someone
else in a different scenario. This second kind of thinking is usually
called de re thinking about oneself. In these cases we’re thinking of a
specific particular thing—a res—and not just something that satisfies
a certain description—a dictum. However, as the case of our amnesiac
Alpha shows, thinking de re about oneself still doesn’t imply that the
thinking subject realises that it’s her she’s thinking of.
So, we finally come to the third variety, which got Narcissus into
trouble and many philosophers alike. This variety of thinking about
oneself carries an intimate connection to the entertaining subject and
above all entails someminute grasp of who’s the thought’s dramatis per-
sona: yourself. Valentina Tereshkova doesn’t suffer from amnesia and
she knows that she herself just turned 80. In other words, she thinks
something along the lines of I just turned 80. And in virtue of thinking
about herself in that way she’s aware of the object of her thought. She
grasps that it’s herself she’s thinking of.
In the same way you’re aware of who’s doing the reading while you’re
reading this book: it’s yourself. And when you’re cooking you can be
aware of who’s doing the cooking: it’s yourself. This third variety of
thinking about oneself is usually called de se thinking and interests us
the most. You’re no longer merely thinking about an object that fits
a certain description—as in the case of mere de dicto thinking. And
you’re no longer just thinking about a specific particular thing without
necessarily realising that the thing is you—as in the case of mere de
re thinking. You’re now thinking explicitly about yourself: Congratu-
lations!
It’s important to note, however, that de se thinking is only typic-
ally a conscious activity. Self-consciousness is just the most apparent
and—for us—easily graspable form of de se thinking. However, there
are many cases where you’re thinking about yourself in the de se way
without being aware of that fact. For instance, seeing the tennis ball
approach you, you’re thinking about the tennis ball in relation to you.
Let’s say that you’re trying to hit a forehand winner. This requires you
to position yourself in a specific way relative to the ball. So, while
you’re consciously focused on the ball quickly flying your way you’re
at the same time thinking about the movement of your feet, your arm,
your eyeballs, your knees. All this is necessary for a successful winner
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but none of it needs to be conscious. In these cases you’re thinking de
se without these thoughts becoming conscious. Similarly, saying that
de se thinking comes with a certain grasp or awareness of who you’re
thinking of merely means to convey that you can’t think about some-
thing else in that particular way.
We’ve now marked out the topic of this book on the basis of a first
conceptual distinction between three different varieties of thinking
about oneself. What we’re interested in is de se thinking—but that’s
not enough. We want to know what’s special about this kind of think-
ing and we’ve already witnessed in passing some of the features of our
ability to think about ourselves. I’ll now discuss these peculiarities of
de se thinking in a bit more detail (A.1.1).
1.1 thinking about yourself
One of the more basic features of de se thoughts is that they’re always
about the subject that’s thinking the thought. Take an example: In
one sense, Valentina Tereshkova thinks about herself in the same way
when she believes I just turned 80 as she’s thinking about Steffi Graf in
believing Steffi Graf won 22 Grand Slam singles titles. What do I mean
by ‘the same way’ here? Well, the question ‘Who are you thinking
about?’ would be answered with ‘Myself, Valentina Tereshkova’ in the
former case and with ‘SteffiGraf, the tennis player’ in the latter. What
a thought is about is oftentimes called the ‘intentional object’ of the
thought. And in the case of de se states, the intentional object is always
the thinking subject (A.1.2).
With respect to the intentional object, de se thinking is different
from de dicto thinking because the latter isn’t always about the think-
ing subject. Of course, when Valentina Tereshkova believes The first
woman in space just turned 80, she’s also thinking about herself. And
hence, she’s the intentional object of that instance of thinking. How-
ever, not all instances of de dicto thinking are like this. Someone else
might have been the first woman in space and then the intentional ob-
ject of Valentina Tereshkova’s de dicto belief would’ve been that other
woman. So, a subject can think de dicto about a variety of things and
hence, her thinking can have a wide variety of intentional objects.
Something similar applies to cases of de re thinking. We can think
de re about a whole lot of things. Sure, whenever a subject thinks de
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re about herself—as in Alpha’s belief Alpha is tall—she can’t fail to be
the intentional object of her thinking. Additionally, that’s true in all
possible worlds—in contrast to thinking de dicto about oneself. Alpha
always thinks about Alpha, i.e. herself, in virtue of believing Alpha is
tall. But Valentina Tereshkova doesn’t always think about herself in
virtue of believing The first woman in space just turned 80 because in
some other possible world you could’ve been the first woman in space.
Nonetheless, de re thinking doesn’t imply that the thinking subject is
always the intentional object because we can think about many things
in a de re way: When Alpha believes Venus is bright tonight she’s think-
ing de re about something; but it ain’t herself. She’s thinking about the
planet in the sky and so in this case Venus is the intentional object of
her belief.
We’ve seen that neither de dicto nor de re thoughts have the feature
of always being about the thinking subject. That’s unsurprising. As we
saw, we can think de re about all kinds of things: apples, Steffi Graf,
or me. And the same applies to thinking de dicto. But every subject
can only think about one thing in the de se way: herself. This makes
thinking in the de se way special: it’s always about ourselves. Hence,
the intentional object of de se thinking is always, i.e. necessarily, the
thinking subject. When you’re thinking about the position of your feet
before hitting a winner, you can’t fail to think about yourself. And
equally, when Narcissus contemplates suicide he can only think about
himself and nobody else.
A closely related second feature of de se thoughts concerns the ques-
tion: What needs to be the case for my de se thinking to be accurate?
We often want to know what needs to be the case for a belief to be
true, a desire to be fulfilled, an order to be executed. In other words,
we’re often interested in the conditions of satisfaction of our mental
states and attitudes. And in the case of de se thinking the conditions
of satisfaction always depend on the thinking subject in a specific way.
This is, of course, a rather direct consequence of the fact that the think-
ing subject’s always the intentional object of de se thinking.
To illustrate this point let’s look at the belief I am tall. We can ask:
Under which conditions is that belief true? Well, there’s no direct an-
swer because that depends on who entertains the belief. Is it Alpha, or
Beta, or Steffi Graf? If Alpha believes that she herself is tall, then the
belief is true if Alpha is tall. And if Beta believes that she herself is tall,
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then the belief is true if Beta is tall. Hence, what makes a de se belief
true depends on who’s entertaining it. But what does it mean that the
belief ’s truth-conditions ‘depend’ on who’s entertaining it?
In general we might say that the conditions of satisfaction of a men-
tal state are given by whatever proposition tells us what needs to be the
case for the belief to be true, the desire to be fulfilled, the order to be
executed. But what’s a proposition and how does it help us? Let me
give an example of the role of a proposition and explain after: When a
subject believes that Sydney is the capital of Australia she has in mind
a certain possible way the world could be. This way is characterised by
having Sydney as the capital of Australia. Now, a proposition can be
understood just as a possible way the world could be. And since it’s
possible that Sydney were the capital of Australia there’s a proposition
which ‘tells’ us that. So, we can use this proposition—an abstract en-
tity which tells us how things could be—in order to characterise the
subject’s belief.
There’s a whole bunch of theories on what propositions are exactly,
e.g. what their metaphysical, semantic, logical, and syntactic features
are. This dispute needn’t bother us for the moment. For the illustrative
purpose of this excursion it’ll be enough to take what I’ll call the Pro-
pophile’s theory of propositions as an example. According to the Pro-
pophile a proposition is a structured abstract entity that tells us how
things could be. Furthermore, it’s a bearer of a truth-value in a cer-
tain absolute sense. It can be either true or false—at least in the most
simple and accessible case of standard bivalent logic. Propositions are
true absolutely in the sense that it’s once and for all determined in
which possible worlds they’re true and in which they’re false—there’s
no middle ground.
A possible world is a world pretty much like the one we’re living in
with small or large differences. For instance, there’s a possible world
which is identical to our actual one—it includes all our laws of nature,
the planet Venus, people who believe in God, this book you’re cur-
rently reading, the Sombrero Galaxy M104, and so on—save for the
fact that I’m left-handed. And hence, there are myriads of possible
worlds. Every tiny change in how things could possibly be gives rise
to a new possible world. In some of these worlds, the laws of nature
are altered, in others there might be no laws at all. Some philosophers
think that possible worlds are merely abstract products of our ima-
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gination, useful to think about what’s possible and what’s impossible;
others think that they’re just as real as the world we’re actually living in.
Again, we don’t let ourselves get held up by these discussions. We can
use the talk about possible worlds just to talk about alternative scen-
arios how things could be or turn out. It doesn’t matter for us whether
these scenarios merely play themselves out in our heads or actually ‘out
there’. And that’s just fine.
Back to propositions: More important for our topic of de se thinking
is the following feature that Propophiles have in mind: If a proposition
is true in a specific possible world, it’s true for everyone in that world.
Pluralism and relativism about truth aside, propositions, so we’re told,
can’t be true for you and false for me (A.1.3). How does that work
exactly? Take the belief that Sydney is the capital of Australia as an
example. Here’s the proposition that interests us:
(1) <Sydney, being the capital of Australia>
As a matter of fact that proposition is false in our world. Sydney
isn’t the capital of Australia, Canberra is. And that fact doesn’t change
whether you or I believe that Sydney is the capital of Australia. How
can a state in the world make an abstract entity like a proposition true
or false? We can be happy with the metaphorical way of speaking in
which a proposition is like a picture—something made popular for a
while by the young Ludwig Wittgenstein (1922). Pictures might be
accurate or inaccurate representations of reality. And propositions be-
long to the realm of hyperrealism: the more accurate, the better. The
picture that’s painted by the proposition (1) doesn’t represent our real-
ity accurately at all. Hence, the proposition is false in our world. In a
different world (1) might’ve been true, but not in ours.
Classically, Propophiles have used propositions in order to charac-
terise and individuate mental states. If you want to know what a sub-
ject believes, you just need to knowwhat proposition she thereby holds
true.We can ask the metaphorical question: ‘What picture of reality is
she holding in her mind?’ Take as an example the case of believing that
Sydney is the capital of Australia. We can now characterise your belief
using the proposition (1) and ipso facto distinguish it from other beliefs
you could have. The belief that Sydney is the capital of Australia is dif-
ferent from the belief that Canberra is the capital of Australia because
the former is characterised by the proposition (1) while the latter is
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characterised by the distinct proposition <Canberra, being the capital
of Australia> (A.1.4).
Interestingly, propositions don’t just help us tidy up our mental lives
in telling us what subjects believe.They also tell us what needs to be the
case for the relevant belief to be true. For instance, if Alpha believes
that Sydney is the capital of Australia, we know that she therefore
holds the proposition (1) to be true. That proposition matches the pic-
ture of reality she has in mind. So, if Sydney has the property of being
the capital of Australia in our world, the proposition is true and Al-
pha’s belief likewise. However, the city with the characteristic opera
house doesn’t have the property in question. Hence, (1) is false and
any belief that’s characterised using that proposition is likewise false.
So, propositions can be used to give us the conditions of satisfaction
of our beliefs, desires, or hopes. Of course, we can also use propositions
to characterise our de se thoughts. For instance, the proposition <Al-
pha, being tall> tells us what needs to be the case for Alpha’s belief I am
tall to be true. She believes truly just in case Alpha is tall. And that’s to
say that she believes truly just in case Alpha has the property of being
tall: exactly the picture that’s painted by the relevant proposition.
What’s special about de se thinking is that we need to know who’s
thinking in order to know which proposition is relevant to determine
the conditions of satisfaction. The belief I am tall can be entertained
by many different subjects. Thus, we need a different proposition that
tells us the truth-conditions of the de se belief for each case. If Alpha
believes I am tall, the relevant proposition is <Alpha, being tall>. Her
belief is true just in case Alpha, the believer, has the property of being
tall. And likewise, if Beta believes I am tall, the relevant proposition
is a different one: <Beta, being tall>. So, her belief is true just in case
Beta, now the believer, has the property of being tall. We can gen-
eralise from these observations and describe our second characteristic
feature of de se thinking—that the conditions of satisfaction of de se
thoughts depend on who’s thinking—in the following way: A subject’s
de se thought of the form I am F, where F is any property you want, is
satisfied just in case the thinking subject instantiates the property in
question.
There’s an interesting contrast here to cases of de re and de dicto think-
ing. We saw that it doesn’t matter who’s believing that Sydney is the
capital of Australia in the Propophile’s picture: the proposition (1) al-
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ways determines what needs to be the case for the belief to be true or
false. In contrast to the de se case we don’t find any variability in the
case of belief de re and de dicto between the specific entertained belief
and the proposition that gives the conditions of satisfaction. But de se
thinking comes with such variability due to its crucial reflexivity. Ac-
cordingly, de se thinking needs a special treatment in order to get from
the thought to the relevant proposition. As we’ll see this has given a
lot of people headaches.
These are then the two first features of de se thinking which we need
to keep in the back of our minds when we answer the question: What
are de se thoughts and how can we account for them? On the one hand,
we have the seemingly trivial feature that we’re always thinking about
ourselves when we’re thinking in the de se way. This might sound like
an insignificant feature but it’s one of the driving insights in developing
a theory of de se thinking. Necessity—such as the fact that we’re neces-
sarily the intentional object of our de se thoughts—belongs to philo-
sophers’ most priced toys and is certainly worth considering. On the
other hand, we saw that the conditions of satisfaction of our thoughts
about ourselves depend in a systematic way on the thinking subject.
Whenever a subject entertains some de se thought the thinking subject
will be part of what determines the conditions of satisfaction of that
episode of thinking. That’s something which distinguishes our de se
thoughts radically from thoughts about things in the ‘outside world’,
which don’t exhibit this kind of dependance. We can see that the two
features are closely related: It’s because of the fact that the thinking
subject is the intentional object of de se attitudes that the conditions of
satisfaction depend on who’s thinking the thought in question.
1.2 a vaccination for thoughts
The next feature I’ll illuminate concerns the problem that the inten-
tional object of our thought sometimes doesn’t conform to the actual
object which brought the mental state about. We assume that we’re
thinking about something but we actually misidentified that thing and
are instead thinking about something else. Interestingly, de se thinking
sometimes enjoys a special kind of immunity to this identificational er-
ror in thinking.What’s that supposed to mean?When a subject thinks
about a specific thing—for instance the tree in her garden—she can
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go wrong with regard to what brought that mental state about. There
might be no tree, or what she takes to be a tree is in fact a vividly
hallucinated friend. In such a case we can say that the intentional ob-
ject of her thought is the tree in her garden that she’s having a visual
experience of. After all, that’s what her thought ‘intends’ to be about.
However, she can’t base her belief on the tree’s existence because
there’s no such tree. What actually made the subject think that there’s
a tree in the garden is the presence of her friend—the source of her
perceptual experience. It’s just that through the use of hallucinogenic
drugs her friend appears to the subject in the disguise of a tree. Despite
the fact that the subject’s belief is about the tree in the garden with its
beautiful red apples, there isn’t such a tree out there. She misidentified
the object of her belief as a tree instead of a friend. What she’s intend-
ing to think about just isn’t there. In such a case we could say that no
thing in the world conforms to the intentional object of her thinking.
Her thought isn’t actually about the thing it was meant to be about.
This kind of error creeps up on many of our intentional states. We’re
often wrong about what we thought we identified in thinking.The sub-
ject in our example seemed to see a tree in the garden but she misiden-
tified what her thought was about. The thought was brought about by
her friend and not by the tree in question. Another standard case is the
following: Beta might see herself in the mirror and think that she’s tall
while in fact the reflection is of her twin sister Gamma via a complex
system of mirrors. While she’s the intentional object of her thinking
Beta’s belief is based on the presence of her twin sister Gamma because
she’s the origin of her perceptual experience; after all, it’s a reflection
of Gamma. These examples show that we’re generally susceptible to
misidentifying the object of our thoughts. Sometimes our aim isn’t
as good as we wish—a fact that powers many skeptical scenarios and
challenges.
Wittgenstein is among the first in the 20th century to have made
some more or less systematic study of this identificational error in
thinking. In his The Blue and Brown Books (1958), he describes that
our de se thoughts are peculiar with respect to the possibility of misid-
entifying the intentional object. He contends that such an error isn’t
possible in some cases of thinking about ourselves:
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There are two different cases in the use of the word ‘I’ (or
‘my’) which I might call ‘the use as object’ and ‘the use
as subject’. Examples of the first kind of use are these:
‘My arm is broken’, ‘I have grown six inches’, ‘I have a
bump on my forehead’, ‘The wind blows my hair about’.
Examples of the second kind are: ‘I see so-and-so’, ‘I hear
so-and-so’, ‘I try to lift my arm’, ‘I think it will rain’, ‘I
have toothache’. One can point to the difference between
these two categories by saying: The cases of the first cat-
egory involve the recognition of a particular person, and
there is in these cases the possibility of an error, or as I
should rather put it: The possibility of an error has been
provided for. … On the other hand, there is no question
of recognizing a person when I say I have toothache. To
ask ‘are you sure that it’s you who have pains?’ would be
nonsensical. Now, when in this case no error is possible,
it is because the move which wemight be inclined to think
of as an error, a ‘bad move’, is no move of the game at all.
Wittgenstein 1958: 66–67
The linguistic feature that Wittgenstein describes in this passage
also has a home in the mental realm. We already encountered the two
different uses in a different disguise when we distinguished between
thinking de dicto and thinking de se. In the former case the thinking
subject identifies her intentional object via some description that’s sup-
posedly satisfied. And then, the subject ascribes some property to that
thing. In the case of Valentina Tereshkova she’s identifying her inten-
tional object via the description ‘the first woman in space’ and sub-
sequently ascribes to that identified woman the property of just having
turned 80. However, in the de se case the subject doesn’t need to do
anything like that. Her thought can in a way be directly about herself
without any intermediate ‘picking-out’ to be done. She just ascribes
the property to herself without first needing to identify her intentional
object in some way or other.
However, the scope of the distinction thatWittgenstein has inmind
isn’t about the difference between de dicto and de se thinking. It’s much
narrower andmore specific.We can distinguish the way the intentional
object is identified even within different kinds of de se attitudes. If we
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take the examples from the quoted passage as a guide to understand-
ing the point that Wittgenstein was intending to make—something
which is best left to Wittgenstein experts, a set which I’m not a mem-
ber of—it certainly looks like the former kind are about aspects of the
subject that are accessible to anybody, such as her bodily properties.
Whether my arm’s broken can be determined by a doctor just as well
as me—or even better. Whether I’ve grown six inches is normally de-
termined by someone other than me using a ruler—though I could
do it too. It seems that the ‘uses as object’ apply to properties of sub-
jects which aren’t necessarily first-personal but can be ascribed from
the third person just as well—for instance our bodily properties.
What other properties of subjects are there which are more readily
characterised as first-personal? Classically, mental properties such as
our experiences, our beliefs, or our tryings are thought to be intrins-
ically first-personal. It seems that my trying to lift my arm isn’t some-
thing that can be determined by others—not even using an fmri scan-
ner. Equally, my experiencing a toothache seems to be only accessible
to me. How could anybody but me myself know what I’m currently
experiencing? It seems that we’re now confronted with properties of
subjects which are typically first-personal (A.1.5). If we prescind from
science fiction scenarios for the moment, we can say that we’re typic-
ally in a position to know who we’re thinking about when thinking
I’m in pain. As Wittgenstein observes, there’s a distinctive oddness in
asking whether the subject is sure that it’s herself who’s in pain in such
cases. Who else would she be thinking about?
We could take this as a hint that our method of knowing who we’re
thinking about in such cases is in a way direct. In other words, we don’t
need to first ‘pick out’ an object in the world before we can ascribe
toothache to that object. We just ascribe that property to ourselves
directly; no big deal. But this doesn’t answer the question why the
specific identificational error—namely, misidentifying the object that
brought about our thought—isn’t possible in the case of ascribing pain
to oneself in the de se way.
One, possibly better, answer is: being in pain is a kind of first-per-
sonal mental state that’s usually grasped through introspection, our
ability to think about our ownmental going-ons. And in introspection
the question ofwhowe’re thinking about doesn’t arise since it’s not sub-
ject to any kind of doubt—something we’ve learned from Descartes’s
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famous Cogito argument in Meditation II of his Meditations on First
Philosophy. In this most famous piece of philosophy Descartes argues
that some of our thoughts which are about ourselves imply the know-
ledge of the existence of the thinking subject:
But I convinced myself that there was nothing at all in
the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Did
I therefore not also convince myself that I did not exist
either? No: certainly I did exist, if I convinced myself of
something. But there is some deceiver or other, supremely
powerful and cunning, who is deliberately deceivingme all
the time. Beyond doubt then, I also exist, if he is deceiving
me; and he can deceive me all he likes, but he will never
bring it about that I should be nothing as long as I think I
am something. So that, having weighed all these consider-
ations sufficiently and more than sufficiently, I can finally
decide that this proposition, ‘I am, I exist’, whenever it
is uttered by me, or conceived in the mind, is necessarily
true.
Descartes 2008: 18
From the fact that I am introspectively aware of my own thinking,
doubting, wondering, it follows that there’s someone who exists. After
all, without someone who’s doing all that thinking there wouldn’t be
any thinking going on at all. This piece of knowledge is beyond any
doubt and can thus be taken as a secure epistemic foundation on which
to build. Now, the nature of introspection is such that it necessarily
informs us about our own mental states. It simply isn’t possible to be
introspectively aware of some mental state without thereby actually
being in that mental state.
Even if we’re telepathically engaged in some form of proper mind
reading, we would still thereby go through the same mental states as
the person we’re telepathically hooked up to. We would feel what the
other person feels, we would think what the other person thinks. So,
your introspective awareness of doubting going on in theCogito doesn’t
just imply the existence of someone but of you yourself. Hence, the
Cogito can be used to reach an important conclusion: In introspection,
there’s no room for doubt concerning the intentional object of the sub-
ject’s de se thought (A.1.6).
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How does this relate to what was said earlier? The subject using the
Cartesianmethod of doubt is employingWittgenstein’s ‘use as subject’.
And since there isn’t any room for doubt concerning the intentional ob-
ject, the corresponding introspective belief isn’t subject to the identific-
ational failure that we found in other kinds of thought. Hence, the cor-
responding thoughts are prevented from any possible misidentification
of the intentional object. Introspection doesn’t involve identification
because it’s not supposed to inform us about anything but ourselves.
Accordingly, we might argue that the use as subject in introspective
thinking ensures that we’re thinking about ourselves. Thinking about
someone else in introspection is ‘no move of the game at all’—such an
activity wouldn’t properly be labelled ‘introspection’. Therefore, these
mental states can’t fail to be about us: they’re immune to error through
misidentification.
This peculiar term has been coined by Sydney Shoemaker in his
seminal paper ‘Self-Reference and Self-Awareness’ (1968). To reach
a characterisation of the term Shoemaker takes Wittgenstein’s catalog
of examples very much at face value. He argues that the distinction
between the ‘use as subject’ and the ‘use as object’ of the first-person
pronoun is essentially made in terms of what kind of properties we
want to ascribe to ourselves. If they’re the kind which are normally
grasped through introspection, then the resulting thought is a candid-
ate for immunity to error through misidentification because there’s ‘no
question of recognising a person’—as Wittgenstein would put it—in
introspection. Introspection is always about ourselves. And this is why
the subject can’t wonder who’s having a toothache when she thinks I
have a toothache.
Unfortunately, this simple picking and choosing from properties
doesn’t work. We can’t just distinguish between ‘introspective’ prop-
erties and others and claim that self-ascribing the former results in
thoughts that exhibit immunity because it’s impossible to introspect-
ively think about someone else. Here’s why: Sometimes a subject self-
ascribes an introspective property on a strange epistemic basis. For in-
stance, I see that the person in the mirror is writhing in pain and con-
clude that therefore I’m in pain—but strangely without feeling it. This
is because I sensibly believe that it’s my mirror image. Unbeknownst
to me, this belief is false: the image is of my evil twin. In such a case
I’m therefore misidentifying the subject in believing that I’m in pain.
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The basis of my belief is the reflection of my twin which I mistakenly
take to be of me. And thus, one and the same property leads to a belief
with immunity in one case and a belief without immunity in another.
It’s true that we usually grasp and self-ascribe introspective proper-
ties like being in pain, seeing something, or trying to move a body part
through introspection. And in such cases there’s in fact ‘no question of
recognising a person’ because the nature of introspection is such that it
necessarily informs us about states of the thinking subject. But we can
ascribe introspective properties in all kinds of contexts; some of which
don’t have the peculiar nature of introspection. So, Alpha can ascribe
the property of seeing something on a nonintrospective basis too—for
instance when she believes that her friend can’t see the beautiful bird.
And in such cases there’s a question of who the subject’s thinking about
and thus there’s the possibility of misidentification. Therefore, so the
objection concludes, the fact that the property is of an introspective
kind can’t play the demarcating role between thoughts that exhibit
immunity and thoughts that don’t.
So, we have to rethink our model. We want to know which feature
makes some of our thoughts immune to error through misidentifica-
tion and some not.We saw that Shoemaker interpretedWittgenstein’s
distinction between the ‘use as subject’ and ‘use as object’ in a way
which distinguishes between mental properties on the one hand and
bodily or physical properties on the other. His idea was: when a subject
self-ascribes mental properties, we’re left with a de se thought that ex-
hibits immunity. But, as our arguments showed, the simple distinction
between two types of properties that we can self-ascribe doesn’t suffice.
Subjects can ascribe mental properties to themselves in different con-
texts on distinct and potentially unreliable epistemic bases. And only
in some of these cases do we have a candidate for immunity.
Amore reasonable way to understand the phenomenon of immunity
is to make a small amendment to the original suggestion: Any specific
thought—independently of whether it’s de se or not—is immune to er-
ror through misidentification if it’s formed on the right epistemic basis
that doesn’t allow for misidentification. But what could this right epi-
stemic basis amount to? Let’s take as an illustrative example Beta’s
belief that she’s in pain:
(2) I’m in pain
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On first sight it seems that Beta can’t fail to think about herself in
believing (2). We saw that the thinking subject is always the inten-
tional object of her de se thoughts. However, this doesn’t imply that
we’re in fact always also basing these de se intentional states on a basis
that necessarily or actually concerns us. Sometimes we’re just plainly
mistaken about who we’re actually thinking about—even in the cases
where we’re consciously thinking about ourselves. In the case of de
dicto thinking we’ve already encountered the possibility of misidenti-
fication. What Beta takes to be the tree in her garden might as well be
her friend. In that case the intentional object of her thought doesn’t
correspond to the thing which Beta takes as the basis of her thought.
So, we can be wrong about what we’re actually thinking about. But
how’s that possible in de se thinking? Isn’t that always about us?
Let’s contrast two scenarios in which Beta could come to believe
(2). In the first scenario, she forms the belief on the basis of her own
proprioception and nociception. Because she feels the burning pain in
her calves from running earlier she subsequently believes (2). In a case
where everything works as it normally does, she receives propriocept-
ive and nociceptive information from her own limbs in the regular way.
And forming the belief I’m in pain on that specific epistemic basis is
a way that ensures that the subject can’t misidentify who she’s think-
ing about. There’s no wedge that could be driven into the epistemic
process underlying the formation of (2) on the basis of a subject’s first-
personal experience of pain. Hence, there’s no possibility of misidenti-
fying the subject of pain if the relevant belief is formed on that appro-
priate basis. Our proprioception normally informs us about our own
states. So, pace science fiction scenarios, attitudes based on this form of
perception necessarily concern us. And ergo, the belief (2) is immune
to error through misidentification in this scenario.
Now, let’s look at a second possible scenario in which Beta can come
to believe (2). Here we have to make use of some science fiction but
that only makes it that much more interesting. In this scenario, Beta
has been using strong pain killers which effectively remove all feeling
of pain, were there any to appear. Now, Beta is examined by a doc-
tor using some elaborate machine that detects painful injuries. She
informs Beta on the basis of these scans that her calves are heavily
inflamed—a usually very painful injury. Beta then reacts to this piece
of information by saying something like ‘Oh my, that means that I’m
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in pain’. And this again is a good indicator that she now believes (2).
However, unbeknownst to either of them, the doctor made a mistake
and inspected the scan of someone else—Gamma. So, Beta forms the
belief (2) on a different epistemic basis than in the earlier scenario.
Proprioception and nociception, which in the regular case give rise to
beliefs that exhibit immunity, didn’t play a role this time. Instead, Beta
forms her belief on the basis of the doctor’s third-personal testimony.
Does this lead to the possibility of misidentification in her belief
(2)? Yes. The fact that it’s possible for the doctor to misidentify the
origin of the scans opens the possibility for misidentification for any
thought that’s based on her testimony. The epistemic ‘impurity’ seeps
through. It’s in virtue of the doctor’s de re belief Beta is in pain being
subject to identificational error together with the fact that Beta’s de se
belief is based on the doctor’s belief that Beta’s de se belief is now also
error-prone. We can reconstruct Beta’s reasoning process in the first
scenario in the following way. She has a certain first-personal painful
experience.These experiences are such that they usually give rise to cor-
responding attitudes which are immune to error through misidentific-
ation because the things we feel are normally about us. Subsequently,
Beta forms the de se belief (2) on the basis of this first-personal ex-
perience. Hence, her reasoning is secured against error through misid-
entification; we normally can’t experience someone else’s feelings. In
contrast, Beta’s reasoning in the second scenario begins with the belief
that the doctor’s information is about herself—and that belief isn’t im-
mune to misidentification. The information could be about someone
else. So, even if the belief (2) is classically formed on a secure basis, it’s
not necessary that it’s formed on such a basis—there are deviant cases
where we can go wrong. What’s the upshot of this argument?
Immunity to error through misidentification doesn’t have its source
in the nature of the ascribed property but in the nature of the epistemic
basis on which the relevant de se belief is formed. This implies that
not all de se beliefs exhibit immunity. Beta’s belief (2) in the second
scenario is still de se, she’s believing something about herself in the de
seway.However, due to the unreliable nature of the epistemic basis, the
question ‘Are you certain that it’s you that’s in pain?’ isn’t nonsensical
anymore—it’s now a legitimate move of the game.
We owe this crucial insight to Gareth Evans (1982). His precise
position is extremely complex and somewhat cumbersome. Hence, I
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won’t elaborate it here in detail. However, we’ll make use of Evans’s
notion of identification-freedom in order to explain why some of our
thoughts are subject to misidentification and some aren’t. Evans’s idea
is that all thoughts which are identification-free are ipso facto immune
to error through misidentification. The obvious question is: In which
cases is a subject’s thought identification-free? To answer this question
we can start by looking at our ability to think about things in general.
Here, we find clear cases of identification that can be contrasted. In
the most simple case a subject picks out an object in the world and
ascribes a property to it. For instance, in believing Sydney is the capital
of Australia Alpha picks out a famous city and ascribes to that thing
the property of being the capital of Australia.
But we have to be careful here. This way of describing the case
doesn’t imply that the subject literally does two things in believing. It’s
rather that we can analyse this belief by distinguishing two elements
that are present in the thought. First, there’s an ascription element of
the form x is F which ascribes a specific property to a thing. Secondly,
there’s an identification element such as Sydney is the xwhich identifies
the thing the subject’s thinking about. Most of our thoughts comprise
these two elements. For instance, when Valentina Tereshkova believes
that the first woman in space just turned 80 she identifies a thing in
the world (the first woman in space is the x) and then ascribes the prop-
erty of just having turned 80 to that thing (x just turned 80). Similarly,
in believing that the shop is open we identify the shop we’re thinking
about—it’s the one at the corner—and ascribe to that specific identi-
fied thing the property of being open. Hence, whether we believe in
the de re or de dicto way, as soon as the subject has to identify the thing
she’s ascribing a property to in thinking we have a case of an attitude
that involves an identification element.
Now, let’s look at thoughts which are immune to error through
misidentification against this background. One rather obvious way of
accounting for this feature is by using their supposed identification-
freedom as an explanation for immunity: They don’t involve an iden-
tification element and hence the intentional object can’t be misiden-
tified. The property is simply ascribed to the appropriate thing. So,
when Beta believes (2) on the basis of her proprioception she simply
ascribes pain to herself—the appropriate intentional object of beliefs
of that kind. Whenever the question ‘Who’s this thought about?’ is
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superfluous we’re confronted with a thought that’s identification-free.
Of course, this opens up a whole new can of worms. How is it possible
that some thoughts are identification-free and others aren’t? How is it
possible that one and the same thought—such as our belief (2)—can
be identification-free in one case and not in others? A theory of de se
thought is supposed to give answers to these questions and I’ll provide
them in this book.
The idea that identification-freedom, and not some special class of
properties, is responsible for a thought’s immunity has an interesting
consequence: we’re capable of self-ascribing all kinds of properties and
the resulting thoughts might be immune to error through misidenti-
fication. As long as the de se thought is identification-free we’re on the
safe side. This is in stark contrast to Shoemaker’s account. He focused
his explanation of immunity on a specific kind of property which we
ascribe—introspective ones—whereas Evans’s account is not restric-
ted in this way; here the epistemic basis is what’s relevant. We can self-
ascribe mental properties just as well as bodily properties. Beta can
believe I’m thirsty just as well as I’ve got ink on my chin. And as long
as the thought was formed on the right epistemic basis it can be im-
mune to error through misidentification. What would be an example
of such an immune belief which consists of the self-ascription of a
bodily property? Here’s an example:
(3) My legs are crossed.
Using Evans’s account, we can easily explain why (3) might exhibit
immunity. On the one hand, Beta might see her reflection in the
mirror. She sees that the person in the mirror has crossed legs. She
then identifies herself with that person and ascribes to herself—via
this identification—the property of having crossed legs. So, her be-
lief involves an ascription element as well as an identification element.
Accordingly, this way of forming the belief—via a visual experience
of one’s own body and the identification of that body as one’s own—
doesn’t give rise to immunity. It involves an identification which can be
erroneous because the source of the visual experience could be someone
else. Another example where a de se belief fails to exhibit immunity is
when a subject believes (3) on the basis of seeing a picture of herself.
Again, the belief is based on the fallible recognition of herself in the
picture. And thus, it isn’t immune to error through misidentification.
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On the other hand, if Beta thinks (3) on the basis of her proprio-
ceptive feeling she needn’t identify a thing in the world as herself be-
fore she can ascribe the property to herself. In the contrasting mir-
ror case, Beta’s belief relies on her holding something like the belief
Thatwoman is me. Her belief (3) thus depends on some identificational
premise. And this epistemic dependence—her justification for believ-
ing (3) is dependent on the mentioned identificational belief—results
in the possibility of misidentification in her believing (3). However,
such a dependence is absent from the case where Beta forms the belief
(3) on the regular basis of her proprioceptive feeling. She feels that
her legs are crossed and directly self-ascribes the property of having
crossed legs. In this case, her belief doesn’t get its justification from
some identificational premise that could go wrong. When we hold
beliefs on the basis of proprioception we don’t need to identify the in-
tentional object of our mental attitude: no identification is involved
and thus the belief is immune to error through misidentification.
This shows that de se thoughts involving introspective properties like
being in pain or seeing something don’t have a monopoly on immunity.
Other properties are on the market too. Furthermore, it shows that
one and the same thought can be formed on different epistemic bases.
And depending on the nature of that basis the resulting thought can
be properly ‘vaccinated’ or not. Evans’s idea of identification-freedom
neatly explains how this difference arises. Immunity occurs in all those
cases in which a belief or judgement doesn’t involve an identification—
neither as an explicit element nor as part of the epistemic warrant.
1.3 know thyself
Now that we’ve discussed this first epistemic feature of de se thoughts
we can dedicate ourselves to the historically most important epistemo-
logical aspect of our thoughts about ourselves.We’re now talking about
the profound aspect of de se thinking that’s referred to in the inscrip-
tion on the Temple of Apollo at Delphi: know thyself. Self-knowledge
is oftentimes thought to be special because it’s more secure and reliable
than regular knowledge. It originates from different sources and pro-
ceeds along distinct epistemic ‘paths’ compared to our acquisition of
knowledge about the external world. It’s not surprising thatDescartes’s
rock bottom piece of knowledge results from self-knowledge: the in-
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dubitableness of I think, I am. But what’s special about self-knowledge
so that it’s provided these extraordinary epistemic qualities?
Let’s look at one classical instance of self-knowledge that’s referred
to in Plato’s ‘Apology’. In that dialogue Socrates hears of the Delphic
oracle claiming that no one in Athens was wiser than Socrates himself.
This puzzles Socrates since he didn’t believe himself to know many
things about the external world:
Finally I went to the craftsmen, for I was conscious of
knowing practically nothing, and I knew that I would find
that they had knowledge of many fine things. In this I was
not mistaken; they knew things I did not know, and to
that extent they were wiser than I. But, men of Athens,
the good craftsmen seemed to me to have the same fault
as the poets: each of them, because of his success at his
craft, thought himself very wise in other most important
pursuits, and this error of theirs overshadowed the wisdom
they had, so that I asked myself, on behalf of the oracle,
whether I should prefer to be as I am, with neither their
wisdom nor their ignorance, or to have both.The answer I
gave myself and the oracle was that it was to my advantage
to be as I am.
Plato 1997: 22, 22d–e
Socrates’s knowledge amounts to knowing something that’s distinct
from knowledge of the external world and its workings. It’s knowledge
of the fact that he himself didn’t know many things—least of all all
things. It’s the archetype of realising the limits of one’s own knowledge.
He didn’t know how to build a ship or write a beautiful poem, but he
knew about his ignorance in this respect. In contrast, the craftspeople
thought that their expertise was boundless and that they knew all there
was to know. But, Socrates wouldn’t have been able to attain this in-
sight without the capacity to think about himself while grasping that
he’s doing so. So, Socrates’s knowledge is crucially based on his ability
to have de se thoughts.
We can now see how the dependence of self-knowledge on our abil-
ity to think about ourselves is crucial for our investigation of de se think-
ing. All items of self-knowledge are instances of de se thinking because
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they appear in the first-person form.Hence, without de se thinking you
wouldn’t be capable of gaining self-knowledge because you wouldn’t
realise that whoever you’re thinking about is actually you.When think-
ing about how de se thinking works we therefore need to make room
for the possibility that some of these instances of thinking amount
to self-knowledge with all its distinctive features. The idea being that
the transcendence of self-knowledge originates in our unique ability
to think in the de se way.
So let’s look at the nature of self-knowledge and what elevates it
above other kinds of knowledge. First and foremost, what applies to
all things in life must also apply to knowledge: you win some, you
lose some. Possible items of self-knowledge share this characteristic
with other possible items of knowledge. So, when we’re interested in
the question of self-knowledge that means that we sometimes get it
wrong when we self-ascribe a property. Supposed self-knowledge is
not beyond doubt. For instance our legs weren’t crossed after all, so
our claim of self-knowledge on the basis of de se believing (3) is unjus-
tified. At other times, we’re getting it right: Beta is really in pain and
really wants some pain killer. Everything in her proprioceptive and
nociceptive system works as it should be and she’s not forming her de
se belief in some deviant way. Hence, she’s justified in believing (2)
and has a valid claim to self-knowledge in this case.
The goal now isn’t to give an account of self-knowledge but rather
to identify the general nature of the phenomenon and relate it to our
ability to think in the de se way. Let’s start with a very plastic sub-
type of self-knowledge. It concerns our knowledge of our own mental
states, more specifically our beliefs. It’s in these cases where we can find
some of the most characteristic features of self-knowledge. To take an
example, I believe:
(4) Roger Federer has so far won 20 Grand Slam singles titles.
Furthermore, I know that I have this specific belief—whether it’s cor-
rect or not. Now, someone might come along and ask me two differ-
ent kinds of questions: ‘Do you believe (4)?’ and ‘Why do you believe
(4)?’ The answer to the latter question might involve aspects that have
nothing in particular to do with myself. I’m giving an explanation of
why I came to believe what I believe by pointing to the public sources
of this belief. For instance, I could answer that I’ve read the relevant
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Wikipedia article, that I’ve heard this claim uttered by many people,
or even that my neurons are connected in such a way as to cause in me
the relevant belief. It’s true that the last option is less likely because
we normally don’t explain why we came to certain beliefs by pointing
to our brains. Regardless, it shares with the other answers the char-
acteristic that I don’t have any kind of special position regarding the
knowledge in question, i.e. the sources of my belief. The reasons why I
believe what I believe are public. They’re not in my head. You could go
to Wikipedia and check. Or you could follow me around and listen in
on all my conversations. The reasons why I’m in a better epistemic po-
sition are entirely contingent on the fact that it’s easier to know what
my evidence is. But you could gather all the same evidence and thus
the epistemic discrepancy could be levelled.
On the other hand, I seem to be in a special position to answer the
first question.More specifically, I’m the touchstone of whether or not I
have a specific belief—manifesting my authority relative to the item of
knowledge—and I’m in a very good epistemic ‘position’ to determine
whether I believe something or not. Gianfranco Soldati puts this point
in the following way:
[Self-knowledge] is a domain where epistemic authority of
the subject is particularly manifest. I know what I think
without having to rely on the kind of evidence you would
typically have to rely on in order to know what I think.
Soldati 2013: 169
Soldati thus identifies two characteristics of self-knowledge. With
regard to our own beliefs we’re generally epistemically authoritative and
epistemically well positioned. First, we’re usually in a situation where my
word trumps yours. If I claim to believe (4) and you deny it, my claim
normally overrides yours. I have authority over the possible items of
self-knowledge concerning me. So, the idea that we’re epistemically
authoritative reflects the oddness of being told by someone else that—
according to her analysis of my behaviour, the oxygen flow in my brain,
my dreams, or what not—I don’t really believe (4) at all. In a way this
is similar to the oddness of being told by someone else that you don’t
actually prefer tomatoes over eggplants despite feeling that way.
What’s the source of this oddness? Usually our first-person perspect-
ive informs us pretty well about what we believe, prefer, or desire. And
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this results in my astonishment were you to tell me that I don’t actu-
ally believe (4) despite the fact that introspection tells me the opposite.
How would you know better than me what I believe or not? Imagine
you ask me how many titles Roger Federer has won. I’ll answer ‘20
and he might even win a 21st title before retiring’. If you were then to
tell me ‘Yes, I’m aware of the fact that it seems to you that you believe
(4). But listen, you’re actually wrong about that. You don’t really be-
lieve that!’ I would strongly believe that you’re messing with me and
not really questioning that I believe (4).We’re better at telling what we
believe than some neuroscientist’s fmri scanner.This is what we mean
by being authoritative regarding knowledge of our own mental states.
Not only am I in a good epistemic position to know what I believe but
‘my word is truth’.
Secondly, I usually come to knowledge about my beliefs on a dif-
ferent epistemic ‘path’ than someone else who wants to know what I
believe. If you want to find out about my beliefs, you’ve got several op-
tions: you could ask me directly, you could observe what I do and try
to infer what I believe from it, or you could put me in an fmri scan-
ner and do some complex, and so far unreliable, procedure in order to
‘read off ’ what I think from the provided data. In all these cases, you
have to arrive at knowledge about my mental states in some indirect
way. I, however, don’t have to do anything of that kind. Of course, I
could do these things as well—and with some of my mental states it
might even seem necessary to see a psychoanalyst—but it usually isn’t
necessary. I have a more direct and immediate access to what I believe
or not: I don’t have to ask, observe, infer, or ‘read off ’. I just know.
There are different ways to spell out what this direct knowledge
amounts to and where it originates. One option is that the relation
we’re in to ourselves is of a direct and ontologically primitive nature.
The idea is that every subject is immediately acquainted with herself
and thus epistemically privileged regarding herself. There’s no better
epistemic point of view on a subject than actually being it. A second
option is that introspection—the capacity to be acquainted with one’s
own mental states—offers us a qualitatively exquisite insight into our
own minds. Consequently, we would be in a special position with
regard to self-knowledge because introspection acquaints us directly
with the states in question whereas others have to rely on their indir-
ect perception of us in order to gain knowledge of our minds.
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According to both options there’s a distinct asymmetry between
knowing one’s own mind and knowing another’s mind. This asym-
metry is grounded in the fact that we have direct knowledge of our
own mental states and only mediated knowledge of those of others.
This reflects the proposed fact that subjects are epistemically well po-
sitioned regarding knowledge of their own mental states.
There might be an intimate connection between the fact that we
sometimes are in a good position to know our own mental states and
our authority regarding that item of knowledge. Why is that? Ima-
gine you witness a car crash. Later that day you hear a contradicting
report from someone who heard about the same car crash on the radio.
While you believe that the red car drove into the blue car, the other
person claims the opposite. In this case, it seems that you’re authorit-
ative about the details of the crash because you were in a better position
to gain knowledge about the crash than a person who relies on mere
hearsay. In the same way we can take Soldati as claiming that you’re
epistemically authoritative with regard to items of self-knowledge be-
cause you usually don’t have to rely on the kind of evidence that’s typical
of third-personal knowledge. You’re in a privileged position and this
provides you with the authority in question (A.1.7).
To be clear, not all possible items of self-knowledge have these two
features. There are many instances of de se beliefs which are utterly
mistaken. For instance, Beta might think that she’s a charitable per-
son while always failing to donate to charitable causes. But if Beta
doesn’t actually exhibit any charitable behaviour, we are justified in
denying her privileged position regarding knowledge of her own char-
acter traits. She’s a bad judge of her own character. And were Beta
to claim that she’s really a charitable person, it would be ok to agree
to disagree. Beta’s self-deception, which isn’t based on any reasonable
justification but on something else, undermines her authority with re-
gard to purported self-knowledge. Our authority isn’t global because
our capacity for self-knowledge isn’t infallible (A.1.8).
Character traits aren’t the only possible items of self-knowledge
where subjects oftentimes lack both epistemic authority and a priv-
ileged access. Other examples include our own moods and emotions.
I might think that I’m in a good mood while I’m actually constantly
shouting at people and criticising them—something rather atypical of
being in a good mood. Furthermore, we seem to be rather weak in
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figuring out the causes of our own actions. Beta might think that she
bought a new smartphone because it’s superior to the previous model
which she claims was already having some serious issues with the cam-
era, generally sluggish, and so on and so forth. But really, she just
wanted to have something new, maybe as a status symbol, or because
she enjoys new gadgets. This kind of epistemic impairment also con-
cerns assessments of how we would feel were certain things to happen
in the future. For instance, Gamma might think that having a child
will make her happier, but in fact the opposite might be true.
Looking at self-knowledge from this empirical point of view thus
exposes some very central and wide-ranging defects and shortcomings
concerning the scope and content of self-knowledge. There might be
cases where we’re both privileged and authoritative, but the exemp-
tions are aplenty. However, the original claim wasn’t that we’re always
epistemically well positioned and authoritative. Rather, the idea is that
we’re usually or characterstically in this situation. In a manner of speak-
ing, the burden of proof lies with someone who wants to deny our au-
thority and privileged access. It’s the others who have to demonstrate
that we’re a bad judge of our own character traits, emotions, or moods,
and that in these specific cases our word isn’t truth. And the discussed
shortcomings merely demonstrated that there are certain limits to our
authority and epistemic position which have to be fathomed.
There are some, however, who outrightly deny even the possibil-
ity of self-knowledge. Wittgenstein features most prominently within
this camp. However, he doesn’t raise empirical objections but rather
conceptual ones: self-knowledge isn’t knowledge at all. To support
this rather surprising claim he argues in his Philosophical Investiga-
tions (1953) that supposed knowledge of our ownmental states isn’t an
epistemic achievement and thus can’t take credit for being successful—
something characteristic of knowledge. It’s an achievement to be right
about what someone else is believing, desiring, or feeling.We employ a
certainmethod of acquiring knowledge of others’ mental states or facts
about the world in general.We observe, infer, or conclude from certain
information that things are thus and so. Similarly, it’s an achievement
to calculate the solution to a complex mathematical problem; there’s
a significant risk of being wrong. But in the case of self-knowledge,
there’s no similar epistemic method of acquisition:
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I can know what someone else is thinking, not what I am
thinking. It is correct to say ‘I knowwhat you are thinking’,
and wrong to say ‘I know what I am thinking’. (A whole
cloud of philosophy condensed into a drop of grammar.)
Wittgenstein 1953: 222e
Again, I’m not claiming expertise in Wittgenstein exegesis, but we
can take home two points from this quote and the surrounding pas-
sages. Both concern the desideratum that for something to qualify as
knowledge it needs to be an epistemic achievement. And because it
needs to be achieved it has to satisfy two conditions. First, possible
items of knowledge should be capable of being false. Where there’s no
possibility of error there’s no possibility of knowledge. Secondly, pos-
sible items of knowledge need to be susceptible to public verification—
a central theme of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. It seems necessary that
we can check whether someone’s claim to knowledge is fulfilled or not.
If there were no way for you to tell whether I really believe (4), then
it wouldn’t make sense to call my claim to know what I believe a pos-
sible item of knowledge because there wouldn’t be a way for others to
challenge my claim.
Wittgenstein’s argument against the possibility of verification of
first-personal mental states is connected to his well-known and com-
plicated Private Language Argument. In its essence it’s meant to show
that saying of something that it has a specific property entails that
there is some way for us to distinguish the cases where it has that
property from the cases where it doesn’t. In other words, when we’re
concerned with knowledge, ‘anything goes’ isn’t a viable option. And
that means that we need some kind of publicly intelligible criterion to
distinguish the have’s from that have not’s.Without some independent
standard of evaluation one’s claim to knowledge can’t be verified. The
crucial question is then: What are the independent standards—the
criteria—on the basis of which we can determine whether my claim
of knowing that I believe (4) is true or not?
As a response to this question Wittgenstein sets up a dilemma for
anyone trying to establish some extraordinary form of self-knowledge
that’s based on some privileged first-personal access. Either the criteria
on the basis of which I self-ascribe a property are of a public nature
or they are of a private kind. The latter possibility would lend support
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to the idea that there’s something special about self-knowledge which
gives rise to its purported authority, while the former possibility un-
dermines this relationship. So, our proponent of a special kind of self-
knowledge need to opt for the latter position. But the problem with
the idea of private criteria of correctness runs against our commitment
to knowledge as something that’s intersubjectively determined. My
claims for knowledge can be challenged and supported on the basis
of public information. Were my claims of self-knowledge based on
purely first-personal data, such a challenge would be pointless. How
could I determine whether my self-ascription is correct without some
independent and graspable criterion? As Wittgenstein claims: ‘One
would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And
this only means that here we can’t talk about “right”’ (Wittgenstein
1953: §258).
The upshot ofWittgenstein’s dilemma is thus the following:The cri-
teria for genuine self-knowledge—which is supposedly distinct from
and paramount to other kinds of knowledge—are either private, but
then they’re null and void, or they’re public. And if they’re public,
then there’s nothing special about self-knowledge since it’s just another
form of regular knowledge about things. It collapses together with the
undermined pillars of authority and privileged access (A.1.9).
Wittgenstein’s criticism shouldn’t discourage the project of explain-
ing self-knowledge. After all, it doesn’t explain the profound oddity of
having one’s supposed items of self-knowledge challenged. Thus, the
empirical and conceptual doubts about the distinctive nature of self-
knowledge can be acknowledged but not taken as conclusive reasons
to abandon the possibility of self-knowledge altogether.
Furthermore, there are several concrete options to respond to the
challenges we encountered. One option is to remain mute and neutral
about the possibility of self-knowledge. In effect, we can take an ag-
nostic point of view on the debate. Since it’s far from clear whether one
of the two sides clearly has the better arguments, this option simply
acknowledges the controversial nature of the topic and tries to work
its theory of de se thinking around that fact. Another option is to claim
that we can still uphold our privileged access to our mental states as the
distinctive mark of self-knowledge—while accepting that knowledge
has some public element. In effect, it rests content with the claim that
there are different kinds of knowledge—knowledge by acquaintance,
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knowledge by testimony, or also knowledge by privileged access. Self-
knowledge is just one of these special kinds of knowledge.
For the purpose of explaining the nature of de se thinking we’ll em-
ploy a combination of these two strategies. One the one hand, we only
have to account for the possibility of self-knowledge without settling
in on any substantial theory. In other words, we only need to be cap-
able of fitting into our account the possibility of self-knowledge—just
in case that it proves to be a real and distinctive thing. On the other
hand, some self-ascriptions of properties are indeed special. And this
might amount to something like self-knowledge based on privileged
access. However, should this claim prove unjustified, we can still fall
back on the first strategy.
1.4 who’s making that mess?
The last feature of de se thinking that we’ll examine is the connection it
has to our actions and behaviour. Here’s the reasoning behind this con-
ceptual link: Many of the things we do, we do for a reason—normally
something that motivates us to do something or not. But we don’t just
act for any reason, it has to be a reason for us. And taking a reason as
being a reason for us is to exert one’s capacity for de se thinking.
To take an example, if Valentina Tereshkova believes that the first
woman in space needs to buy groceries, she’s not necessarily motivated
to go shopping herself. That’s because she doesn’t need to know that
she herself is the first woman in space in virtue of her de dicto belief
and she maybe couldn’t care less what that woman needs to do. On
the other hand, if I believe that I’m in pain, I’m ceteris paribus very
motivated to do something about it. I’ll go to the medicine cabinet
and get some pain killer or try to avoid what’s causing me pain in some
way. Were I to entertain a mere de re or de dicto belief about myself, I
wouldn’t immediately be motivated to do something about it. Why’s
that so?
John Perry provides us in his ‘The Problem of the Essential Index-
ical’ (1979) with a nice thought experiment that illustrates why de se
thinking embodies the motivational power that’s needed for action.
It’s also meant to demonstrate why other beliefs lack this important
motivational power:
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I once followed a trail of sugar on a supermarket floor,
pushingmy cart down the aisle on one side of a tall counter
and back the aisle on the other, seeking the shopper with
the torn sack to tell him he was making a mess.With each
trip around the counter, the trail became thicker. But I
seemed unable to catch up. Finally it dawned on me. I
was the shopper I was trying to catch.
Perry 1979: 3
The story manifests a specific type of cognitive move: from one kind
of belief to another. First, Perry believes de dicto of some person or
other that she’s making a mess. And after a while he acquires a new
belief and now believes de se that he himself is making amess.This new
belief is of special practical and motivational importance to him. It’s
only because he finally believes de se about himself that he’s making a
mess that he’s now driven to rearrange the torn sugar sack in his basket.
At first, Perry didn’t feel motivated to clean up the mess because he
didn’t believe he himself, i.e. in the de se way, was making a mess. Only
once he entertains the relevant de se belief
(5) I’m making a mess
is he motivated to act accordingly. And if he entertains any non-de se
belief about himself without a supporting de se belief, he won’t con-
template that he’s the potential mess-maker.
Can we give some justification to this claim? As so often, mirrors
will help us to get the main point across. If he sees a reflection of
himself in the mirror making a mess without realising that it’s his own
reflection, he’s de dicto thinking about himself without believing (5).
By seeing the mess-maker in the mirror he might thinkThat person is
making a mess. And because he doesn’t recognise himself in the mirror,
he won’t do anything about the mess he’s making. And the case is
similar for any potential de re belief about himself. Believing John Perry
is making amesswouldn’t automatically move him to rearrange the torn
sack. This is because he might have forgotten his own name or how he
looks in the mirror or be subject to all kinds of weird science fiction
scenarios. As long as he doesn’t think that he himself is making a mess
by believing something along the lines of (5), he won’t stop and inspect
his basket.
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These examples lead to the idea that de se thinking is intimately con-
nected to our behaviour and motivation for action. It’s only in virtue of
entertaining a reason in the de se way that a subject feels moved to act
accordingly—and, if circumstances allow it, will act as well. The argu-
ment for this connection runs by showing that everything that motiv-
ates a subject to act contains at least one de se element. This claim isn’t
uncontested and I will now provide some justification why we should
nonetheless hold on to the idea.
We’ll use Perry’s example as an illustrative case study. The first step
of the argument is to give all the possible ways that Perry could think
that he’s making a mess. The de se belief (5) is an obvious first example,
but due to the fact that it’s our standard de se belief, it’s also the last
resort for our opponent who’s trying to show that a de se belief isn’t
necessary for action. After all, she doesn’t want de se thinking to be
involved.
What other options are there? The obvious candidates are de re and
de dicto thoughts about himself. We already saw that de re believing
John Perry is making a mess won’t motivate him to clean up the mess.
In the ultra-amnesiac case, he doesn’t care what John Perry’s doing.
He needs to identify himself with this person in order to be motivated
by what John Perry’s doing. So, only by thinking something like I’m
John Perry will the de re belief in question give him a reason to clean
up the mess. But this new thought is a classical example of a de se
belief. Hence, a mere de re belief isn’t enough to motivate a subject to
act because only in conjunction with a de se attitude does it provide a
reason for the subject to act.
What about the de dicto option? To make our case as strong as pos-
sible we can use the most detailed way of describing John Perry. The
description in question is so detailed that it only fits this specific per-
son in this specific possible world. It’s so detailed that the smallest
deviation will give rise to a new distinct description. Let’s call this
detailed description . Now, would Perry be motivated to clean up
the mess he’s making were he to believe  is making a mess? Because
the description is so specific he can’t fail to refer to and think about a
particular person, namely himself. But all that applies to any kind of
detailed description. He also can’t fail to think about a very specific
person were he to think  is making a mess and where  is the ulti-
mately detailed description that uniquely fits Roger Federer. The fact
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that he can’t fail to think about himself on the basis of the description
 is irrelevant to the question whether it’s enough to motivate him to
act. Because the messes that Roger Federer is making aren’t a concern
of his—despite the fact that he can’t fail to refer to Roger Federer us-
ing the description —what  is doing isn’t either. Furthermore, why
should this very specific thought involving the description  only mo-
tivate Perry to act and not other subjects who also think about Perry
using that description? The point is that merely knowing of an incred-
ibly detailed description of himself doesn’t yet ensure that he’s aware
of the description referring to himself. So, only in conjunction with
the de se belief I’m  will this incredibly detailed de dicto belief motiv-
ate him to do what it would motivate the referent of  to do. The case
of de dicto belief hence doesn’t help us either. As in the case of de re
thinking, we need the addition of a de se attitude to generate a reason
for a subject to act in a certain way.
This already provides some initial support to the idea that all our
actions are based on some form of de se thinking. We’ve shown that
merely entertaining a de re or de dicto state is insufficient to motivate
the subject to act accordingly. The suggestion was that the reasons
for our actions need to be reasons for us, for otherwise they wouldn’t
concern us directly and wouldn’t bring about action. The fact that we
slaughter more than 150 billion sentient animals every year is only in-
sofar a reason for me to change the way I eat if I relate this reason
in some way to me. This might be by desiring to stop supporting the
industry that causes these deaths. Such a desire, however, necessarily
comes in the de se form: I don’t want to eat animals anymore.
An example which takes place on the lower unconscious levels of
de se thinking is additionally illustrative and supportive. Consider that
I’m now sitting in my living room and feeling some thirst. This pro-
duces a de se mental state of the form I’m thirsty. I’m not necessarily
consciously entertaining this thought. It’s merely there in my mind.
Implicitly, I additionally know that in order to quench thirst one needs
to go to the kitchen to get water. But my knowledge of this instru-
mental connection doesn’t itself produce the appropriate action. After
all, it applies to anyone who’s thirsty and has water in the kitchen.
Were I not thirsty, there wouldn’t be a reason for me to go to the kit-
chen merely on the basis of knowing of this instrumental connection.
Only in conjunction with my de se mental state does my knowledge of
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the connection between thirst and the water in the kitchen provide a
reason for me to go to the kitchen.
We can now see more explicitly why explanations of actions make
reference to the subject’s de se thoughts. Both from the first and third
person, explanations are only complete if they make implicit or expli-
cit reference to some de se thought or other. If we look at Alpha’s reas-
oning ‘I ran home because it was dark’, we get an explanation of her
running home only because it gives us implicit information that Alpha
doesn’t like being in the dark. A complete first-personal explanation
would have the form ‘I ran home because it was dark and I’m afraid
of the dark’. Similarly, we only explain someone’s action completely by
incorporating a de se thought of hers. For instance, when we want to
know why Beta watered the plants it’s insufficient to say that the soil
was dry. We also have to mention that Beta believes that dry soil leads
to withering plants. And crucially, we’ve got to include Beta’s desire for
living plants which she would express by saying ‘I want living plants’.
And this, of course, is a report of some de se thought she has (A.1.10).
Being motivated to act thus requires some form of de se thinking
which ties the reasons in the world to our ownmotives. It’s not enough
to desire some state of the world in order to change it. One has to in-
tend to do something about it first. And this intention has the form
I will do '—a clear case of de se thinking. This demonstrates the in-
timate connection that our ability to think about ourselves has to the
explanation and motivation of our behaviour and intentional action.
1.5 beginning from the origin
We’ve now established five features that are important to our discus-
sion of de se thinking. First, all de se mental states are about the think-
ing subject. In other words, the thinking subject is necessarily the in-
tentional object of the thought. Secondly, the satisfaction conditions
of de se thoughts depend in a systematic way on the thinking subject.
Whenever a subject entertains some de se thought she will be part
of what determines the conditions of satisfaction of that episode of
thinking. Thirdly, some of our de se mental states are immune to er-
ror through misidentification. We can’t misidentify the intentional ob-
ject of our thoughts—i.e. ourselves—in some special episodes of de se
thinking. Fourthly, de se beliefs provide the fundament of self-know-
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ledge. Only because we’re capable of thinking about ourselves in the
de se way are we also able to achieve self-knowledge, by knowing that
this knowledge pertains to ourselves. And fifthly, our intentional ac-
tion and behaviour is intimately connected with our ability to entertain
de se thoughts. When we explain our action we make reference to de
se mental states and the reasons that motivate us are reasons we grasp
as our own by way of de se thinking.
What kind of account of de se thinking can do justice to these identi-
fied features? Luckily, contemporary philosophy has offered us a selec-
tion of interesting options to choose from, so we may not need to pull
a new one out of our hats. The goal of the thesis is to determine how
well some of these options fare in dealing with the different features
we’ve established.We’ll see that some of them are better than others at
vindicating a specific feature. But the same ones might be worse off in
dealing with other features. In this way, the discussion of our theoret-
ical options won’t aim to exclude a specific theory by principle. Rather,
I’ll identify problematic and felicitous aspects of these strategies with
respect to the features of de se thinking and determine their merit on
the basis of this analysis and their overall coherence and plausibility.
None of the employed strategies that will be discussed is free of
problems and obstacles. But some of them are less problematic or bet-
ter at dealing with the overall picture of de se thinking that has been
illustrated in this first chapter. The goal of the book is then to provide
an alternative story of how to characterise de se thinking. This new
and more encompassing strategy is supposed to account in the most
coherent way all these characteristic features of de se thinking.
But what’s the overall picture that I’m providing? A detailed account
will have to wait until chapter 4, where I’ll have the chance to develop
the theory in detail against the backdrop of our previous discussion
of competing options. But we can end this first chapter with a short
synopsis of my favoured view. This synopsis is intended as a rough
sketch against which we can compare and contrast the other theoret-
ical options. For this purpose, I’ll refrain from giving any arguments
and supporting reasons and merely state the different characteristics
outright. The arguments will follow later.
The guiding principle of the account is that subjects self-ascribe
properties when they entertain de se beliefs. For instance, when Al-
pha believes (3) she self-ascribes the property having crossed legs. But,
being in the mirror 37
as we saw, we can self-ascribe properties in different epistemic con-
texts. In some cases, a self-ascription is derivative and based on some
prior ascription. But in other cases, I’ll hold that the self-ascription is
primitive. This primitive self-ascription of properties forms the basis
of de se thinking. If Alpha experiences the feeling of having crossed
legs, she can thereby primitively self-ascribe the relevant property—
resulting in the de se belief (3). And this makes it the case that she
takes herself to have crossed legs.
In this way, the account I’m defending is based on the concept of
primitive self-ascription.This again can be characterised inmore detail
using the notions of a subject’s egocentric space and the origin thereof.
Subjects usually find themselves at the centre of their world. The tree’s
in front of us, other people behind us. We may call the way subjects
think about the world from their first-person perspective ‘thinking
about space egocentrically’. In such thinking, things are ‘to the left’
or ‘to the right’ of others. Some things are ‘in reach’ or ‘far away’. And
here we can also find connections between the thinking subject and
the acting subject. In virtue of thinking of the glass of water as ego-
centrically ‘to the left’, the subject uses her left arm in order to grab
it. Were she to mistakenly think of the glass as egocentrically ‘to the
right’, she would use her right arm and fail to find the glass.This leaves
us with the following conception of primitive self-ascription:
primitive self-ascription
When a subject primitively self-ascribes a property, she ascribes that
property to the origin of her egocentric space.
The notion of the origin of egocentric space is supposed to provide
an explanation of who the subject takes herself to be and thus explain
how subjects come to ascribe properties to themselves. We usually
know where we are and know what things belong to us and can be
moved by our intentions and our will. For instance, my hands are ex-
perienced as mine because they act according to how I want them to
move. And similarly, the feelings of touch or pain in my hands are
experienced as my pain because these hands form part of my way of
directly interacting with the world. But how should we best character-
ise the concept of the origin of thinking that constitutes us?
My suggestion is that the concept of the origin of egocentric space is
in turn illuminated and explained by the notion of the lived body—or
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Leib in German.We don’t experience ourselves at the geometric origin
of egocentric space because we don’t experience ourselves as mathemat-
ical point-like entities. Instead, we’re experiencing the world as being
around our lived body with which we can interact with the world. We
experience and manipulate the world through our lived body.
So, the phenomenological notion of the lived body is central to the
account. A subject’s origin of egocentric space can be defined via the
phenomenological notion of a lived body. On this account, there’s a
distinction between the lived body and the physical body we call our
own.The distinction is probably most plastically illustrated by looking
at a partially paralysed subject. While her legs belong to her physical
body, they aren’t part of her lived body. The subject isn’t capable of
interacting with the world through her legs because she doesn’t feel
these legs and can’t move them. The lived body is thus constituted
through the possibilities of direct interactionwith the environment. As
I’m typing these words, the movement of my fingers is the realisation
of one of the many possibilities of the lived body. The feeling of the
keys being pressed down and of the fingers scurrying over the keyboard
is an experiential feeling of the lived body.
This leads to the idea that all subjects ‘have’ a lived body. Strictly
speaking, we can’t speak of a subject as possessing a lived body. This
is because the subject is constituted by the lived body while not be-
ing identical to it. There couldn’t be a subject without a lived body
but we can clearly distinguish between the subject and the lived body.
It’s important to further distinguish between the experienced physical
body and the experiencing lived body. The lived body is the means
by which subjects are experiencing and directly interacting with the
world around us. And this lived body doesn’t necessarily coincide with
the physical body that’s typically associated with the subject—as we’ve
seen in the case of the paralysed subject. A subject might have an ex-
perience of a specific part of her own physical body without thereby
taking that part to be part of her lived body. In such a case, the body
part is experienced but not experiencing.
Finally, a subject’s lived body is essentially first-personal. This is be-
cause we can only experience one living body—which isn’t to say that
it’s impossible that more than one physical body constitutes the lived
body. And this lived body is necessarily experienced as ‘one’s own’. Ed-
mund Husserl explains this in the following way:
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The perceiving subject perceives ‘her’ lived body and can,
in principle, perceive only one lived body as hers. She can
perceive no other lived body in the peculiar way that she
perceives her lived body.¹
Husserl 1973: 42
If we want to anchor self-ascription in the notion of the origin of
egocentric space—and hence the foundation of de se thinking in the
notion of the lived body—it needs to provide a foolproof connection
between the subject and something that she takes to be her own body.
The lived body thus understood doesn’t require identification of a body
because there’s only one thing that’s phenomenologically given to the
subject as the lived body.
This, then, is the origin of our ability to think in the de se way.
Through primitive self-ascription of properties subjects are capable of
de se thinking. And the primitive self-ascription of properties consists
in the ascription of properties to the lived body. In other words: On the
basis of experiencing the world through the lived body—the origin of
our egocentric space—we are all origins. Thus, the defended account
of de se thinking can be characterised in the following way: When a
subject thinks about herself in the de se way she entertains a thought
that’s partly constituted by her ascribing a property to the lived body.
The reason why de se thinking is necessarily first-personal is because
subjects potentially grasp that they’re thinking about themselves. And
this kind of grasp is best explained via the phenomenological notion
of the lived body.
Now that we have a sketch of the ultimately defended account, we
shall first delve into the other possible strategies which attempt to deal
with the nature of de se thinking and it’s peculiarities.This will show us
the necessity and the merit of finally opting for the lived body account.
1 This is my translation of the passage: ‘Der Wahrnehmende nimmt “seinen” Leib wahr,
und prinzipiell kann er nur einen Leib als seinen wahrnehmen und keinen anderen Leib
in der eigentümlichen Weise wie seinen Leib wahrnehmen.’
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DIVIDE AND CONQUER
Consider the following case. Dr. Gustav Lauben says, ‘I
have been wounded’. Leo Peter hears this and remarks
some days later, ‘Dr. Gustav Lauben has been wounded’.
Does this sentence express the same thought as the one
Dr. Lauben uttered himself ?
Gottlob Frege: ‘The Thought: A Logical Inquiry’: 297
The logician and philosopher Gottlob Frege was among the fore-
fathers of the Propophile way of thinking. Remember that Propophiles
characterise mental states mainly on the basis of a proposition—a pos-
sible way the world could be. For instance, a subject’s belief that Sydney
is the capital of Australia can be individuated by calling on the propos-
ition <Sydney, being the capital of Australia>, which the subject be-
lieves to be true. Soon enough the Propophiles realised that the case
of de se thinking is not as straightforward as they would wish. Frege’s
quote above expresses a puzzlement that emerges: In one sense, the
proposition—what Frege calls a thought—that Alpha holds true in
thinking I’ve been wounded is the same as the proposition she holds
true in thinking Alpha has been wounded. In either case, she pictures
the world with Alpha being wounded.
In another sense, Alpha pictures the world in two quite different
ways. There’s a much more intimate epistemic connection in the case
of de se thinking which isn’t present in the de re case. In the former case,
she’s thinking about herself whereas in the latter she’s thinking about
Alpha, whoever she might be. The fact that these two things happily
coincide in the case at hand is a mere stroke of luck—something un-
determined by the thoughts themselves.The world happens to be such
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that Alpha is also the person who’s thinking, but nothing in the two
beliefs determines that she’s actually thinking about the same thing.
Rather, there’s room for discrepancy. And thus it seems that the pro-
position Alpha entertains isn’t the same in the two cases. The person
who’s pictured by believing I’ve been wounded isn’t necessarily the same
as the person pictured by believing Alpha has been wounded.
I’ve introduced the notion of a proposition as a possible picture of
how the world could be. What becomes more and more clear is that
this metaphorical way of talking is too vague. This is because we can
think of pictures representing reality in quite distinct ways. On the one
hand, a picture can represent the world in a very particular and unique
way. In this sense, Van Gogh’s self portraits are pictures of Van Gogh
and no one else. But we can also think of pictures as representing the
world in a more general way which could correspond to very different
situations.The picture is just a facelessmask which represents anything
that fulfils the role in question. In this sense, Picasso’sThree Musicians
could represent many different kinds of musical trios, provided they’re
composed in a certain way which corresponds to the picture.
Why is this important? Let me explain. Imagine our beliefs would
be characterised merely on the basis of their course grained satisfac-
tion conditions. What does it mean for conditions of satisfaction to
be course grained? We could say that these conditions answer to the
rock bottom question: Which objects need to have which properties
in order for the belief to be true? If we then look at the two beliefs
from this point of view, Alpha’s de se belief and her de re belief would
be identical.They are both true if Alpha—the thing in our world these
beliefs refer to—has been wounded. This is the first sense of proposi-
tions as very particular and unique ways of representing reality.
But we don’t want to say that the two beliefs are identical. After all,
Alpha can believe one without believing the other and vice versa. So,
since Alpha’s two beliefs aren’t identical, this can’t be the whole story.
Instead, we need to include a second level: How is the rock bottom
state of affairs that Alpha is wounded presented to us in thought? Are
we thinking of Alpha on the basis of seeing her directly? Or are we
thinking of her on the basis of reading the newspaper headline ‘Peace-
ful protester shot by police’? These are two fundamentally different
ways of picturing reality and this insight corresponds to the second
way of thinking about propositions. Propositions sometimes leave it
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open which particular object is required for the belief to be satisfied.
Instead, they care about how things are presented to us in thinking
about the world. The truth of the newspaper headline is independent
of any particular subject—for instance Alpha—being shot. It’s true as
long as some peaceful protester was shot by the police (A.2.1).
This move from propositions as characterised by their rock bottom
satisfaction conditions to propositions as characterised by the way we
think about the world in more general terms has some important con-
sequences. It coincides with a specificmove of individuating our beliefs
and other mental states on the basis of these propositions. There are
now two ways of characterising beliefs. On the rock bottom level, we
have propositions that correspond to course grained satisfaction con-
ditions. And these are shared by many similar but distinct beliefs. One
level above, we’re confronted with propositions that are characterised
by the different modes of presentation that are present in the way we
think about the world and its objects (A.2.2).
Importantly, one and the same object on the rock bottom level can
be presented to us once in this way and once in another. For instance,
we can think of Wonder Woman either as the superheroine wielding
the Lasso of Truth or as the superheroine wearing indestructible brace-
lets. In either case, we’re thinking about Wonder Woman on the rock
bottom level, but this person comes to our minds in different garments.
This distinction is important because it’s not the same to think that the
superheroine wielding the Lasso of Truth is brave and to think that the
superheroine wearing indestructible bracelets is brave. After all, these
descriptions could potentially be about distinct people in some other
possible world. So, our beliefs might correspond to quite different rock
bottom conditions of satisfaction. And even if they should coincide on
this level, we might not know about this. We can think about Won-
der Woman as the Lasso of Truth wielder without knowing anything
about her bracelets. If we accurately want to represent the multitude
of ways we think about the world, we need to take both this epistemic
and the previous semantic difference into account.
Following Frege, this second level of thinking where we bear in
mind the different ways of thinking about one and the same thing has
often been labelled the sense of a belief. Frege observed that a sense
alone isn’t enough to give us the course grained satisfaction conditions
at rock bottom which help determine whether a belief is true or not.
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The sense fixes the conditions of satisfaction only in a more open sense
which corresponds to how things are given to us in thinking. It doesn’t
yet tell us which particular objects we’re actually thinking about. If we
want to know whether it’s true that the peaceful protester was shot by
the police, we need to know who that person was. And that means
looking into the world and determining which person is presented to
us in thinking as the peaceful protestor. Hence, a complete character-
isation of our belief needs both this second level of thinking and ref-
erence to the specific world we’re looking at. Determining how things
are presented to us in believing—that’s to say, determining the sense
of a belief—is only a first, and necessary, step.
It’s easiest to illustrate this picture on the basis of an example. Ima-
gine that Alpha is the peaceful protester in our world. Of course, not
every peaceful protester is Alpha. Hence, Beta could have been the
person we’re looking for in a different possible world. If we then take
the belief
(6) The peaceful protester was shot by the police
and we want to know the course grained satisfaction conditions, we
need to knowwhichworld we’re talking about.The sense that’s involved
in believing (6) doesn’t yet determine whether we’re looking for Alpha
or Beta. It’s open to either possibility. But since Alpha is the peaceful
protester in the actual world we care about, (6) is true if Alpha was
shot. And of course in a different world, the same belief would be true
if Beta was shot. Once we’ve done this detective move, we’ve got all
we need for characterising our mental states. On the one, hand we’ve
got the way things are presented to us in thinking. And on the other
hand, we know exactly what needs to be the case in our world for the
belief to be true.
Following the Fregean way of laying out the conceptual ground-
work, we can distinguish mental states on the basis of these two differ-
ent levels: course grained satisfaction conditions—or reference as Frege
called it—and the mode of presentation or sense of the belief in ques-
tion. The mode of presentation is a functional thing which is associ-
ated with the specific mode that an object is presented to a subject as
the first woman in space or as the superheroine wielding the Lasso
of Truth or as the peaceful protester. And we get from this way of
thinking to the intentional object—what our thought is about—of our
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thinking by looking into the possible world and finding out who sat-
isfies that description. To take an example, Alpha is the object that
‘answers’ to the mode of presentation described as ‘the peaceful pro-
tester’ in our possible world.
The following rather technical and abstract picture emerges from
this introduction: A belief has a first element which is fully character-
ised by its course grained satisfaction conditions. Furthermore, a belief
has a second element. This second element is characterised by the way
the first element or its constituents are presented to us in thinking
(A.2.3). We can then say that any two beliefs which differ with regard
to one or both of these elements are distinct. So, as in the case ofWon-
der Woman, two beliefs can have the same first element but different
second elements. Believing that the superheroine wielding the Lasso
of Truth is brave involves a different second element than believing
that the superheroine wearing indestructible bracelets is brave. This is
because the way that Wonder Woman is presented to you in either be-
lief is distinct. But, since both beliefs are about the same subject, they
have the same first element in our world. They’re both about Wonder
Woman. And hence, the beliefs are true if Wonder Woman is brave
in either case.
Both elements are necessary to fully characterise and individuate
beliefs. If we only look at the second, element our belief will be un-
derspecified because we don’t know the satisfaction conditions of the
belief.These conditions are only determined by taking into account the
first element of belief. We may ask: In which case is the belief The su-
perheroine wielding the Lasso of Truth is brave true? Well, that depends
on who that superheroine is and thus which world we’re wondering
about. After all, the lasso wielder could be a different person in a dif-
ferent world. Hence, we need the first element as well to determine
the truth.
But how do we get from the second element of belief to the first?
Or, put differently, how do we arrive at the rock bottom satisfaction
condition starting from the way things are presented to us in thinking?
The answer is quite simple. We ask which possible world we’re think-
ing about and check which objects correspond to our way of thinking
in that world. In other words, we take the second element of the be-
lief and ‘add’ the relevant possible world to get to its first element. For
instance, if I want to know what needs to be the case for the belief (6)
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to be true, I need to know which possible world we’re talking about. If
we’re talking about our actual world, then Alpha needs to have been
shot for the belief to be true. Adding a different possible world might
result in a different first element because some other peaceful protester
was shot in that world. In such a case, (6) would then be true if that
other protester was shot.
This also shows that there’s a very direct move from the second ele-
ment of belief to its first element. Building on Frege’s words, we might
say that there’s a direct and inescapable route from a belief ’s sense to
its reference. Or, more canonically, that sense ‘determines’ reference.
Once we have fixed the second element of thinking and determined
which world we want to look at, the dice have been cast. There’s only
one person that I refer to when I believe (6). And the way that person
is presented to me in thinking determines in a given possible world
who I’m specifically thinking about. In this sense, the second element
‘determines’ the first element in any given world.
Of course, two beliefs with the same second element can have dis-
tinct first elements but only if we’re looking at them in two different
possible worlds. Once we hold the possible world fixed, we can only
think about one particular protester in believing (6). As we saw, the
second element isn’t specific enough to fully characterise a belief. But
as soon as we take the relevant possible world into account there’s no
wiggle room left for the first element. We then have everything we
need to know to determine the belief ’s truth-value.
We now have a theory that aims to represent the differences in how
we think about the world. For that task, it makes use of two elements
of thinking. One concerns what the thought is about—giving us the
semantic rock bottom conditions of satisfaction, the other is about
the way we think about the world. This semantic picture is sometimes
called a one-dimensional theory. Unfortunately, this isn’t a very intu-
itive label, so let me explain it. The idea is the following: If we only
look at the first element of thinking, there’s no room for variation
between the belief and what that belief is about—its intentional ob-
ject. For every belief there’s exactly one possible intentional object and
vice versa. But as soon as we add the second element, there’s a dimen-
sion along which beliefs about the same intentional object can come
apart. We witnessed this when we looked at different ways of think-
ing about Wonder Woman. One and the same intentional object, but
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different beliefs. Hence, the one-dimensional theory adds the dimen-
sion of the second element to the fray in order to better represent the
differences we find in our mental states.
What the opening quote indicates is that Frege realised that this
probably isn’t enough to deal with de se thinking.The reason is that the
uniform relation between the second and the first element collapses in
the case of de se thinking. I explained that the one-dimensional theory
holds that sense determines reference—the second element of think-
ing determines exactly one first element in every possible world. The
relation is between many modes of presentation and one intentional
object. But in the case of de se thinking it’s possible that one and the
same type of belief can havemany different first elements in one and the
same possible world. In the one-dimensional theory, that shouldn’t be
possible. This is because the road from second element to first element
is a matter of simply adding a possible world. But in the de se case, it
isn’t enough to hold a possible world fixed in order to know what the
first element of the belief I am tall is. It isn’t sufficient to say: ‘Anyone
holding that belief in our world is thinking about x’ even though that
would be sufficient were we to talk about believing (6).
Rather, when we’re confronted with de se beliefs we need to know
more than the possible world we’re looking at in order to know who
we’re thinking about. Most importantly, we need to know who’s think-
ing. If it’s Alpha, then the first element concerns Alpha, and if it’s Beta,
then it concerns Beta.Hence, the one-dimensional move of adding the
second element isn’t enough to account for de se thinking. Instead, we
need to divide and conquer and go two-dimensional. We want to be
able tomake room for another dimension on which we can disentangle
the relation between our thinking and the things we think about.
So, let’s introduce such a third element next to the two others we’ve
already established into our theory.The job of this new third element is
to pin down the narrow context of a belief within a possible world.This
will allow us to home in on a specific instance of thinking—something
which is required in order to understand the peculiarities of thinking
in the de se way. And once we’re equipped with this third element of
thinking, we can add it to our arsenal of second and first element to
form a complete picture. Our two-dimensional theory can then accur-
ately distinguish between different ways of thinking about an object
and all of our thoughts are grounded in some first element of thinking.
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This gives us both the diversity required on the level of how the world
is presented to us and the rock bottom conditions of satisfaction that
semantics requires.
Admittedly, this is all very abstract and sounds convoluted. How-
ever, looking at the following temporal belief as a practical example
will show the surprising simplicity and usefulness of this way of de-
scribing the issue:
(7) Yesterday it rained.
If we were still stuck in the one-dimensional theory, we would at some
point in our quest to fully characterise this belief ask the question:
‘What world are we talking about?’ And an answer to that question
would supposedly take us from the second element to the first. This
would enable us to know what the satisfaction conditions of (7) are.
But unfortunately, this move doesn’t work in the one-dimensional the-
ory. That’s because there’s no simple route from the second to the first
element in the case of believing (7). Simply inserting a possible world
into our one-dimensional functional model won’t do. In believing (7),
the world is presented to us as a tale of yesterdays. But, we don’t know
which day we’re thinking of when we’re thinking about yesterday.There
are many yesterdays in every possible world, and now we want to know
which one we’re thinking of. But how?
Obviously, the first element of (7) differs not just between various
possible worlds that we can think about. It also depends on the specific
context of thinking. Most importantly, it depends on the exact day a
subject entertains that belief. If I believed it on Tuesday, the belief
would be true if it rained on Monday. And if I believed it on Sunday,
the belief would be true if it rained on Saturday. But the second ele-
ment can’t represent this kind of dependency because it only takes into
account the possible world we’re looking at. It doesn’t care about the
subtleties of contexts and situation. We introduced it as being consti-
tuted by the way we think about the world and we originally thought
that only requires taking into account a specific possible world. But
beliefs like (7) need a magnifying glass to zoom into the specific time,
place and subject of the belief.
That’s where the third element of thinking comes into play. Not all
of our beliefs are like (6).They don’t present us the same thing in differ-
ent ways in our thinking. Rather, beliefs like (7) are of a kind where
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one way of thinking about an object can refer to a myriad of things
depending on when, where and who is thinking. The third element
of thinking aims to systematically connect these contextual ways of
thinking with our by now familiar second element of thinking. Hence,
we can say that in the case of (7), the third element is required to pin-
point the varying date that’s being picked out by a subject believing it
on a certain day.
We thus get the following:The third element of (7) is constituted by
a specific day being presented to us as yesterday. Because that day var-
ies depending on when the belief was entertained, the third element
doesn’t require us to add a possible world. Rather, we need to add the
specific context of thinking. In this case, the day of thinking is the
relevant part of the context. Hence, the third element of (7) asks for
whatever day the belief was entertained and is tantamount to some-
thing like ‘It rained the day before the subject believed this’. Now, we
first need to take a look into the world and determine the context of
that particular belief. Importantly, we need to know which day the rel-
evant belief was entertained. So, we identify the context and see that
it was Alpha who believed (7) on March, 27, 2016. From that we get
the second element ‘It rained the day before March, 27, 2016’. Once
we have this, we can add the possible world we want to know about
and find out what the first element of our belief is. This step is neces-
sary because the description ‘the day before March, 27, 2016’ could
potentially pick out different days in different possible worlds. Maybe
March, 26, 2016 isn’t followed in all possible worlds by March, 27,
2016. In the actual world, however, the relevant first element is the
state of affairs that it rained on March, 26, 2016.
Here’s another example of the importance of the third element of
thinking which is more relevant to our case of de se thinking. Let’s de-
termine the different elements of Alpha’s belief I am tall. Starting from
the third element, we get something like ‘The subject of this belief is
tall’. To get from this to our second element, we have to add the relev-
ant context of thinking. Merely adding a possible world wouldn’t yet
tell us which belief ‘this’ belief is. So, let’s add the context of the belief
and we get a second element which resembles ‘The subject believing I
am tall on June, 1, 2016 in Fribourg is tall’. We still don’t know who
that subject is, so we need to look into our world and thus determine
the first element. Once this is done, we may see that the subject that’s
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believing herself to be tall on that date and in that location is Alpha.
And thus we know the first element of the belief in question. Because
Alpha is the subject of the belief we’re interested in, we know that
Alpha needs to be tall in order for her belief to be true.
We’ve now characterised beliefs and other mental states on the basis
of three elements. The first element is needed to know under which
conditions a belief is true. It tells us what a thought is about and gives
us the conditions of satisfaction. We determine these conditions by
taking into account the second element of thinking. This element con-
cerns the way we think about the first element or its constituents. Since
one and the same state of affairs or object can be presented to us in
various ways, we need to take a look at this second element in order
to do justice to these differences. Finally, we have the third element
which is used for beliefs that are dependent on their context (A.2.4).
This element is needed because we sometimes think about one and
the same thing in various ways and we sometimes think about diverse
things in one and the same way.While the second element is adequate
for the former task, it’s unfit for the latter. This is where the third ele-
ment shines because it relates one type of thinking withmany different
second elements.
The introduction of the third element of thinking opens up the fol-
lowing possibility: Beliefs with identical third elements can be about
quite distinct first elements even if we hold the possible world we’re
looking at fixed. Hence, Alpha can think about Monday or Tuesday
by believing (7). If she believes it on Tuesday, she’s thinking about
Monday, and if she believes it on Wednesday, she’s thinking about
Tuesday. Recall that the same isn’t true for the relation between the
second element and the first element of thinking. It’s a one-way street
from the former to the latter. Something similar applies, however,
when we move from the third element to the second element. Once
we hold a specific situation or context fixed, we’ll always get the same
second element. The introduction of the third element was therefore
necessary because we sometimes think about one intentional object in
different ways and sometimes in one specific way about different inten-
tional objects. Our two-dimensional theory allows a move from one
kind of belief with its characteristic third element to several different
first elements in one and the same possible world—something which
wasn’t possible in the one-dimensional theory.
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Admittedly, this general framework is still very abstract. You might
also claim that it involves some overcomplicated moves. In practice,
things are much easier because it isn’t necessary to consciously go
through all these steps in order to determine the intentional object
of a belief. However, if we stumble upon an old inscription saying:
‘I’m the greatest philosopher of all time’ we have to go through these
detective moves in order to find out who wrote it down. Usually, we go
through the steps seamlessly but sometimes they require more caution.
Now, how is this relevant to our goal of understanding de se thoughts?
In the remainder of the chapter we’ll look at three concrete strategies
of how we could understand the nature of these different elements of
belief. These strategies are meant to be rather general with the men-
tioned quotes and proponents as illustrations. This somewhat across-
the-board kind of approach will naturally gloss over the more intric-
ate details of the specific varieties of theories that are defended under
the heading of a particular approach. However, since we want to learn
their general advantages and shortcomings, which need to be over-
come by an encompassing theory of de se thinking, this is a somewhat
necessary evil which we condone.
2.1 a friendly character
There’s a close resemblance between talking about ourselves by using
the word ‘I’ and thinking about ourselves in the de se way. For instance,
we can’t fail to talk about ourselves when using the first-person pro-
noun. The reference of the word depends on the context of usage. Ad-
ditionally, we can find other words that depend on the context such
as ‘here’, ‘now’, or ‘that’. All of these call for a two-dimensional treat-
ment in the semantics of language. This parallel of sensitivity to the
context suggests that the way these indexicals and demonstratives work
in natural languages like English or Breton might serve as a key and
blueprint to understand de se thoughts. The idea is to start from our
understanding of how we—as language speaking subjects—talk about
ourselves. If we understand how we come to use words such as the
first-person pronoun in a meaningful way, we might learn something
about our capability to think about ourselves in the de se way. I’ll call
this approach the linguistic approach. For our purposes, we can charac-
terise the linguistic approach as claiming that we can understand how
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language using subjects think about themselves via their use of the
first-person pronoun in speech.
In his ‘Demonstratives’ (1989), Kaplan provides us with a very char-
acteristic version of this kind of approach. We can use his account
as a kind of template to examine the linguistic path to de se think-
ing. Kaplan wants to find out ‘what is said’ by some peculiar kinds of
utterances like ‘That’s green’ or ‘I’m tall’. In this context, he draws a
distinction between the character and the content of an expression be-
cause he notices that a purely one-dimensional semantic theory won’t
suffice for these utterances. Demonstrative expressions like ‘that’ are
highly dependent on the context of their utterance and need a two-di-
mensional treatment instead. We can point out many different things
using the word ‘that’ and only the context will determine which one
is pointed out. Merely adding a possible world to the picture tells us
practically nothing about what particular thing we’re picking out with
that expression. To get the referent of such a demonstrative we need
to know the context of the utterance.
The general layout of Kaplan’s two-dimensional semantic theory of
linguistic expressions is as follows: The role of what I called the third
element of thinking is played by the Kaplanian character of an expres-
sion or utterance. And what I called the second element is akin to the
Kaplanian content. At rock bottom—our first element—we then have
the appropriate extension for the relevant expression. For instance, if
we’re looking at a sentence, the rock bottom extension is a truth-value,
and if we’re looking at a term like ‘the best female climber’, it’s an
individual.
Let’s look at these three elements within the linguistic approach in a
bit more detail. The content of an expression is what’s being evaluated
for its truth in a given circumstance. We want to have something that
can be either true or false simply by looking whether it’s true in a given
world. It should be possible to evaluate the truth of a content in any
given possible world. For instance, the content of my statement ‘The
first woman in space just turned 80’ is that the first woman in space just
turned 80. This can be evaluated in our world for its truth by determ-
ining who the first woman in space was and checking whether she just
turned 80 or not. Here, we don’t need to be bothered by the more fine-
grained context of the utterance. Whoever will utter that sentence in
our world will thereby talk about Valentina Tereshkova. Hence, we
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get from the content of an expression to its truth-value by evaluat-
ing the content in a specific possible world. The resemblance between
the content and the second element of thinking becomes very striking.
Furthermore, the relation between content and extension is similar to
the relation between the second and first element: The content of an
utterance ‘determines’ the extension in every possible world. In other
words: The relation between the content and the extension is many to
one. One extension can be picked out by many contents.
But it isn’t always this easy to establish the content of an utterance.
Sometimes we need some additional information to get to something
which can be evaluated for its truth in a world. In Kaplan’s theory, that
job is reserved for the character of an expression. It takes us from a spe-
cific context of utterance to a content which can then be evaluated for
its truth in a possible world. In the case of saying ‘It rained yesterday’,
the expression ‘yesterday’ is such that we have to take into account the
context of utterance in order to know its content. Here’s where the
character comes into play. The character of ‘yesterday’ is such that it
picks out the day before the utterance in order to form the right con-
tent. Once we have that, we can evaluate the content in the world we’re
interested in—usually our own actual one. Expressions such as ‘yes-
terday’ require a two-dimensional treatment—and thus a character—
because we don’t automatically know its content just by looking at it.
We don’t immediately know which day we’re talking about. It heavily
depends on the context, and not just the possible world we’re looking
at, which day is picked out by a specific use of the expression.
All expressions have a specific character. But only some of them
have a character that factors in the context of the utterance within a
specific possible world. Because our conversations are usually anchored
in one and the same world, the expression ‘the first woman in space’
has a fixed character in normal circumstances. It refers to Valentina
Tereshkova in all possible contexts in the actual world. Hence, we don’t
need to take a closer look at the character and context in order to at-
tain an evaluable content. On the other hand, the expression ‘I’ has a
character that takes into account who’s using it. It doesn’t always refer
to the same individual in all possible contexts. We can use one and the
same expression to talk about many different subjects. So, we need to
bear in mind the context of utterance in order to know what’s being
said by the speaking subject.
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Of course, what interests us the most is how the linguistic approach
characterises the nature of the third element—the character. After all,
this is what forms the crucial step for dealing with de se attitudes and
decides the fate of the theory for our purposes. Characters aren’t just
functional devices that take us from a context to a content. They have
to ‘do’ this somehow. What is it about the character of an expression
that does this job? As explained, characters are fundamentally explic-
ated in functional terms in pretty much the same way as I characterised
the third element of thinking in general. While contents are functions
from possible worlds to extensions, characters are functions from pos-
sible contexts to contents. Or, to put it differently, we get from a spe-
cific content to an extension by ‘adding’ a possible world, and we get
from a character to a content by ‘adding’ a context. So, if we want to
know what a subject says by uttering ‘I’m tall’, we look at the charac-
ters of the contained expressions and the context of utterance to arrive
at a content. Once this is done, we can evaluate that content for its
truth in a specific possible world. But what determines the function of
a character? For Kaplan, it’s the rules of language:
The character of an expression is set by linguistic conven-
tions and, in turn, determines the content of the expres-
sion in every context. Because character is what is set by
linguistic conventions, it is natural to think of it as mean-
ing in the sense of what is known by the competent lan-
guage user.
Kaplan 1989: 505
Speakers of English know that we always refer to ourselves when we
use the word ‘I’ and related expressions. After all, that’s the meaning
of the first-person pronoun; it’s how we use that expression in speech.
Our linguistic conventions thus determine the character of the inno-
cent word ‘I’: In all contexts of utterance it refers to the subject using
that expression. So, when we’re confronted with a specific instance of
that expression we can determine the content on the basis of its charac-
ter and the context. Imagine I sit across from you and you tell me ‘I’m
thirsty’. On the basis of my knowledge of the character of ‘I’, I could
establish that the speaker of that particular sentence is thirsty. I then
identify the context of your utterance and determine that the content
is something like the proposition <the subject uttering ‘I’m thirsty’ on
divide and conquer 55
July, 7, 2016 in Fribourg, being thirsty>. Now, I have a proposition
that I can evaluate for its truth in our world.
A different example involving an expression with a variable charac-
ter would be Alpha uttering ‘That tennis player is sublime’. Speakers of
English know that the reference of ‘that’ is determined by some kind
of demonstration—pointing out who the subject intends to talk about
and refer to. Of course, such a demonstration is heavily dependent on
the context. After all, we can point out many different things with just
one finger. Sitting in the ranks of Centre Court in Wimbledon, you
see that Alpha points out the player to her left. You can thus establish
that the content of her utterance is something like <the tennis player
to the left of Alpha on Centre Court in Wimbledon, being sublime>.
That again can be evaluated for its truth. If that player is Steffi Graf,
then Alpha’s utterance is true if Steffi Graf is sublime. Again, this
sounds more convoluted than we’re used to in everyday talk. However,
the cases where speakers aren’t easily identified or demonstrations are
unclear show that this complex two-dimensional semantic system is
necessary and always works in the background. It’s just very well inter-
nalised in our everyday speech.
Here’s an example of an expression with a character that doesn’t
seem to require us to take the context of utterance into account. The
meaning of ‘the element with the atomic number 79’ is usually such
that it picks out one and the same element in all contexts within a
possible world. It isn’t the case that the expression refers to gold on
Monday and helium on Wednesday. It also isn’t the case that it refers
to different elements when used in Greenland as opposed to Samoa.
And it also doesn’t matter whether I’m using the expression or Valenti-
na Tereshkova is. We’re always talking about gold. Of course, in a dif-
ferent possible world, some other element might have the atomic num-
ber 79 and thus be the extension of that expression. But that variance
is already covered by the content which allows us to pick out different
things in different possible worlds. And because the content of the
expression doesn’t vary across contexts, the character is fixed.
So, Kaplan identifies the character of an expression with its con-
ventional meaning. But what exactly does that entail? Notice first that
conventional meaning is a normative and notmerely a descriptive term.
The meaning of a word tells us how we should use that word in a given
circumstance and not just how we actually use it. If we want others
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to understand what we’re saying, we have to follow some rules of lan-
guage. For otherwise, wemight not be able to communicate what we’re
thinking to others. Of course, nothing stops you from using the expres-
sion ‘I’ to refer toMont Blanc. But you’ll have a hard time getting your
point across if you’re not using an expression according to its conven-
tional meaning.
Another important feature is that the conventional meaning of an
expression is quite rigid. It might change slightly over time but it usu-
ally stays more or less the same. To illustrate this, let’s look at the
meaning of the first-person pronoun: It always refers to the speaker.
So, when Alpha utters ‘I’m tall’, she’s using the first-person pronoun
with the same meaning as when Beta says ‘I’m tall’. Both statements
use the same words and have the same meaning. Even if Beta meant
to convey that she’s tall in Breton, her words would have a similar
meaning as Alpha’s English utterance.The fact that the character is es-
tablished by the conventional meaning explains why Alpha and Beta
were, in an important respect, saying the same thing despite talking
about two completely different subjects. They both use the expression
‘I’ which has the same character, and thus the same meaning, in both
cases. Due to the two-dimensional nature of that expression, it allows
us to refer to quite different things despite having the same conven-
tional meaning in each case.
How is themeaning of an expression determined? Kaplan holds that
competent language using subjects have some knowledge of the rules
of language—after all, that’s what makes them competent. They know
that names refer to the things they name, they know that predicates
can be applied to various things, they know that some expressions can
be used in various contexts to refer to different things. This kind of
knowledge establishes the character of the first-person pronoun. We,
as competent language users, know that we use that expression to refer
to ourselves in all cases. In other words, ‘I’ always refers to the speaker.
Our knowledge of how language is to be used thus determines the
character of the expressions we use.
Now, there’s a final element in Kaplan’s linguistic approach which
is of great importance when we think about the role of de se think-
ing. That the meaning of an expression like ‘I’ is determined by what
is known by a competent language user doesn’t imply that a subject
needs to be aware of these rules if she utters ‘I’ with meaning. After
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all, we can utter meaningful words without understanding them prop-
erly. But in the de se case, we want more than that. We want subjects
to talk about themselves knowingly. For this task we need to add some
epistemic element which connects our use of language with our capa-
city to think in the de se way. Subjects need to be aware of the rules of
language which govern the use of the first-person pronoun. For oth-
erwise, they wouldn’t be capable of using the expression ‘I’ to express
their de se thoughts. Instead, they would mindlessly utter meaning-
ful words. But because of their lack of knowledge, these words and
utterances wouldn’t serve to express what they usually do. The point
is the following: For an expression to play the role in language that
it’s supposed to play, users need to employ that expression somewhat
knowingly. So, a subject needs to have some kind of knowledge that
her use of the first-person pronoun refers to herself in her own use if
she wants to successfully use that expression.
Imagine a parrot who supposedly has no idea of how language works.
Such a subject can’t express her thought that she’s tall by uttering ‘I’m
tall’ even if that would be the right way to express her thought were she
aware of the conventions of the English language. That’s because she
has no idea that uttering ‘I’m tall’ is the right way to express your belief
that you’re tall. And this ignorance is also responsible for the fact that
if an incompetent speaker like our parrot were to utter such a sentence,
that utterance wouldn’t express what is normally expresses—even ifwe
can determine the conventional meaning of the utterance.
Kaplan addresses this important aspect of the character only quite
late in his paper when he discusses some epistemological ramifications
of the theory. This is quite surprising. After all, our knowledge of the
rules of language is necessary if we want to use it to express what we’re
thinking. We’re not babbling like infants after all. And since the lin-
guistic approach to de se thinking wants to explain our capacity to think
about ourselves via our ability to talk about ourselves, it should abso-
lutely include such an epistemic element which ensures the knowing
use. In the end, though, Kaplan delivers:
What we must do is disentangle two epistemological no-
tions: the objects of thought and the cognitive significance of
an object of thought. As has been noted above, a character
may be likened to a manner of presentation of a content.
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This suggests that we identify objects of thought with con-
tents and the cognitive significance of such objects with
characters.
Kaplan 1989: 530
What’s the argument for the claim that the cognitive significance
lies in the character of an expression? Here’s one possible answer. It
seems that we can meaningfully wonder ‘Is this me?’ while looking
into the mirror. And for that to be possible it certainly isn’t necessary
to know the Kaplanian content or extension of all the terms involved.
After all, part of what we’re wondering about is whether the extension
of ‘this’ and the extension of ‘me’ are identical. Thus, it seems that we
need to pin down the epistemic aspect of thinking in the character and
not the content of an expression. The cognitive significance is rooted
in the character of an expression because two fundamentally different
objects can be given to us in very much the same way. And in two
situations where two distinct objects are given to us in the same way,
we act identically. For instance, most subjects will try to get out of
danger when they utter to themselves ‘I’m in danger’. That’s because
they’re all being presented to themselves on the basis of their use of
the first-person pronoun with its character.
This quote reflects what’s special about de se thinking: the way we’re
presented to ourselves in thought. It’s a way that’s fundamentally dif-
ferent from the way we think about other things in the world. And
with it comes a certain cognitive significance that’s distinct from the
significance of thinking about ourselves in other ways. Alpha will draw
different conclusions from her de se belief I’m tall than from her de re
belief Alpha is tall. These two respective beliefs play fundamentally dif-
ferent roles in her reasoning and motivation. And this difference is
reflected in the different expressions we use to report our beliefs. The
expression ‘I’ has a different character than the expression ‘Alpha’.This
isn’t merely because they are different kinds of expressions with differ-
ent semantical properties. It’s also because they are used to express
beliefs with different epistemic roles in reasoning.
Now, let’s recapitulate the linguistic approach. Remember that it
claims that we can understand how language using subjects think about
themselves in the de se way via their use of the first-person pronoun
in speech:
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linguistic approach to de se thinking
When a language using subject thinks about herself in the de se
way, she entertains a thought that’s constituted by her knowledge
of the character of the first-person pronoun which is governed by
the meaning rule that ‘I’ always refers to the speaker.
The linguistic approach thus converges on the characterisation of
de se thinking via the linguistic meaning of the first-person pronoun
and a subject’s grasp of that meaning. The meaning is then identified
with the character of an expression according to the two-dimensional
semantic theory. Unsurprisingly, this move nicely accounts for the se-
mantic features of de se thinking. The interaction of character, content,
and extension makes sure that our de se thoughts are always about the
thinking subject and that the satisfaction conditions systematically de-
pend on the subject that’s entertaining a de se thought.
However, the approach also needs and wants to account for the epi-
stemic features we’ve identified. This is why an epistemic constraint
was introduced to the theory. The subject can’t merely comply to the
rules of meaning which govern the use of the first-person pronoun. If
we want her speech to be a proper expression of her thought, she also
has to do so knowingly, for otherwise her use wouldn’t be endowed
with the cognitive significance that’s characteristic of de se thinking.
In other words: If a subject doesn’t know that her use of ‘I’ always
refers to the speaker, she wouldn’t be in a state of thinking endowed
with the characteristic epistemic features of de se thinking. As a con-
sequence, this provides us with a necessary minimal requirement on
the contribution of the character of the first-person pronoun to de se
thinking. If language is supposed to be explanatory of our abilities to
think in the de se way, then a subject has to be aware of the fact that she
refers to herself by using the first-person pronoun. Without this epi-
stemic contribution, the linguistic approach doesn’t get off the ground
as a worthwhile candidate. After all, the epistemic features of de se
thinking form the heart of the explanatory project we’re pursuing.
You might now object that such an approach is quite limited since
it only attempts to explain how language using subjects think about
themselves in the de se way. What about non-linguistic subjects like
koalas and cheetahs? Ultimately, we couldn’t use such an approach
to explain how non-linguistic animals might think de se thoughts be-
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cause they don’t express their mental states linguistically. If you have
this objection, I’m conceding it to you. The approach is indeed very
narrow and unsuited to give an account of this kind of non-linguistic
de se thinking. Even if there are arguments against the presence of de se
thinking in nonhumans, this claim should be supported independently
of the linguistic approach. Nonetheless, there’s a reason to take the lin-
guistic approach seriously. That’s because a proponent of the approach
might counter in the following way: It’s unclear whether we can even
find de se thinking in non-linguistic subjects. However, it’s very clear
that we find it in language users. And if we look at the phenomenon
from the perspective of language use, we at least learn something about
how language users, such as human subjects, think about themselves
in the de se way. Once this is achieved, we have a better understanding
of the nature of de se thinking and might still broaden our theoretical
scope to include non-linguistic subjects.
We now have a dispute between those who want to achieve a neut-
ral account of the nature of de se which leaves room for non-linguistic
thinking about oneself on the one side and those who hold that our
only reliable tool to uncover what a subject is thinking is the subject’s
linguistic behaviour on the other. My reaction is to sympathise with
the first group but refrain from providing a justified decision between
the two for the moment. Maybe there’s no need to pick a side because
the linguistic approach doesn’t even account for de se thinking in lan-
guage users. Indeed, that’s exactly what we’ll see. I want to discuss two
crucial problems for the approach. And these remain valid even if we
narrow the approach down to how language using subjects think about
themselves in the de se way.
The first concerns a certain paradox of self-consciousness. How can
a subject learn and understand the meaning rule of the first-person
pronoun if she isn’t already capable of some non-linguistic form of de
se thinking? Isn’t the meaning rule dependent on a prior knowledge
of how we think about ourselves? Hence, isn’t the direction of explan-
ation exactly the opposite of what the linguistic approach holds? The
second problem asks how the approach explains the nature of inten-
tional action. Is the character of the first-person pronoun capable of
doing justice to the motivational force of de se thinking? Does know-
ledge of the character of ‘I’ play the right kind of practical role in order
to motivate a subject to act according to her own reasons?
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Let’s first look at the problem concerning the way we learn and apply
the meaning rule for ‘I’. On the linguistic approach, our knowledge of
the character of the first-person pronoun is supposed to account for
our capability to think about ourselves in the de se way. It’s because
we’re competent users of the expression ‘I’ that we’re able to entertain
beliefs like I’m tall or I’m hungry. But we can now ask: How can a
subject acquire knowledge of the meaning rule for ‘I’? The supposed
answer is that a subject already has to have the capacity to think in the
de se way in order to come to understand the meaning rule. If I want
to linguistically express that I’m thinking about myself in the de se way,
I need to have that capacity in the first place. That’s because I’m only
capable of grasping how to use the first-person pronoun according to
its meaning rule if I can think about myself in the de se way already.
José Luis Bermúdez discusses this problem in his The Paradox of Self-
Consciousness (1998). He explains the dependence between knowing
the character of ‘I’ and de se thinking in the following way:
The point here is that the capacity for reflexive self-ref-
erence by means of the first-person pronoun presupposes
the capacity to think thoughts with first-person contents,
and hence cannot be deployed to explain that capacity. In
other words, a degree of self-consciousness is required to
master the use of the first-person pronoun.
Bermúdez 1998: 18
The linguistic approach holds that we explain our capacity to think
in the de se way by our knowledge of the character of ‘I’. But Bermúdez
wants to argue that this knowledge is only possible if we’re capable of
thinking de se thoughts already. Without the knowledge that utter-
ing ‘I’ refers to yourself—a piece of de se thinking—you haven’t fully
grasped the meaning of the first-person pronoun. He concludes that
we can’t use our linguistic ability to explain de se thinking. If we take
the explanatory route of the linguistic approach, we’re going in circles.
The capacity we want to explain is itself required for the capacity we
think does the explaining.
How does Bermúdez argue that de se thinking is required for the
mastery of the first-person pronoun? As we saw in the elaboration
of Kaplan’s account, some knowledge on the part of the subject is re-
quired to do justice to the epistemic aspect of de se thinking. A subject
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can use the first-person pronoun in order to express her de se beliefs
only if she knows that by using ‘I’ she’s thereby referring to herself.
But this kind of knowledge presupposes her ability to think in the de
se way. For otherwise, she wouldn’t understand that she refers to herself
when she’s using the first-person pronoun. She might only grasp that
she’s referring to the speaker—whoever she might be. But grasping
that you yourself are the speaker—and thus the appropriate referent
of your use of ‘I’—requires you to think about yourself in the de se
way. Or, as Bermúdez puts it: ‘Employing a token of the first-person
pronoun in a way that reflects mastery of its semantics requires know-
ing that one is the producer of the relevant token and that is a piece
of knowledge with a first-person content’ (Bermúdez 1998: 15–16).
Since first-person contents are de se in nature, our mastery of the first-
person pronoun requires the capacity to think in the de se way.
So, Bermúdez’ argument is indeed quite simple. A subject’s grasp
of the meaning rule of the first-person pronoun requires her know-
ledge that her use of ‘I’ refers to herself. This kind of knowledge is de
se in nature. Therefore, the acquisition and application of the mean-
ing rule for ‘I’ depends on a prior capacity for de se thinking. And this
means that learning and employing the meaning rule of the first-per-
son pronoun isn’t the basic explanatory capacity we’re after. Hence,
the linguistic approach to de se thinking fails (A.2.5).
Now, it’s important to note that this argument doesn’t imply that the
Kaplanian character of ‘I’ is ill-defined. There’s indeed nothing wrong
with the meaning rule for the first-person pronoun. Rather, it’s the
proposed explanatory project of the linguistic approach which gets us
into circularity troubles. The approach is circular only because it holds
that the ability to think in the de se way has to be explained on the basis
of a subject’s knowledge of the character of ‘I’. More specifically, the
trouble arises with the addition of the epistemic constraint. Remem-
ber, this constraint was introduced to exclude accidental self-reference.
Thinking about oneself in the de se way is a way of genuinely and neces-
sarily thinking about oneself. So, the use of the first-person pronoun
has to make sure that the subject genuinely thinks about herself in the
de se way. This has to exclude some accidental way of thinking about
oneself. If the speaker grasps that ‘I’ always refers to the speaker, but
fails to understand that she herself is the speaker, she only referred to
herself by accident through her use of ‘I’. She didn’t intend to speak
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about herself. On the linguistic approach, the subject excludes this ac-
cidental self-reference only through her knowledge of the character of
‘I’. However, in order for this knowledge to be of the kind that se-
cures the kind of reflexive self-reference we want, the subject needs to
anchor it in her already present ability to think de se thoughts.
The downfall of the linguistic approach thus arises from its move
beyond the mere semantic realm. As a semantic account of the refer-
ence of ‘I’, it doesn’t face any vicious circularity. It’s the claim to serve
as an explanation of the possibility of de se thinking—with all its epi-
stemic features—which leads to futility. As soon as we build epistemic
requirements on top of the semantic account, we topple the explanat-
ory project because we take for granted what we set out to explain.
That’s already really bad news for the linguistic approach. But two
is better than one, so let’s reinforce our dismissal of the linguistic ap-
proach with a second problem. I argued that there’s a special relation
between de se thinking and the ability for intentional action. I argued
that subjects need to take reasons for certain actions as their own reas-
ons in order to be motivated to act on them. And this in turn requires
them to think about their own reasons in the de se way as their own.
So, when Alpha is being attacked by a bear, there’s a strong reason
for her to run away. She takes this reason as her own by believing I’m
being attacked by a bear and maybe concludes from that that she’s in
danger. Through this, she takes the reason that Alpha is in danger as
a reason for herself. And she does this because that reason is presented
to her in the de se way. Were it presented to her in some other way, she
wouldn’t necessarily be motivated to act on that reason without some
additional de se belief.
Hence, our favoured account of de se thinking needs to be able to do
justice to this feature. Can the linguistic approach succeed? Kaplan’s
proposal for the linguistic character of ‘I’ is roughly tantamount to
‘the speaker of this sentence’. If we want to understand what a subject
means by uttering ‘I’m in danger’, we should substitute the character
of ‘I’ accordingly and get:
(8) ‘The speaker of this sentence is in danger.’
However, this certainly doesn’t express what the subject thinks when
she’s entertaining the de se belief that she herself is in danger.Why not?
Because there’s an epistemic problem. It’s perfectly possible for Alpha
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to utter (8) and wonder whether she herself is the speaker of (8). In
other words, she can—from her point of view—reasonably utter ‘The
speaker of this sentence is in danger but I’m doing fine’. Understanding
the character of ‘I’ results in the insight that the expression means ‘the
speaker of this sentence’. But this results in an unfortunate elimination
of the crucial de se element. We lose the grasp that Alpha is talking
about herself.
The Kaplanian semantic theory eliminates the de se element from
the picture by mischance. But that’s the opposite of what we want.
We don’t want to eliminate the de se because that would make the
desired features hard or impossible to explain. Indeed, we’ve already
witnessed in our prior objection the unfortunate interaction between
two elements of the linguistic approach. On the one hand, we char-
acterise de se thinking through the knowledge of the character of ‘I’.
On the other hand, we eliminate the de se element through our two-
dimensional semantic theory of characters. This makes it hard to ex-
plain how a subject takes her belief that she’s in danger to be a reason
for her to run away.
If the character of ‘I’ is to always refer to the speaker, the de se belief
I’m in danger seems to amount to the acceptance of the sentence (8).
But why should a subject react in the usual way to the danger she’s in
when she accepts (8)?Why should she, upon her acceptance, run away?
If a subject accepts that the speaker of a certain sentence is in danger,
that doesn’t usually lead to her running away. Something crucial is
missing: She has to believe that she herself is the speaker. But that
just reintroduces a new de se belief which requires two-dimensional
analysis. And if we analyse this new belief in the same way as the
original one, we inevitably end up in an infinite regress. Something
that’s better avoided.
We can now see that the linguistic approach is bound to failure be-
cause it pins down the issue of de se thinking on a level that’s not basic
enough for our purposes. From within the Kaplanian picture, we need
a rather demanding notion of character if we want to do justice to the
features of our capacity to think about ourselves in the de se way. This
notion of character requires extensive knowledge by the subject in or-
der to do the required epistemic job. Unfortunately, this will inevitably
result in a notion that demands toomuch epistemic work from the sub-
ject to get off the ground. What we want to explain—the capacity for
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de se thinking—only really works if the subject is already capable of de
se thinking. So, we might be better off with something more basic to
account for the specific work that de se thinking provides.
2.2 digging for the fundament
As we’ve seen already, there are certain relations between de se think-
ing on the one hand and self-knowledge, reasoning, and rationality on
the other. But what’s responsible for these connections? We might try
to forge the necessary links via our linguistic competences. We could
argue that subjects are rational because they assent to the appropriate
sentences on the basis of accepting other sentences and understanding
how they logically relate to others. And by using the first-person pro-
noun in the appropriate circumstances, they express their self-know-
ledge in a way that makes others’ doubt void.
However, I argued that this approach leads to some devastating
problems in the case of de se thinking. Circularity and infinite regress
loom around every corner. Not only that, it seems that we have to look
at somethingmore basic than language in order to pin downwhat’s spe-
cial about de se thinking. Our ability to think about ourselves is more
ancient and basic than our use of language. And our competence of
the first-person pronoun seems to be grounded in a prior capacity to
think in the de se way. It’s only because subjects have some other ca-
pacity that they’re able to rationally assent to sentences and express
their self-knowledge linguistically. But what might that capacity be?
Maybe we shouldn’t look at our mastery of the first-person pronoun
but rather at the kinds of concept that are employed in thought. More
precisely, the first person concept seems to be a good place to start if
we want to better understand de se thinking.
Let’s call this the conceptual approach to de se thinking. In its most
general formulation it holds that we think about ourselves in the de
se way through employing the first person concept in thinking. So,
whenever a subject entertains a de se thought, she’s thereby using that
concept in her belief, judgement, or desire. The first person concept
thus plays the semantic, epistemic, and pragmatic roles that are re-
quired of our way of thinking about ourselves. It’s only because we
conceptualise ourselves using the first person concept that our de se
thoughts have their special qualities.
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In order to better understand and assess this approach, we should
first ask what a concept is in general. As usual, there are a multitude
of theories that elucidate the nature of concepts. Some philosophers
think that concepts are merely the discriminative elements of think-
ing that categorise the unstructured perceptual input for our minds to
process. Others have a more elaborate and demanding theory of con-
cepts which draws connections to rationality and reference. Still others
might hold that learning a concept is nothing more than learning how
to use the relevant word in one’s language.
In the context of our two-dimensional journey we’ll take a closer
look at a theory which builds on the self-referential nature of the first
person concept. This way of treating concepts is heavily influenced by
Frege. From him we get the idea that the first person concept is such
that it refers to the thinking subject in all possible situations and con-
texts. Other concepts aren’t like that. Their referential rules don’t men-
tion the circumstances of thinking in the same way. For instance, the
reference of the concept of an astronaut doesn’t shift when different
subjects employ it in thought. So, the first person concept is differ-
ent from other concepts in that its reference depends heavily on the
context of thinking. And this is also the reason why it requires a two-
dimensional treatment.
Many concepts do justice to the fact that we can think about one and
the same things in different ways—reminiscent of the second element
of thinking. We can think of Jane Austen as the author of Pride and
Prejudice or as the most famous female novelist of the 18th century. But
since we can also think in one and the sameway about distinct things—
such as when we’re thinking about yesterday—our theory of concepts
has to account for that as well. This is why concepts sometimes involve
an element that takes the context into account.
The conceptual theory we’re focusing on builds on a Fregean un-
derstanding of concepts which individuates them on the basis of two
criteria: their contribution to the conditions of satisfaction and the way
they present objects in thinking. On such a view, concepts are partly
constituted by a specific way of thinking about something and form
part of complete judgements. If they are applied in thought, they’re
partly applied on the basis of one’s grasp of the rules of reference of
the concept in question. So, when Alpha believes (6), she applies the
concept of a protester. This concept is partly constituted by the rules
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of reference. They tell us when something falls under the concept and
when it doesn’t. On the other hand, it’s constituted by the way we think
about these objects—as protesters and not as the ordinary subjects that
they also are. Of course, these two things are often interrelated and
don’t need to be independent at all. Alpha’s application of the concept
of a protester in her belief (6) is thus partly due to her grasp of the rules
of reference of that concept and partly because she thinks of someone
as a protester (A.2.6).
The neo-Fregean philosopher Christopher Peacocke provides a nice
example of this approach to concepts in general and the first person
concept in particular. In hisTheMirror of the World (2014) he explains:
I will be taking it that a concept is individuated by its fun-
damental rule of reference. Intuitively, the fundamental
rule of reference for a concept states the condition that
makes something the reference of the concept. … The
psychological significance of the fundamental rule of refer-
ence for a concept lies in part at least in the contribution it
makes, in combination with the rest of a thinker’s inform-
ation, in helping to determine what are, and what are not,
good reasons for judging contents containing the concept.
Peacocke 2014: 81–82
We can nicely observe the two individuating criteria we’ve illus-
trated above in this passage. On the one hand, the fundamental rule
of reference is a semantic rule that determines which things fall under
the concept. They tell us what needs to be the case for something to
be referred to on the basis of a use of the concept. On the other hand,
a subject who applies the concept in thought has to grasp this funda-
mental rule of reference so that she only employs the concept in the
appropriate judgements.
Now, how does this play out in a concrete example? On the basis
of this exposition, we might say that Alpha and Beta apply the same
concept of danger when they individually believe:
(9) The spider is dangerous.
This is because they would draw the same inferences—provided
they’re otherwise sufficiently similar—on the basis of believing (9).
And they draw the same inferences because they both grasp that the
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concept of danger applies to active volcanoes, poisonous substances,
and corrupt politicians, but not to napkins, empty water bottles, and
toddlers. In other words, they both associate the same fundamental
rule of reference with the concept of danger in believing (9). If they
separated all things in the world into two piles, one labeled ‘dangerous’
and the other ‘not dangerous’, their piles would be sufficiently similar.
These fundamental rules also incorporate the reasons a subject has to
judge that something is dangerous.
How do we as outsiders know if two subjects apply the same concept
in believing (9)?Well, imagine Alpha reasons that the spider is danger-
ous, therefore she should be careful.Meanwhile, Beta ponders that the
spider is dangerous, therefore it’s coloured. Other things being equal,
the concept of danger—the one that applies to active volcanoes, pois-
onous substances, and corrupt politicians—doesn’t have a lot to do
with colour, so it shouldn’t be brought into rational connection with
that other concept. The reasons for judging something to be coloured
prima facie have nothing to do with the reasons one has to judge some-
thing as dangerous and vice versa. But, something being dangerous is
a good reason to judge that one should be careful.
Hence, whatever concept Beta applied in believing (9), she wasn’t
applying the regular one of danger. And that’s because she draws fun-
damentally different inferences on the basis of thinking of the spider
as dangerous. This again points to the fact that she associates a funda-
mentally different rule of reference with her concept of danger. And
since concepts are individuated by their rules of reference, Alpha and
Beta aren’t applying the same concept in their beliefs. Were they to
separate all things in the world into two piles, they wouldn’t be sim-
ilar at all. And were they to think about when we have good reason to
think of something as dangerous, they would significantly disagree.
Now that we know a little more about how concepts work in general,
we can apply the story to the first person concept and see whether the
conceptual approach is satisfactory for our purposes. Let’s start with
the fundamental rule of reference that individuates the first person
concept. After all, the reference rule plays a crucial role in specifying
the nature of a concept and in characterising how something is given
to subjects in thought.
Luckily, Peacocke offers us an account of the first person concept.
He holds that the fundamental rule of reference for the first person
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concept is the following: Whenever the first person concept is applied
in an instance of thinking by a specific subject, it refers to that specific
thinking subject in virtue of her being the producer of that event of
thinking. Or, to formulate it in a more technical and convoluted way:
Whenever there’s an event of thinking and a thinking subject applies
the first person concept in that specific event of thinking, then the
concept which the subject used in her event of thinking refers to that
specific thinking subject in virtue of her being the thinking subject of
that particular event of thinking.
Here’s an example of that account in action. When Alpha believes
I’m tall, she thereby applies the first person concept in an event of think-
ing. The event of thinking is her forming the belief that she’s tall. And
since she’s the producer of that event, she’s also the referent of that
application of the first person concept in virtue of the fundamental
rule of reference. So, she’s thinking about herself in applying the first
person concept because every application of the first person concept
refers to the thinking subject. The same applies to Beta when she be-
lieves I’m tall. The fundamental rules of reference of the first person
concept represent the reflexivity we’ve already witnessed.
Is this semantic analysis enough to account for our features of de se
thinking? Well, the semantic part of the linguistic approach didn’t do
the job before. But the semantics of the conceptual approach are quite
similar to what we had in the linguistic case. We saw that semantics
is one thing, but de se thinking requires some epistemic flavour too.
In the linguistic approach, we had to include a subject’s knowledge of
the fact that ‘I’ always refers to the speaker. And something similar is
required for the conceptual approach.
The subject needs to have some epistemic access to the fundamental
rule of reference that individuates a concept. Peacocke is well aware of
the need for such a qualification when he writes that ‘a theory of con-
cepts needs to be accompanied by a theory of what it is to grasp those
concepts’. And he provides such a theory by explaining that ‘grasp
of a concept consists in tacit knowledge of its fundamental reference
rule’ (Peacocke 2014: 84). What does that amount to?When a subject
makes a judgement, she needs to employ the required concepts. And
that requires some grasp of the concepts in question—she has to some-
how be aware of what she’s judging and the concepts she uses therein.
Grasping a concept needn’t be a conscious activity but rather consists
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in some form of knowledge of what it means to apply the concept
in thinking. She needs to be aware of what are and what aren’t good
reasons to judge something to fall under a concept.
Exactly what a subject’s tacit knowledge of the fundamental rules of
reference generally amounts to isn’t quite clear though. And even Pea-
cocke, unfortunately, leaves us somewhat in the dark.There are at least
two apparent options which attempt to explain how a subject possesses
tacit knowledge of the rules of reference of a concept. One possibility
is that the tacit knowledge simply manifests itself in the subject’s cor-
rect application of the concept in her beliefs and inferences. Another
alternative is that it’s based on some other underlying epistemic capa-
city which forms the basis of the concept.
Let’s pause for a moment and assess these two options. When we
look at the first option, we’re left wondering what explains the subject’s
correct application.What’s responsible for her applying the concept in
the right way? It can’t magically happen to be that way. For example,
we may ask why Alpha apparently applies the concept in the right
way in believing (9) and why Beta doesn’t do so. Something in their
application must indicate that only Alpha applies the concept correctly.
But, we can’t offer an account that uses tacit knowledge of the reference
rules of a different concept because that just shifts the problem over.
Now we would need to explain what it is to grasp that other concept.
What we need is some independent ground on which we can decide
whether a subject grasps a given concept or not.
This leads us to the second option. Maybe there’s some underlying
capacity which establishes and enables the grasp of a concept. The ta-
cit knowledge would then be established in a more basic capacity. One
possibility could be connected to the kinds of reasons that subjects take
to be good reasons for judging something to fall under a concept. But
if that underlying capacity isn’t the grasp of some other concept—but
rather something non-conceptual—it seems to jeopardise the concep-
tual approach as a whole. After all, that approach aims to explain the
characteristic features of de se thinking on the basis of a subject’s use of
the first person concept. We don’t want some non-conceptual ability
of the subject to meddle with this endeavour. If the important work
in explaining what’s special about de se thinking isn’t done by the first
person concept but rather some more basic capacity, then we can reas-
onably ask what explanatory work the conceptual approach provides.
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The conceptual approach tells us that the first person concept is re-
sponsible for the special features of de se thinking. But our analysis of
the notion of tacit knowledge places doubt on this claim because it
shows the requirement of something more basic. After all, we want to
know what gives a subject a reason to apply the first person concept in
de se thinking.
There’s a real difficulty of explaining what exactly tacit knowledge
amounts to. And we can’t merely brush the question and the require-
ment of tacit knowledge aside. This is because the knowledge con-
straint is necessary for two reasons. First, the mere semantics of con-
cepts doesn’t account for all our features of de se thinking. We need
some epistemic element in order to account for things like self-know-
ledge and immunity. Secondly, we want the knowledge to be tacit to
avoid the implausible assumption that a subject needs to be able to
consciously grasp the fundamental rule of reference—and hence all
the involved concepts—if she applies a concept in thought. Subjects
don’t need to be capable of conceptualising the fundamental rules of
reference of a concept in order to employ it in thought. After all, a
child may believe That apple is red without being able to think about
concepts like that of thinking or of perception. But both of these are
involved in the fundamental rules of reference for the concepts em-
ployed by the believing child.
It seems that the requirement of tacit knowledge leads to problems
similar to the ones encountered by the linguistic approach. Before go-
ing on to discuss these issues in more detail, let me quickly recapitulate
the conceptual approach. I will use the following general characterisa-
tion of what I take to be the essential part of the approach:
conceptual approach to de se thinking
When a subject thinks about herself in the de se way, she entertains
a thought that’s constituted by her tacit knowledge of the funda-
mental rule of reference of the first person concept which she em-
ploys in her thinking.
The conceptual approach tries to capture what’s characteristic about
de se thinking via the grasp of the first person concept in its applic-
ation in thinking. Since the concept is such that it always refers to
the subject that employs it in thinking, the approach easily gets the
semantic features right. When a subject believes I’m tall, she employs
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the first person concept which makes sure that she herself is the in-
tentional object of her thinking. The fundamental rule of reference of
the first person concept is such that it always refers to the thinking
subject. Furthermore, the concept ensures that the conditions of satis-
faction depend systematically on whoever entertains the de se thought.
Because the thinking subject is the referent of the first person concept,
the satisfaction of any de se attitude depends on who’s thinking.
Now, it’s important to note that there’s only one first person concept.
So, two subjects thinking in the de se way are both employing the
same concept. This is because the first person concept is individuated
by its fundamental rule of reference. And that reference rule doesn’t
change when Alpha instead of Beta employs that concept in thinking.
Moreover, the epistemic grasp of the concept always amounts to some
tacit knowledge of the reference rule we’ve established.The knowledge
might be more pronounced in some cases, but it’s always knowledge
of one and the same rule of reference. Hence, Alpha’s belief I’m tall is
identical to Beta’s belief I’m tall on the conceptual level.Thinking back
to our three elements of thinking, this amounts to an identity of the
third element. Of course, the other two elements of thinking will dif-
fer due to the context-dependence of the first person concept. After
all, Alpha is thinking about Alpha and Beta is thinking about Beta.
But since the way the world is presented to us is established on the
conceptual level—the third element of thinking—Alpha’s and Beta’s
ways of thinking about the world are identical.
This is somewhat opposed to other accounts inspired by Frege.These
take it that every subject has an individual first person concept (A.2.7).
And this concept isn’t merely applied on the basis of one’s grasp of the
reference rule. Rather, it’s applied on the basis of one’s primitive and
subjective grasp of oneself. Presumably, this kind of relation we have
to ourselves is individual and unique. The relation that Alpha has to
herself is different from the relation that Beta has to herself. This idea
has its origin in a cryptic remark by Frege where he maintains that
‘everyone is presented to himself in a particular and primitive way, in
which he is presented to no-one else’ (Frege 1956: 298).
It’s possible to take Frege as holding that there are individual senses
associated with every subject’s particular way of thinking about herself.
That’s because we might want to hold on to the idea that there’s only
ever one thing in the world we refer to when we apply a concept. In
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other words, we might want to retain the claim that sense determines
reference. When we think of something as the most famous female
novelist of the 18th century, we’re always thinking about Jane Austen
in our world. And when we apply the concept of pride, we always refer
to one and the same property of pride. However, in the context of two-
dimensional approaches to de se thinking we discovered the need and
possibility to have only one first person concept. One single concept
that’s capable of referring to different things in different situations.
This allows that all de se thoughts are fundamentally of the same type.
They only differ insofar as they’re thought in different contexts by dif-
ferent subjects. And such an account easily explains why subjects draw
the same rational inferences on the basis of their application of the
first person concept. If they literally apply the same concept—and not
a concept which is merely in the same ball park as the other concept—
it’s clear why they should reason similarly on that basis.
Now, this semantic theory is complemented by an important epi-
stemic element that attempts to explain the non-semantic features of
de se thought. Tacit knowledge of the rules of reference is required to
apply a concept in thought. This addition elucidates why immunity
to error through misidentification is characteristic of de se thinking.
If a subject grasps the fundamental rules of reference, then there’s no
open question for her concerning the intentional object of that event
of thinking. Presumably, a subject can’t grasp that her use of the first
person concept is such that it always refers to the thinking subject and
at the same time wonder who she’s thereby thinking about. This fact
isn’t grounded in the semantic nature of the first person concept. It’s
rather established in the epistemic aspect which resides in the subject’s
tacit knowledge of the fundamental rule of reference.
So far so good. However, I’ve already hinted at some problematic
similarities between the linguistic and the conceptual approach. We
can ask whether the regress problem doesn’t peak its head out here as
well. In our discussion of the linguistic approach, we saw that a strange
identification between the first person pronoun and its de se-devoid
character gave us a serious headache. Assenting to a sentence reporting
the character of the first-person pronoun isn’t the same as assenting
to the de se sentence. If we now look at the conceptual approach, we
notice that the definition of the fundamental rule of reference of the
first person concept is equally lacking what’s characteristic for de se
74 being origins
thinking—an unmistakable epistemic self-reference to the thinking
subject. There’s nothing de se about the fundamental rule governing
the reference of the first person concept. It merely describes under
which conditions subjects necessarily refer to themselves.
In the context of the linguistic approach, I argued that the subject
can reasonably ask who the speaker of (8) is despite the fact that that
sentence accurately reports the character of ‘I’. And since the character
marks the cognitive significance of an expression, the account doesn’t
represent the epistemic feature of de se thinking accurately.
A similar defect can be identified in the context of the conceptual
approach. Here, we’re confronted not with the character but with the
fundamental reference rule. And similarly, the de se role of the first
person concept isn’t exhausted by the description ‘the subject who’s
thinking this thought’, which expresses its fundamental rule of refer-
ence. A subject can reasonably believe that the subject who’s thinking
this thought is tall while doubting whether she herself is tall.This is be-
cause she can wonder whether she herself is the subject who’s thinking
this thought. Hence, mere grasp of the fundamental rule of reference
of the first person concept doesn’t seem to be enough to account for
what’s characteristic of de se thinking. A subject needs to be capable of
self-referring in the de se way in order to grasp the self-referring nature
of the first person concept. But because the conceptual approach puts
all the explanatory weight on the grasp of the reference rule, it can’t
incorporate this more basic, primitive way of thinking about yourself.
This new regress problem reveals its full force when we turn to the
connection between de se thinking and intentional action. While be-
lieving I’m in danger ensures that the believing subject will take the
necessary actions to get out of danger, the same doesn’t apply to her
beliefThe subject of this thought is in danger. This is despite the fact that
the latter expresses the fundamental rule of reference of the former
and is thus what individuates the relevant first person concept.
What is it for a subject to believe I’m in danger on the conceptual
approach? Most importantly, it involves the application of the first
person concept which refers to the thinking subject in all cases. This
semantic fact is coupled with the requirement that the subject should
possess tacit knowledge of this semantic rule. The subject needs to
know in some—to be established—way that her use of the first person
concept always refers to the thinking subject. But how does that help?
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A subjectmight be fully aware that her use of the first person concept
in believing I’m in danger is governed by the fundamental rule of ref-
erence. She might even have full knowledge of that rule. Nonethe-
less, she wouldn’t be moved to action on the basis of that semantic
knowledge. This is because she doesn’t think of herself in the de se way
when she’s aware of the fact that subjects in general necessarily self-
refer when they employ the first person concept. We can make this ar-
gument stronger and more precise by approaching it from the point of
view of rationality. It might be rational for a subject to judge The sub-
ject of this thought is in danger but I shouldn’t run away. This is because
her knowledge of the semantics of the description ‘the subject of this
thought’ is distinct from her knowledge that the description refers to
herself. Similarly, the knowledge of the semantics of the first person
concept is distinct from the kind of de se grasp we’re after.
In fact, the theory of concepts we’re using, which works in the back-
ground of the conceptual approach, comes back to bite us. It holds that
the objects of thought are presented to us in thinking via the concepts
we use. But it doesn’t seem that subjects are presented to themselves
in de se thinking via knowledge of some complex fundamental rule of
reference. It’s rather the opposite. We think about ourselves first in
the de se way and only later possibly grasp the fundamental rule of ref-
erence governing our use of the first-person concept. In other words,
our acquisition of the first person concept depends on our prior ability
to think in the de se way. And therefore, not every instance of de se
thinking is governed by the application of the first person concept.
Let me give a quick argument for this claim. For the first person
concept to play a grounding rule for de se thinking, it has to be neces-
sarily self-referring because every instance of de se thinking is about the
thinking subject. Any subject that employs a concept in thinking has
to tacitly know the referential nature of the concept. Hence, a subject
employing the first person concept needs to know that the first person
concept is necessarily self-referring. The knowledge of the necessary
self-referring nature of the first person concept is de se because the sub-
ject needs to know that she’s thereby referring to herself. Therefore, a
subject employing the first person concept needs de se knowledge in
order to apply the first person concept.
This argument supports our earlier rebuttal of the conceptual ap-
proach. Rather than thinking about ourselves in the de se way on the
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basis of employing the first person concept, that conceptual capability
depends on some prior de se knowledge. Otherwise, a subject couldn’t
grasp the self-referring nature of the concept. So, something more epi-
stemically basic on the non-conceptual level has to support the role
that the first person concept plays. Something without which the con-
ceptual approach doesn’t even get off the ground. This doesn’t mean
that any account of de se thinking requires knowledge of the neces-
sity of self-reference. This would be much too strong. But, if we think
that the ability to think about oneself is guided by the application of
the first person concept, then such knowledge is crucial because it’s
implied by the necessary grasp of the relevant concept.
In all fairness, Peacocke is well aware of this inevitable path to some
more primitive conception of de se thinking.He anchors the tacit know-
ledge underlying our grasp of the first person concept in what he calls
the non-conceptual first person notion. He explains that ‘this connec-
tion with knowledge is explained by the relations between the first per-
son concept and the more primitive nonconceptual de se notion’ (Pea-
cocke 2014: 86). In this way, he permits that we need to distinguish
the cognitive role of the de se element from the semantic content of de
se thoughts. It’s one thing to identify the two-dimensional conceptual
content of the belief I’m tall. It’s quite another to explain how a sub-
ject thereby comes to think about herself in the de se way. While our
conceptual approach does fairly well on the semantic part, it overlooks
the primitiveness of de se thinking that governs its cognitive role.
Even with this proviso concerning Peacocke’s own account—which
goes beyond what we’ve called the conceptual approach by including
an important de se element that’s non-conceptual—one can’t refrain
fromwonderingwhy the conceptual approach should be especially well
equipped to explain the basic way of thinking about oneself that’s char-
acteristic of de se thinking. Arguably, not all thinking is thinking in
concepts. And because some forms of de se thinking seem to be cases
of a primitive and basic way of thinking, there’s a strong possibility
that they potentially also reside in the non-conceptual realm. After all,
a subject doesn’t need a first person concept in order to believe that
she’s in pain or that her food is to the left—both instances of de se
thinking. But if there’s non-conceptual de se thinking, then the con-
ceptual approach is fundamentally misguided. It misses a large chunk
of what needs an explanation.
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So, it seems that the focus on the first person concept is only viable
in the highly rational and sophisticated thinking that’s characteristic
of projects like the one by Descartes. You might object that I take
it for granted that there’s non-conceptual de se thinking. And that I
can’t invoke this assumption against the conceptual approach. And
you would be right. The fact that the conceptual approach requires an
underlying non-conceptual de se way of thinking about oneself weighs
stronger though. Not only does the conceptual approach miss a po-
tentially primitive form of non-conceptual de se thinking. I also ar-
gued that without such a more primitive ability, it can’t even do the
job on the conceptual front. Without it, a subject’s tacit knowledge of
the first person concept can’t get off the ground because she couldn’t
understand what it is for something to be self-referring in the first
place. So, the first person concept derives its de se powers from an un-
derlying capability of subjects which allows them to primitively think
about themselves in the de se way. The conceptual approach is based
on the grasp of the reference rule. And this grasp is only complete
if it’s already de se in nature. A subject can only understand that her
use of the first person concept refers to herself if she has some prior
grasp of what it means to refer and think about oneself in the de se
way. This shows that the non-conceptual way of de se thinking is more
fundamental than the use of the first person concept. And hence, the
conceptual approach—as a whole—fails to account for the basic kind
of de se thinking that we want to understand.
We’ve seen now that the conceptual approach does fairly well in a
small area of typically highly rational de se judgements. Here, it ex-
plains how subjects come to think of themselves in the characterist-
ically self-referential way when they employ the first person concept.
But the discussion above identified two main problems for such an
account that attempts to explain de se thinking via the use of the first
person concept.The weaker first problem is that the account is too nar-
row by excluding many de se thoughts which are most likely not from
the conceptual realm. If subjects can think non-conceptually in the de
se way, then the conceptual approach doesn’t provide an explanation
of what’s going on in these cases. The second more serious problem
is that even in the case of conceptual de se thinking, we need an an-
chor that’s located on a more primitive and basic level. Otherwise, the
concept can’t play its epistemic role aimed at characterising a special
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way of thinking about an object. The reference rule alone doesn’t tell
us that we’re actually thinking about ourselves. Hence, the conceptual
approach is neither sufficient for our purposes because it overlooks im-
portant areas of de se thinking which need to be accounted for. Nor is it
necessary since it has to rely on some more basic way of de se thinking
in order to play the cognitive role it’s supposed to.
2.3 functioning properly
It seems that our excursion into the two-dimensional world hasn’t
been particularly crowned with success so far. The strategies we’ve
discussed got the semantics of de se thinking right but failed on the
epistemic front. But let’s not get discouraged yet, because there’s one
final two-dimensional theory I want to look into before drawing a ver-
dict. And what’s interesting is that this approach doesn’t start from
the semantic two-dimensional framework we’re all familiar with right
now. It rather starts from the cognitive significance of our thoughts
by asking about the role that mental states play in our reasoning and
motivation.That certainly sounds promising because it tackles the epi-
stemic features upfront. The idea is to commence from the epistemic
and psychological role that de se thinking plays and try to account for
the semantic features in a second step.
Why is this alternative worth our consideration? In our discussion of
the conceptual approach, we’ve encountered a need to distinguish the
cognitive role of de se thinking from its semantic content. It’s one thing
to identify the conditions of satisfaction and the intentional object of
our thoughts about ourselves and it’s quite another thing to explain
how this kind of thinking has the peculiar epistemic and cognitive
features it has. The traditional two-dimensional approaches sought to
account for both of these things in one go. Now, we want to look at
another option which attempts to slightly disentangle these two and
deal with them individually.
Thinking about oneself in the de se way is special because it has a
very peculiar cognitive significance. We saw this when we compared
Alpha’s belief I’m tall with her beliefAlpha is tall.The twomental states
have the same conditions of satisfaction—they’re both true if Alpha is
tall. And at the same time, one and the same state of affairs is given
to Alpha in two very different ways. She will reason differently on the
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basis of either belief. And she might be motivated to act in distinct
ways. That’s because the cognitive role of de se thinking is more intim-
ately tied to our own action and motivation. Furthermore, this role
remains the same for every subject thinking I’m tall despite the fact
that the conditions of satisfaction change dramatically. It seems that
all de se beliefs of the same type have the same functional and cognitive
effect on a subject.
The difference in cognitive significance between mental states is at
the forefront of the functional approach to de se thinking. It charac-
terises a thought on the basis of how it’s functionally related to other
thoughts and actions of ours. For instance: Which conclusions can
a subject draw on the basis of entertaining a given belief ? What ac-
tions is she motivated to perform on that basis? What other beliefs
and desires is she inclined to form as a result of that mental state? If
we think about de se thoughts in this context, the similarities they have
when entertained by different subjects in different situations immedi-
ately strike us. The belief I’m tall has a certain cognitive significance
that stays roughly the same—independently of who entertains it. Sim-
ilarly, a different de se belief like I’m scared has the same cognitive role
for all thinking subjects.
This leads to an attempt to individuate our thoughts through their
cognitive function. The background idea is this: If two beliefs produce
the same ‘output’ on the basis of the same ‘input’, they’re identical. And
if two beliefs produce different outputs starting from the same input,
they aren’t the same—independently of whether they have the same
semantic features or not. A belief like I’m tall is of the former kind.
We get roughly the same output in all believing subjects—provided
the other inputs are the same. If you and I are otherwise significantly
similar, we’re going to act similarly on the basis of believing that. For
instance, we’ll both reason that we need to duck or that we can reach
the top cupboard. Amere semantic focus on that belief doesn’t directly
approach this similarity. It merely cares about the conditions of satis-
faction, context dependence, and similar things without looking at the
cognitive effect of our mental states. And in the end, Alpha’s believing
I’m tall has quite different conditions of satisfaction than Beta’s sim-
ilar belief. Instead of looking at the variable conditions of satisfaction,
the functional approach instead shines a light on what stays the same
whenever a subject entertains a certain de se belief. And because de se
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beliefs have quite a different impact on our minds than de dicto beliefs
about ourselves, they should be distinguished accordingly.
The general two-dimensional strategy involves an important distinc-
tion. On the one hand, there’s a dimension that’s concerned with con-
textual features of thought and speech. And on the other hand, we
have a referential or truth-conditional dimension. For instance, the
character of an expression is located in the former domain because it
allows us to determine the truth conditions of an utterance in a spe-
cific context. Without the context, we wouldn’t get anywhere. Or, if
we look at the first person concept, we see that it appeals to the context
of thinking. We only know who’s referred to by a specific use of that
concept once we fix the context of that particular mental state. The
functional approach also distinguishes the contextual, or functional,
dimension from the referential, semantic, or truth-conditional dimen-
sion. The former is concerned with the cognitive role of our thoughts
while the latter tells us a thought’s conditions of satisfaction. That
is why the functional approach—though slightly atypical—is two-di-
mensional in nature.
Again, we can track the origins of the functional approach back to
Frege. But it receives a quite pronounced expression in another influen-
tial paper by John Perry titled ‘Frege onDemonstratives’ (1977), where
he discusses some consequences of Frege’s distinction between sense
and reference for demonstrative thoughts such as That apple is green.
When he gets to de se thoughts, Perry reminds us that we need to keep
in mind the way subjects think about the intentional objects of their
thoughts in order to correctly understand and analyse a given mental
state. More importantly, we need to look at the cognitive significance
or function of a thought for a subject:
We use senses to individuate psychological states, in ex-
plaining and predicting action. It is the sense entertained,
and not the thought apprehended, that is tied to human
action. When you and I entertain the sense of ‘A bear is
about to attack me,’ we behave similarly. We both roll
up in a ball and try to be as still as possible. Different
thoughts apprehended, same sense entertained, same be-
havior. When you and I both apprehend the thought that
I am about to be attacked by a bear, we behave differently.
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I roll up in a ball, you run to get help. Same thought appre-
hended, different sense entertained, different behavior.
Perry 1977: 494
Perry’s claim here is that mental states have to be characterised by
the way things are presented to us in thinking and not by the inten-
tional objects of our thoughts. This is because one and the same in-
tentional object can be presented to us in different ways and produce
different behaviour. And in such a case, we’re left with quite distinct
mental states because the world is presented to us in distinct ways. So
far, this isn’t a particularly new insight. However, Perry focuses on the
neglected fact that these mental states have different connections to
our own actions and our other beliefs and desires. We can take Perry’s
example to illustrate this. Here, we have one and the same state of
affairs—one and the same proposition—which can be presented to
Alpha in two different ways. Alpha can think about the proposition
<Alpha, about to be attacked by a bear> either from her own first per-
sonal perspective or from an impersonal bird eye view. In the former
case, she would be motivated to behave in quite different ways than
in the latter case. In fact, Perry argues that we shouldn’t concentrate
on the mere semantic question, ‘What are you thinking about?’, in the
first place because it doesn’t fully reflect the different ways that things
can be thought about. Rather, we should depart from the idea that we
can characterise mental states merely on the basis of the proposition
that we thereby entertain—or the ‘thought apprehended’ in Perry’s ter-
minology. It’s important that we need to incorporate the way we think
about things into our theory.
As mentioned, this doesn’t sound particularly new yet. But Perry
doesn’t just repeat the Fregean insight that lead us to the distinction
between sense and reference. We have to understand his point as a
focus on the connection between our beliefs and desires on the one
hand and our actions and behaviour on the other. There’s more to the
story than merely doing justice to the different perspectives that sub-
jects have on the world. Beyond that, there are important relations
between the way we think about the world and how we are motiv-
ated to interact with that world. How things are presented to us in
thinking is crucial for understanding the nature and role of our men-
tal states in the broad picture which includes our behaviour as well.
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When two subjects both believe that they’re about to be attacked by
a bear, they normally behave similarly. Their mental states have the
same functional role despite having a different semantic profile. They
motivate us to do certain things and don’t do others. The way things
are presented to us—being associated with the Fregean sense—is part
of the explanation of why we behave in certain ways.
The argument we extracted from Perry can thus be understood in
the following way. We can observe a clear difference between Alpha’s
belief I’m being attacked by a bear and Beta’s beliefAlpha is being attacked
by a bear. This difference manifests itself not only in the way things
are presented to the believing subject. Beyond that, we find disparate
kinds of behaviour that are the result of these distinct beliefs. It’s true
that both beliefs have the same semantic object. They both present the
proposition that Alpha is being attacked by a bear to a believing subject.
However, if there’s a difference between the two beliefs, something has
to make that difference. And this difference has to be located on the
functional level because the two beliefs are semantically identical in
that the same proposition is presented to us in thinking.
Let’s quickly compare the functional approach with the other two
previous candidates in order to carve out the dissimilarities. The lin-
guistic approach focused on the mere semantic profile of the character
of an expression. The character of an expression is a tool that gives us
the right semantic value for a linguistic expression in all kinds of con-
versational contexts and situations. In order to do justice to some of the
epistemic requirements, Kaplan imposed a certain necessary epistemic
access onto the semantic story. We clearly witnessed the failure of that
project. On the other hand, the conceptual approach attacked the epi-
stemic issues more directly. It directed its attention on the way the
world is presented to us in thinking by explaining that certain ways of
thinking about the world coincide with the application of certain kinds
of concepts. Again, I explained the problems of such an approach.
Now, the functional approach builds on the useful elements of both
these approaches and adds its own twist. It remarks that mental states
have a certain cognitive role. And this functional aspect needs to be
at the forefront of the characterisation and individualisation of our
mental lives. Perry’s main observation is that two subjects that behave
similarly in a similar situation should be said to have the same kind of
de se belief. In other words, the functional focus ties in our mental lives
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with our interactionwith theworld—after all, that’s whatmental states
are presumably for.The central claim is that beliefs have the functional
nature they have because they present us the world in a certain way.We
can make this claimmore precise in the following way:The way things
are presented to us in thinking determines an intentional attitude with
a specific functional role. If the world were to be presented differently,
the mental state would have a different functional role. And if the be-
lief had a different functional role, it would present things in a differ-
ent way. An example helps to appreciate this interconnection. Imagine
that Alpha thinks that the spider is dangerous and Beta believes that
the spider is harmless. In such a case, one and the same object—the
spider—is presented in two different ways to the subjects. At the same
time, Alpha and Beta behave differently on the basis of these different
beliefs. Beta might inspect the spider closely while Alpha tries to get
as far away as possible. The functional approach can get two things
out of this example. On the one hand, their distinct behaviour tells us
that Alpha and Beta are in different mental states because same input
should result in same output. On the other hand, the fact that they’re
in different mental states has to do with the fact that they think about
the world in different ways (A.2.8).
Perry calls the contextual and functional dimension of our beliefs
the belief state. The psychological state that a subject finds herself in is
primarily characterised by the functional role of that mental state. It’s
what’s common between Alpha believing I’m tall and Beta believing
I’m tall. They’re both in a certain state of believing of themselves that
they’re tall. This comes with a certain functional profile. Both subjects
will reason that they have to duck or that they can reach the top cup-
board. On the other hand, the semantic dimension of the belief is the
belief content. This content gives us the state of affairs, the proposition,
that the subject believes to be the case. In Alpha’s case it’s the proposi-
tion <Alpha, being tall>, while in Beta’s case it’s the proposition <Beta,
being tall>. The belief content is not very different from Kaplan’s con-
tent and emerges from purely semantic aspects of the belief. It’s only
interested in the belief ’s conditions of satisfaction and reference.
We’re now in a position to give a general characterisation of the func-
tional approach to de se thinking and then decide whether it accounts
for the characteristic features of de se thinking. Let’s proceed with the
following for now:
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functional approach to de se thinking
When a subject thinks about herself in the de se way, she entertains
a thought that’s constituted by its functional role, which is determ-
ined by the subject taking what she thinks about to be of direct
importance to her own behaviour.
Admittedly, this is a quite convoluted and maybe imprecise way to
characterise the functional approach. Nonetheless, let me try to illu-
minate it a bit through Perry’s example. The intentional object—what
our subject is thinking about—of Alpha’s belief A bear is about to at-
tack me is the state of affairs that Alpha is being attacked by a bear.
The belief is de se because she takes that particular state of affairs to
be of direct importance to her own behaviour. What does that mean
exactly? In ordinary circumstances, Alpha wouldn’t need any further
reason beside her belief to do something about her being attacked.The
de se belief alone is enough to motivate her to behave accordingly. She
needn’t think that she herself is Alpha, she needn’t think that Alpha
is worthy of her attention and help and so on. Her cognitive archi-
tecture is such that this kind of belief is directly relevant to her beha-
viour. Compare this to Beta’s belief with the same intentional object.
Whether Alpha is being attacked by a bear or not is only indirectly
important to Beta if she believes A bear is about to attack Alpha. She’ll
only come to aid if she likes Alpha, is capable of helping, and so on.
Beta’s cognitive architecture requires additional reasons for that belief
to produce some kind of action. Alpha’s de se belief, on the other hand,
doesn’t require any additional reason to motivate her to act in some
way or other. So, we might say that her belief is of ‘direct importance’
to her own behaviour.
The functional approach characterised our de se thinking via its spe-
cial functional role. What’s characteristic is that the things we believe
about ourselves in the de se way are of direct importance to us. There’s
no gap between the intentional object and the question whether what
we attribute to that object applies to ourselves or not. Subjects are im-
mediately aware that they’re self-ascribing a property. In contrast, de
dicto thoughts about ourselves have a quite different functional role.
They usually concern something distinct from us—for instance the
first woman in space. And this ranges from important world news to
gossip to utter bullshit; things that are usually only indirectly import-
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ant to us. The disparity between the three different ways of thinking
about oneself—de se, de re, and de dicto—is especially pronouncedwhen
we look at how these thoughts are connected to reasoning and motiva-
tion. Only de se thoughts serve directly as reasons for us and motivate
us to do certain things.The others always require some additional de se
element in order to be taken as concerning ourselves. It’s this special in-
timate connection that’s accentuated by the functional approach when
it stresses the function of being directly important to our behaviour.
But does this account for all the characteristic features of de se think-
ing?The satisfaction of the semantic features suggests itself easily. The
belief content of I’m tall heavily depends on who’s entertaining that
belief. The belief wouldn’t have the functional role it has—that is, it
wouldn’t be the belief state it is—if the content weren’t always in some
sense about the believing subject. How could believing I’m tall be of
direct importance to Alpha’s own behaviour if the functional role of
that belief wasn’t to ensure that she’s thinking about herself ? After all,
we can’t assume that she’s interested in someone else’s height. How-
ever, her own height is important to her movement and her possibilit-
ies of action.The functional approach thus jumps on the bandwagon of
the purely semantic two-dimensional approaches. The belief content
of a de se belief is always about the believing subject in the now familiar
context-dependent way. Hence, the conditions of satisfaction system-
atically depend on who’s entertaining the belief. And this is because
a de se belief wouldn’t exhibit the functional role it has if it weren’t of
a type that’s designed to ensure that the subject thinks about herself.
We thus have a nice account of the semantic features of de se thinking.
Because the functional approach focuses so strongly on the connec-
tion between our mental lives and our behaviour, it shouldn’t come as
a surprise that it elegantly accounts for the fact that de se thinking is
intimately tied to intentional action and behaviour. After all, the char-
acterisation of the approach makes explicit reference to the fact that de
se thoughts are taken by the subject as directly important to her own
behaviour. This, of course, implies that other thoughts which aren’t of
the de se kind are only taken by the subject as indirectly important. In
other words, subjects have to concatenate these other thoughts with a
de se mental state in order to take them as their own reasons for inten-
tional action. The notion of directness that’s in play here is somewhat
vague. However, it has to do with the question of whether some addi-
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tional mental state or reason is required for the subject to be motivated
to act on the basis of her belief or desire. Accordingly, a reason or a
mental state is directly important to the subject if no other independ-
ent reason is required for the subject to be motivated to act according
to that particular reason or mental state.
Let’s flesh out this notion of directness a bit more. Many of our
mental states only give us ‘neutral’ information that requires some ad-
ditional state in order to move us to act in a certain way. Let me give
an example to illustrate this. If a subject believes
(10) There is water in the fridge
she’s entertaining a de dicto belief. But that belief isn’t of direct import-
ance to her because the semantic object of her belief—the proposition
<water, being in the fridge>—doesn’t stand in any kind of rational
or motivational relation to her own behaviour. It’s just a piece of in-
formation that might come in handy. But for all we know, our subject
couldn’t care less about the content of the fridge. However, if she so
desires, she can use this information to achieve some of her goals or
satisfy some of her needs. For instance, if she holds the additional de se
belief I’m thirsty, she can link up that belief with her belief (10) to have
a reason to go to the fridge and get the water she believes is in there.
Without the belief (10), she wouldn’t know where she can satisfy her
thirst. So, while her new de se belief is of direct importance to her be-
haviour, it doesn’t yet ensure successful action. However, (10) alone
doesn’t come equipped with the motivational power that’s typical of
de se thinking. It always requires some additional belief or mental state
to be motivational. So, believing (10) is only indirectly important to a
subject’s behaviour because it requires an additional belief or desire to
be motivating.
If we compare this with the subject’s belief I’m thirsty, we note that
this de se belief doesn’t require further motivational input. It’s directly
relevant to her behaviour. Upon believing herself to be thirsty, she will
think about whether she knows any places to get water or actually go
out to look for a fridge or a fountain. This is because a certain state
of affairs is given to the subject in such a way as to be of personal
relevance—in this case her survival. The function of de se thinking is
to present things as strictly about oneself. And this, in turn, results
in it being directly important to the thinking subject. In believing I’m
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thirsty, the subject’s thirst is presented to herself as something that
concerns her in a very immediate way.Moreover, the functional role of
that particular belief is such that it moves a subject to find something
to drink—always provided there aren’t any other conflicting reasons.
We can thus see nicely how the functional approach accounts for the
intimate connection between de se thinking and intentional action.
What about the proposed immunity to error through misidentifica-
tion that’s typical of de se thinking? Here, things get a bit more tricky.
It’s not immediately clear why immunity should be a feature of mental
states with the functional role that’s indicated in our characterisation.
We said that a subject entertaining a thought with immunity usually
shouldn’t enquire about the intentional object of her thought. If a sub-
ject believes I’m tall, it isn’t open for discussion to her who she’s think-
ing about. There’s no room for error on the part of the subject here.
I explained that one reason for this characteristic is that de se think-
ing typically doesn’t involve an identification of a subject. And this is
why that identification can’t go wrong in such cases. How does the
functional approach fare in this regard? If we look at the characterisa-
tion above, we can’t detect a clear relationship between the intentional
object of a thought being directly important to the behaviour of the
subject entertaining that thought and the fact that this mental state is
a candidate for the immunity in question. Of course, there’s a way to
connect the two things. For instance, one might argue that a subject
can only take something to be directly relevant to herself in the way
envisioned by the functional approach if that mental state is free of
any identification. Were it dependent on an identificational element
in thinking, the thought would only be indirectly relevant to the sub-
ject. So, one might try to argue that identification-freedom and direct
importance to the subject go hand in hand.
There’s a problem with this tightly knit connection though. I argued
that immunity isn’t a feature of the structure of a given mental state
but rather a feature of the epistemic process that underlies the origin
of a thought. One and the same mental state can be immune in one
case and subject to error in another. The fact that a subject takes a
given state of affairs as directly relevant to her own behaviour is quite
independent of the epistemic question concerning the basis of her be-
lief or judgement. Chances are that a subject takes something to be
directly relevant to her actions but still wonders about the intentional
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object of her thought. For instance, she might—on the basis of seeing
a wound on an arm she takes to be her own—judge I’m bleeding and
take this to be directly relevant to her own behaviour. However, due
to the dependence on an identification of some arm as her own, the
judgement doesn’t exhibit immunity. In such a case, we would have
direct importance without identification-freedom.
Themorale of this argument is that not all de se thoughts are immune
to error throughmisidentification. But, according to the functional ap-
proach, all of them are taken by the subject as directly relevant to her
own behaviour. The only way to account for immunity from this per-
spective is to tie it in with the directness of de se thoughts. But this
is overstraining the connection between de se thinking and immunity.
Not all de se beliefs exhibit immunity, yet all of them are taken as dir-
ectly relevant to the subject within the functional approach. Hence,
this directness can’t be taken as an explanatory reason for the immunity
of some de se beliefs. If direct importance explained immunity, then
all de se beliefs should be immune, but that’s not true. Some weaker ex-
planatory feature is required, but unfortunately absent from the func-
tional picture as described here.
This plea for a more flexible connection is at the same time one
of the major shortcomings of the functional approach. Merely distin-
guishing between the contextual and functional belief state on the one
hand and the semantic belief content on the other doesn’t yet tell us
much about the nature of de se thinking. It’s extremely plausible that
de se mental states have a peculiar functional role. But that insight is
utterly anaemic without a further account of what that functional role
precisely consists in. In fact, the proposed connection to our behaviour
and the indication of the direct importance smacks of hand-waving.
We’ve already established that de se thinking is of special importance
to action and behaviour. So, we’ve already marked the field via this
specific function which distinguishes it from non-de se beliefs we have
about ourselves. But we want to have an account of what’s responsible
for that feature. We don’t just want to have it repeated in our defini-
tion of de se thinking. And unfortunately, such an explanation is absent
from the picture (A.2.9).
Sure enough, Perry’s distinction between belief state and belief con-
tent tells us something about de se thinking. It just doesn’t tell us enough.
It establishes quite clearly the peculiar functional role of our thoughts
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about ourselves but it fails to give an account of what’s responsible for
this function. So, the final verdict for the two-dimensional strategies
is unfortunately negative. None of them provides an explanation that
satisfies all our theoretical demands and answers all our fundamental
questions about de se thinking. However, the survey of these failed ap-
proaches wasn’t for naught. We learned the importance of four things.
First, de se thinking has a peculiar directness to it. This directness is
especially manifest in the role de se thinking plays with regard to in-
tentional action and behaviour. We literally can’t help ourselves but
to take our de se thoughts personally. Secondly, there’s an important
epistemic dimension present in de se thinking. Subjects immediately
know that their de se thoughts concern themselves without needing to
apply complex linguistic or conceptual rules. In other words, we can
find a certain epistemic immediacy to our de se thoughts. Thirdly, and
this is related to the previous point, the mode of presentation that’s
typical of de se thinking is fundamentally different from the way we
think about other objects in the world. We draw different conclusions,
act differently, and our thoughts are more directly about their inten-
tional objects—ourselves. The final point will set our way for the next
chapter. We need to depart from the overly intellectual way of char-
acterising our mental states if we want to do justice to de se thinking.
Both the linguistic and the conceptual approach started out from a fo-
cus on certain highly intellectual capacities. But neither our linguistic
competences nor our conceptual abilities can account for the very ba-
sic way of thinking about oneself that’s typical of de se thinking and
grounds these more demanding other capacities. We need to turn to
this primitive first-personal access in order to better understand what
makes our thoughts about ourselves so special.

3
BACK TO THE PRIMIT IVE
Beyond the obvious facts that he has at some time done
manual labour, that he takes snuff, that he is a Freemason,
that he has been in China, and that he has done a con-
siderable amount of writing lately, I can deduce nothing
else.
Arthur Conan Doyle: Adventures of Sherlock Holmes: 31
Whenever we think about the multitude of things in the world, we
attribute properties to these things. We think of the strawberry as ripe,
the day as rainy, the friend as loving and reliable. In all these cases,
there’s a thing we think about and a property we attribute to that thing.
Of course, we can attribute many different properties to one and the
same thing. And by doing that we get a pretty good picture of what
kind of thing it is. In fact, many things can be singled out and individu-
ated by providing a list of all the properties they supposedly have. In
just this way, Sherlock Holmes thinks about the unknown suspect in
the epigraph of this chapter. He doesn’t have a name or a face yet, but
Sherlock has a list of properties of which he knows that the suspect in-
stantiates them—a fancy and more accurate way of saying that a thing
has a property, because things can’t literally have properties, for other-
wise every property could only be had by one thing at a time, which
isn’t what we want. Once he has a list of properties, Sherlock can roam
the world and look for the thing that matches his description.
This is but one example of the importance of properties to our ability
of thinking about the world. They allow us to characterise the things
in the world and distinguish them from one another. These charac-
terisations can be quite general or very rigorous. To illustrate this, we
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can think of Valentina Tereshkova either as a woman or as the brown-
haired Russian cosmonaut born on March, 6, 1937 in Maslennikovo
who, as the first woman, spent 2 days, 23 hours, and 12 minutes in
space. While the former merely places her in a large group of individu-
als who share a property, the latter way of thinking about her ascribes
a whole list of properties to an individual and sets it apart from prob-
ably all other things in our world. As a matter of fact, there’s only one
thing that instantiates all of these properties, whereas there are many
women in our world. So, the more properties we know of something or
someone, the better we know it. And this ultimately brings us closer to
the thing itself. In order to unravel the mystery and ultimately identify
the culprit, Sherlock Holmes and other detectives have to try to dis-
cover as many properties as possible about the suspect. So, we have
another example of how properties play a crucial role in our thinking.
But what are properties? Here’s a very short answer. Properties help
us to characterise the individual things in the world.Most importantly,
they’re something that different things can share, such as when we say
that all the apples on the tree are ripe and ready for picking. In such a
case, we ascribe one and the same property to a variety of, in this case
related, things. In such a way, we can group the things in the world
into clusters sharing the respective properties. As already mentioned,
this also means that properties are normally such that they can be in-
stantiated by several things at the same time. But this doesn’t exclude
the possibility that in our world, or in all different possible worlds com-
bined, only one thing has a particular simple or complex property. We
saw that Valentina Tereshkova is the only thing in our world that ‘fits’
the description of being the brown-haired Russian cosmonaut born
on March, 6, 1937 in Maslennikovo who, as the first woman, spent
2 days, 23 hours, and 12 minutes in space. In other words, she’s the
only thing that instantiates this complex property. In theory, however,
there might be a different thing, maybe in a different world, who also
instantiates that same property.
There are quite many different metaphysical theories about the exact
nature of properties. They deal with questions such as: ‘How can it be
that one thing—e.g. the property of being red—can be wholly present
in two different things at the same time?’ or ‘How can a thing actually
instantiate or take part in a property?’ But we need not deal with these
intricate discussions and bits and bobs. What matters to us is that we
back to the primitive 93
attribute properties to things in thinking, be they individual things
or clusters of things. By that, we logically distribute all the things in
the world into two different groups: the things that instantiate the
property and the things that don’t. Accordingly, the property of be-
ing red divvies up the world into a pile of red things—ripe tomatoes,
human blood, some of Helen Frankenthaler’s paintings, a 1986 Fer-
rari Testarossa—and a pile of things which aren’t red—my hair, clean
drinking water, some other paintings of Helen Frankenthaler.
This way of thinking should strike you as familiar, at least if you’ve
read through chapter 2.There, I explained how concepts work in think-
ing. And in fact, concepts and properties are closely related. Both
things are attributed to things in the world and logically divide all
the things into two different piles. This is a good opportunity to make
the relationship between the two notions a bit more precise. When we
say that a property characterises a thing, we mean to say that the prop-
erty is really instantiated in that thing out there in the world. On the
other hand, concepts are tools of thinking. We apply them in thinking
about the things out there in the world. Hence, when a concept using
subject thinks that the spider is dangerous, she applies the concept
of danger to the thing she thinks of as a spider. In doing that, she
ascribes the property of being dangerous to that individual thing. If
that thing really has that property, her application of the concept was
felicitous. Otherwise, she misapplied the concept in attributing a spe-
cific property to that thing.We can also metaphorically put it this way:
Properties really divvy up the things in the world into different piles
while concepts are our tool of thinkingly dividing the things into piles.
The notion of a property is thus a metaphysical one. That is to say
that it deals with the structure and the things that make up reality.
On the other hand, the notion of a concept is epistemically flavoured.
It reflects the way we think about and gain knowledge of the world
around us. It’s important to keep this distinction in mind. However,
we can and shall talk about the ascription or attribution of properties
in thinking as well. This way of describing things—and the contrast to
the application of concepts—opens up our theoretical scope. It allows
us to capture not only conceptual thinking but every kind of thinking
in which subjects characterise the things they think about in some way.
Using this broader notion, we can say that a newborn thinks of
a stick as bent by ascribing the property of being bent to the stick
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but without applying either the concept of a stick or the concept of
a bend in her thinking. Of course, this way of talking is still epistem-
ically loaded since the newborn might gain some form of knowledge
about the stick through her ascription of the property. Furthermore,
she might be wrong in her ascription of the property. On the other
hand, the stick itself either has the property of being bent or it doesn’t.
We don’t find the epistemic possibility of false ascription of a property
in reality. I will thus contrast between a property being instantiated or
had by a thing and a property being ascribed by a subject to a thing.
Only the latter has an epistemic touch and will prove to be a fruitful
way of describing the situations we’re interested in.
Naturally, we don’t just ascribe properties to things in the world
around us. We also attribute them to ourselves. We think of ourselves
as being tall, as romantic and empathic, as late, or as drunk and in pain.
These are all instances of self-ascriptions. Through these self-ascrip-
tions, we form a picture of ourselves—whether it’s an adequate picture
is, of course, a different question. And every time we ascribe a property
to ourselves we can be described as placing ourselves logically in one
of two piles. So, when Alpha thinks that she’s tall, she characterises
herself as being tall. She thinks that she herself instantiates the prop-
erty of being tall by ascribing that property to herself. And through
that, she groups herself together with all the other tall things in the
world. In the context of our expedition to learn about how we think
about ourselves, these self-ascriptions are of prime interest. What’s
their role in de se thinking? Can they tell us something new which we
haven’t yet discovered (A.3.1)?
3.1 godly properties
We saw that the Propophile way of thinking comes with a certain
schema.They attempt to characterise our de se thoughts on the basis of
a certain proposition—a possible way the world could be—that a sub-
ject entertains. I then examined three different strategies of explaining
how an impersonal proposition can come to concern us in the way typ-
ical of de se thinking. In all these cases, we witnessed a move away from
the proposition itself to the way the subject entertains that proposition.
And maybe the right lesson to be learned from these failed attempts
is to lay aside this Fregean relic and try things anew. Maybe, it’s much
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easier to understand the way we think about the world and ourselves
if we simply take ourselves to ascribe properties to things.
The two famous American philosophers David Kellogg Lewis and
Roderick Chisholm provide prime examples of this way of understand-
ing things. They both want to explain how we think about ourselves
in the de se way in terms of the properties we ascribe to ourselves. One
of their central claims is that only through self-ascribing a property
do we arrive at a de se belief. In other words, entertaining a de se belief
amounts to the self-ascription of a property and that’s it. There’s no
need to bring a proposition or the first person concept into play. All
that’s required is that subjects take themselves to have certain prop-
erties by self-ascribing them. According to this picture then, when
Alpha believes I’m tall, she takes herself to have the property of being
tall by self-ascribing that property. And Beta’s belief I’m tall works in
just the same way: She takes herself to have the property of being tall
by self-ascribing that property.
How did they arrive at this theory? Well, like us, they started with
the Propophile doctrine and soon realised that it can’t be the whole
story. Lewis in particular was interested in properties for reasons that
go beyond the desire to account for de se thinking. He defended a the-
ory that held that every possible world is as real as our own actual
world and exists in the same way. In this theory, properties play an im-
portant role. This is because Lewis took properties to be just the set of
all individual things that instantiate a particular property. He thus ar-
rived at the claim that the property of being red is nothing but the pile
of all things which are red, whether they’re part of our world or some
other far away possible world.This is a surprising claim and somewhat
different from a more Platonic idea according to which a property is
something abstract and outside the realm of directly accessible reality.
Lewis wanted to hold on to the idea that properties are very real—
just like all the possible worlds where they’re instantiated. For our pur-
poses, we don’t need to deal with this debate because nothing in our
endeavour hinges on the exact metaphysical nature of properties. I, for
one, don’t subscribe to Lewis’s theory of possible worlds and proper-
ties. Nonetheless, the thesis that believing in the de se way amounts to
self-ascribing properties is a worthwhile candidate to examine. And
this is why we can just go with the Lewisian flow for the moment and
throw his metaphysics over board later.
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With this metaphysical theory in his pocket, he then contrasted the
way properties divide logical space with the way propositions divide
that same logical space. Let me explain what I mean by ‘dividing lo-
gical space’. Earlier, I elucidated that propositions are generally true
and false in a possible world in toto. That means that if the proposi-
tion <Sydney, being the capital of Australia> is false for me, then it’s
ipso facto false for every other individual in our actual possible world.
Either the world is in that way or it isn’t. There’s no middle ground
and no room for variation here. Propositions aren’t true for some indi-
viduals and false for other individuals within the same possible world.
Hence, if we want to draw a logical map of truth for that particular
proposition within the universe of possibilities—telling us ‘where’ the
proposition is true and where it’s false—our smallest unit will be that
of a possible world.We can’t say that the proposition is true in one part
of that world and false in another. This shows us that propositions can
merely logically carve around possible worlds and divide logical space
along world borders—this way of speaking should, of course, be under-
stood metaphorically and not geometrically. Correspondingly, when
I want to know what the proposition <Sydney, being the capital of
Australia> logically amounts to, I will always pick out whole possible
worlds where that proposition is either true or false.
Now, from this logical point of view, properties are quite different.
They can be instantiated in some objects of a possible world but not
in others. For instance, the property of standing is at this moment
instantiated in some human beings, water bottles and lamps. At the
same time, it isn’t instantiated in some pens, sleeping animals, clouds
and pieces of clothing. This suggests that a property can logically cut
through a possible world and divide things within such a world. So,
properties can ‘zoom in’ on a possible world where propositions are
blind. But properties can do even more. They’re sometimes instanti-
ated in every object of a possible world. To give an example, let’s exam-
ine the property of inhabiting the actual world. Quick reflection reveals
that everything has that property in the actual world and nothing has
it in all the non-actual possible worlds. Hence, this property picks out
a whole possible world within logical space in a similar way as propos-
itions do. These useful features of properties open up the possibility
of dividing logical space in a much more fine-grained way. A specific
property can be instantiated in a couple of objects in the actual world
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and in a couple more in other possible worlds. So, properties are both
capable of carving logical space around possible worlds, in a similar
manner as propositions do, and they’re able to carve through possible
worlds and divide logical space willy-nilly.
That’s certainly an interesting piece of information, but we should
better put it to use somehow. And in fact, there’s more to the Lewisian
story. He goes on to argue that all the work propositions do can be
done equally well if we just use properties. Properties are a much more
flexible tool when mapping logical space and can be used in just the
way that propositions function. How does that work? Well, as we just
saw, there are indeed properties that carve around possible worlds in
the same manner as propositions. They always group together whole
possible worlds including all the individuals that are part of that world.
We’ve already seen a very special such property in action: the property
of inhabiting the actual world. What other kinds of properties could
do that? For instance the property of being such that Anna Magdalena
Bach died in Leipzig.This is a property that you and I—and in fact every
stone, leaf, star, molecule, or Higgs boson in the actual world—have.
Everything in our world has that curious property because it’s a fact
that Anna Magdalena Bach died in Leipzig. And this fact makes it so
that everything in our world has that, admittedly very unsubstantial,
property (A.3.2).
What’s more important for Lewis’s argument is that if we look at the
proposition <Anna Magdalena Bach, having died in Leipzig> which
corresponds to the fact above, we quickly realise that everything in
every possible world where that proposition is true has the correspond-
ing property being such that AnnaMagdalena Bach died in Leipzig. So, if
we peek into possible world w249, where Anna Magdalena Bach also
died in Leipzig, we see that everything instantiates that property just
as everything has that property in the actual world. And conversely,
nothing instantiates that property in all the worlds where the proposi-
tion is false. If we had a look at a possible world where she didn’t die in
Leipzig, nothing could possibly have that property because it’s simply
not true in that world that she died in Leipzig. Hence, if we overlay
the logical space as divided by that proposition with the logical space
as divided by that property, we get a perfect match. Isn’t that great?
Unfortunately, this exercise of logical connect the dots isn’t particu-
larly impressive if we can’t show that properties are necessary for dealing
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with de se thinking. Of course, Lewis is well aware of this requirement
and gives us an argument why we need to take properties on board and
throw propositions out. In fact, he gives us both a negative argument
why propositions aren’t enough—something which we by now hope-
fully accepted—and a positive one which tells us why properties are
a suitable candidate to fill the void that propositions leave. Together,
they are designed to support the claim that properties are a necessary
and sufficient conceptual tool to understand de se thoughts. Let’s see
how Lewis puts the negative part first.
His argument starts from the contrast between knowing something
about the world and knowing something about oneself. Sometimes a
subject gains knowledge about her surroundings, for instance when she
learns the truth about Valentina Tereshkova’s birthplace. And in other
cases, a subject learns the truth about herself, such as when she knows
that she herself is bleeding. Importantly, every piece of self-know-
ledge is at the same time a piece of world-knowledge. If Alpha knows
that she’s tall, then she ipso facto knows something about the world—
namely, that Alpha is tall or that someone is tall. Of course, she might
not know it in that neutral guise, but she knows something about
the world nonetheless. In contrast, and trivially, not everything we
know about the world is a piece of self-knowledge. If Beta knows that
Valentina Tereshkova was born in Maslennikovo, she doesn’t know
anything about herself. Even if some piece of knowledge about the
world is actually about the knowing subject, that fact might be elusive
to her and result in a piece of knowledge about the world without self-
knowledge. So, Gammamight know that Gamma is bleeding without
at the same time knowing that she herself is bleeding. This is our old
contrast between thinking and knowing de re and de se.
Now, imagine there are two omniscient goddesses. As long as we’re
merely equipped with propositions in our theory, we can character-
ise their omniscience as knowledge of every true proposition in their
world. In other words, they know all the facts in their world because
every true proposition corresponds to a fact. They’re equipped with
every possible piece of knowledge about the world. If something is a
fact, then they know it and if something isn’t a fact, then they don’t be-
lieve it. For instance, they know that there are mountains, that there
are goddesses, and that these goddesses interact with their world in
various ways. Let’s imagine that one of the two goddesses, Alpha,
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who’s known to live on the coldest mountain, throws down thunder-
bolts. The other, Beta, who’s known to live on the tallest mountain,
throws down manna.
Being omniscient, both goddesses know these facts. Taking the Pro-
pophile perspective, we would say that they both know the proposition
<Alpha, living on the coldest mountain and throwing down thunder-
bolts> and they both know the proposition <Beta, living on the tallest
mountain and throwing down manna>. So far, so good. But we can
now ask the crucial question: ‘Do they know which of the two god-
desses they themselves are?’ For instance, does Alpha know, based on
her knowledge of every fact, that she herself lives on the coldest moun-
tain? The initial hunch is to say yes—after all, they know all the facts
of their world and it’s a fact that Alpha lives on the coldest mountain—
but Lewis provides us with a famous thought experiment which sup-
ports the negative answer:
Consider the case of the two gods. They inhabit a cer-
tain possible world, and they know exactly which world
it is. Therefore they know every proposition that is true
at their world. Insofar as knowledge is a propositional at-
titude, they are omniscient. Still I can imagine them to
suffer ignorance: neither one knows which of the two he
is.They are not exactly alike. One lives on top of the tallest
mountain and throws down manna; the other lives on top
of the coldest mountain and throws down thunderbolts.
Neither one knows whether he lives on the tallest moun-
tain or on the coldest mountain; nor whether he throws
manna or thunderbolts.
Lewis 1979: 520–521
It’s important here to clearly understand Lewis’s claim. It’s easy to
imagine the two goddesses sitting on the top of their respective moun-
tain and looking from there into their world. With this picture in
our mind, it’s then hard to additionally imagine them as being ignor-
ant of their own location. But the argument isn’t trying to deny that.
Lewis never takes into account the specific perspective of the two god-
desses. And with good reason. The kind of knowledge that proposi-
tions provide is very much independent from the specific perspective
that the goddesses find themselves in. After all, propositions are in an
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important way neutral to the perspectives that we take on the world.
They’re a representation of how the world could possibly be ‘from a
bird’s eye view’. So, what the argument tries to show is that if we
take their omniscience to be purely propositional—consisting of the
knowledge of every true proposition and nothing beyond that—then
they can’t know where they themselves are.
How plausible is that? Lewis holds that we sometimes entertain
beliefs and gain knowledge about ourselves which can’t be properly
represented through observing that the subject believes or knows a
certain proposition to be true. Rather, in some cases, subjects believe
something about themselves in virtue of ascribing a property to them-
selves. And this is different to believing a proposition about oneself to
be true.The case of the two goddesses illustrates this possibility vividly.
The knowledge that Alpha lacks is that she herself lives on the coldest
mountain and throws down thunderbolts. She already knows that Al-
pha lives on the coldest mountain—corresponding to her knowledge
of the proposition <Alpha, living on the coldest mountain>—but she
lacks the necessary self-knowledge in the form of underlying know-
ledge that she herself lives on the coldest mountain. Coming to know
that she herself lives on the coldest mountain doesn’t correspond to
coming to know a new proposition—it’s just the proposition <Alpha,
living on the coldest mountain> in a new disguise. But she already
knew that proposition. Hence, no new proposition can represent this
new insight.
Let me quickly summarise Lewis’s argument. Propositions are such
that they are true in a possible world in its totality. This is our Propo-
phile starting point. Now, knowledge of one’s own location in a world
is knowledge a subject can gain. Yet, if propositions are as the Pro-
pophile envisages them, knowledge of one’s own location can’t be ac-
counted for in terms of knowledge of a proposition. Hence, there’s the
possibility of knowing something that can’t be accounted for within
the Propophile story. More specifically, propositions aren’t enough to
give a full picture of how we think about ourselves and the world.
First off, the crucial premise of the argument is of course that the
Propophile isn’t able to account for a subject’s knowledge of her own
location. The case of the two goddesses, however, makes that premise
very plausible and hence it’s capable of supporting the overall argu-
ment. Alpha learning that she herself lives on the coldest mountain
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isn’t learning a proposition that differs from the proposition <Alpha,
living on the coldest mountain>—a proposition she already knows.
There’s no new proposition that she could come to know which cor-
responds to her novel knowledge of her own location in her world.
Secondly, the conclusion isn’t new to us. We’ve reached it via a dif-
ferent route already. Accordingly, you might be unimpressed by this
mere repetition. What’s important and interesting, however, is that
we arrived at the same result via a different route this time. There-
fore, we have just the more reason to dismiss the Propophile idea. And
moreover, any supporter of it has to overcome an additional difficulty.
Furthermore, Lewis doesn’t stop at this negative point but has a pos-
itive argument in store with which he aims to establish a New World
Order to surpass the reign of the Propophiles. This time, it’s not pro-
positions that rule the world, but properties.
The theory that Lewis, Chisholm, and other so-called property the-
orists aim to defend typically has two components. First of all, de se
beliefs are nothing but self-ascriptions of properties. If Alpha believes
I’m tall, she doesn’t believe a certain proposition in a certain first-per-
sonal way, she also doesn’t necessarily apply the first person concept
in her thinking. All she does is that she self-ascribes the property of
being tall. Secondly, every belief is ultimately a de se belief. And more
broadly, every thought is de se in nature.This is a quite surprising claim.
Just earlier, I wrote that it’s trivially true that not everything we know
about the world is a piece of self-knowledge. If Alpha believes that
Valentina Tereshkova was born in Maslennikovo, that doesn’t strike
us as particularly about herself. But now, these philosophers have the
outrageous idea of claiming exactly that. How do they explain that?
It’s a surprisingly simple theory because we’re already equipped with
a substantial theory of what a property is. So, let’s try to make some
sense of this curious claim. When our goddess Alpha entertains a de
se belief like I’m living on the coldest mountain, she ascribes a certain
property to herself. That property is the property of living on the coldest
mountain. Everyone could self-ascribe that property and end up with
a belief of the same kind. In a way, we can describe what she’s doing
with her belief as Alpha ‘locating herself in logical space’. That means
that she takes herself to be part of the set of things that live on the
coldest mountain. She metaphorically takes a good look at the logical
layout and determines that she’s located within the group of things
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that are unfortunate enough to live on the coldest mountain of their
respective world. Of course, we might find other objects among that
set. There might be a Yeti who lives on the coldest mountain in its
world as well. But Alpha doesn’t need to think about the other things
that also might have that property. She only needs to think that she’s
part of that particular group with that particular property. Similarly,
when I believe that I’m tall, I count myself as belonging to the tall
population of things.
Describing Alpha’s de se belief as locating herself in logical space is
certainly very metaphorical and needs to be unravelled and demysti-
fied a bit. Taking into account what has been said about the nature
of properties will help a great deal in this task. I explained that prop-
erties divide logical space into two respective groups: the things that
instantiate that property and the things that don’t. We can illuminate
this by looking at how regular space is divided into different groups.
For instance, there are different planets in our solar system and we see
ourselves as Earthlings—inhabitants of that blue planet. So, regular
space is divided into groups of things in a similar way as logical space
is divided into sets of things that do or don’t instantiate a property.
Against this metaphorical background, we can say that a subject
who self-ascribes a certain property is therefore similarly identifying
herself with a specific part of logical space and laying claim to her
membership. Because it’s possible to divide all the things in all the
possible worlds into, maybe overlapping, groups corresponding to the
different properties there are, we can expound that believing I am F
amounts to laying claim to membership of the group of things which
are F. And of course, a subject can self-ascribe several properties at
once. She then identifies herself as part of the group of things which
instantiate all of these properties. In this sense, then, self-ascription of
a property is tantamount to locating oneself in logical space according
to the properties one believes oneself to have.
That doesn’t yet explain the outrageous idea that every belief is ul-
timately de se in nature. But this doesn’t require a big theoretical leap
anymore. Let’s look at a case where our goddess entertains a classic de
re belief like Olympus Mons is 21’230 meters tall. It seems obvious that
this belief has nothing to do with our goddess. It’s about that high
mountain on planet Mars and not about herself. How can we spin
this in order to get a belief that’s truly about herself ?
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The answer lies in my earlier explanation that we can create a prop-
erty for every proposition and have them both correspond to each other
in logical terms. In the case of Alpha’s belief, we can take advantage of
the logical equivalence between the property being such that Olympus
Mons is 21’230 meters tall and the proposition <Olympus Mons, being
21’230 meters tall>. Both divide logical space in the exact same way to
produce two identical groups. Everything that has that property will
be a part of a world where the proposition is true and nothing can
have that property in a world where the proposition is false. The re-
spective areas in logical space that are grouped together by these two
distinct things are perfectly identical. Once this is accepted, it’s easy
to just transcribe her de re belief into her self-ascribing that property
and we’ve got a de se belief. To put it differently, in de re believing that
Olympus Mons is 21’230 meters tall, she’s identifying herself as a part
of the group of things that has the property of being such that Olym-
pus Mons is 21’230 meters tall by self-ascribing that property. And
this is nothing but a de se belief.
It now becomes even more obvious how important properties seem
to be for our thinking about the world. In the theories of Lewis and
Chisholm, they constitute the cornerstones of how subjects are cap-
able of being in mental states. While the Propophiles held that think-
ing is constituted by a subject entertaining a proposition in a certain
way, the property theorists tell us that thinking is nothing but the self-
ascription of properties of various kinds. There are three reasons why
such a move is deemed worthwhile. First of all, there are some men-
tal states—de se ones in particular—which are especially problematic
for the Propophile way of thinking. Secondly, properties are much
more liberal in dividing up logical space and can therefore correspond
to many more ways that subjects think about the world. Importantly,
they can do the logical job that propositions do just as well; they’re
a perfect substitute. Thirdly and finally, thinking in the de se way is
easily explained by holding that subjects self-ascribe properties when
they think about themselves (A.3.3).
3.2 ascribing it to yourself
With this preliminary grip on the idea that de se thinking amounts to
the self-ascription of properties, we now want to take a closer look at
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how this way of describing things stands in relation to the character-
istic features of thinking in the de se way. The upshot of Lewis’s argu-
ments is that propositions can’t do the job we want them to do, but
that properties are perfect for it. The resulting idea is that whenever
we have a de se belief, we have a subject that self-ascribes some prop-
erty or other—and not a subject who believes some proposition. This
is supposed to give an account of how we think about ourselves in the
de se way. In other words, it’s an attempt to yield an explanation of the
nature of de se thinking.
While the idea of self-ascription certainly has some immediate ap-
peal and sounds rather inconspicuous, it also requires a bit more elab-
oration in order to be capable of providing a satisfactory account of de
se thinking. Let’s start by examining the following de se belief as a case
study for our theory:
(11) I’m happy.
A subject that entertains the belief (11) believes that she herself is
happy. According to the property theory, this amounts to the subject
self-ascribing the property of being happy. Now, in Lewis’s terms, ‘we
identify ourselves as members of subpopulations’ (Lewis 1979: 519)
when we self-ascribe a certain property. And because Lewis takes a
property to be a set, or subpopulation, of all things with a certain qual-
ity, the property of being happy is nothing but the set of all happy
things in all possible worlds. Hence, our believing subject takes her-
self to be a member of the group of happy things, as opposed to the
sad things, in her self-ascription of that property. We could also say
that she identifies herself with the happy things.
Two things are of relevance in this context. First, the self-ascription
doesn’t have to be appropriate. A subject can potentially self-ascribe
any property she wants without there being any grounds for her to be-
lieve that she really has that property. Nothing is stopping you from
believing that you’re flying right now while you’re sitting in your chair
reading this book. You simply fail to self-ascribe a property that you
actually have. We often go wrong and the theory leaves room for that.
Moreover, subjects sometimes self-ascribe a property without enter-
taining the corresponding de se belief or forming the relevant judge-
ment. For instance, I might imagine myself hitting a wonderful down
the line backhand winner. But, I do this in the mode of imagination.
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Hence, the self-ascription is done only imaginatively. Since these cases
would have to be discussed more seriously within an account of ima-
gination, they won’t occupy us further here.
Secondly, subjects can either self-ascribe a property or they can
ascribe it to other things in the world. Accordingly, Alpha can, above
entertaining the de se belief (11), believe that Beta is happy by ascribing
the property of being happy to Beta. But such a belief is crucially dif-
ferent from her de se belief, which is constituted by her self-ascribing
the property of being happy. Believing that Beta is happy is a classical
instance of a de re belief and needs to be contrasted sharply from the
de se belief (11). The reductionist programme of Lewis and Chisholm
doesn’t change or hide that fact. Even if all beliefs are ultimately logic-
ally reduced to the de se, we need to make room for the different types
of thinking about objects and ourselves on an epistemic and semantic
level. And, indeed, it’s seemingly easy to distinguish the two beliefs
from each other. Following Lewis, we could say that believing de re
that Beta is happy amounts to self-ascribing the property of being such
that Beta is happy. If we believe the property theory, we get a new and
different de se belief that we could express in the following way:
(12) I’m such that Beta is happy.
I hope it’s obvious enough that there’s a big difference between be-
lieving (11) and (12). We can start by noticing that the two properties
which are self-ascribed are quite different. They aren’t different in the
way that the property of being red is different from the property of
being happy. There’s more to it. The two function logically in very dif-
ferent ways. The property that’s self-ascribed in (11) is such that it can
pick out individuals willy-nilly. Any individual in any possible world
can possess it. What the property leaves us with is a pile of things with
borders that run laterally to and across the borders of possible worlds.
In contrast, the property that’s self-ascribed in (12) is such that it can
only pick out very specific groups of individuals. More precisely, it
either picks out all the individuals of a given possible world or none of
them—it corresponds to our good old proposition. A thing can only
be such that Beta is happy if she inhabits a world where it’s a fact that
Beta is happy. Conversely, everything in a world where that fact ob-
tains has the relevant property. Hence, propositions and properties can
be mapped onto each other.
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Now, one important duty of our theory of choice certainly is to dis-
tinguish accurately between thinking de dicto, de re, and de se. Most cru-
cially, we want to clearly isolate cases of thinking in the de se way. So,
how do we distinguish between the de re belief Beta is happy and the de
se belief (11)? The difference between the two properties that are self-
ascribed in (11) and (12) seems to be up to that task. Correspondingly,
despite the fact that Lewis and Chisholm treat both of these beliefs
as ultimately de se in nature—owed to the fact that they’re both self-
ascriptions of a property—they’re nonetheless distinct. They’re self-
ascriptions of quite different kinds of properties. One is the property
of being happy, the other is the property of being such that Beta is
happy. We’re then left with a typical de se belief about oneself in the
case of (11) and a de re belief about Beta translated into a special de se
belief for (12).
Andwemight add that the two properties aren’t merely contingently
distinct. They don’t just happen to pick out different piles of things.
Of course, believing that I’m happy is different from believing that
I’m tall. I self-ascribe very different properties in these two cases since
they correspond to different portions of logical space. But that’s not
the difference at play when we’re looking at the properties involved in
(11) and (12). After all, we’re after a possibility to distinguish clearly
between de se and de re beliefs. Here, we’re faced with two properties
that aren’t just accidentally distinct. Rather, the property of being happy
and the property of being such that Beta is happy are different by their
logical nature. While the former individuates on the level of individual
things—trees, dark matter, office supplies, or polar bears—the latter
individuates on the level of possible worlds.
Let me explain this difference. Simple properties such as being happy
or standing are of a kind that picks out individuals and forms groups
which cut across possible worlds. And because they pick out individu-
als, a subject can locate herself in logical space on the level of indi-
viduals on the basis of self-ascribing them. We could metaphorically
paraphrase this by saying that a subject who believes (11) is identify-
ing herself with a certain kind of individual: a happy one. Accordingly,
self-ascribing such a simple property amounts to a ‘real’ de se belief.
On the other hand, there are more complex and special properties
such as being such that Beta is happy or inhabiting the actual world or
being such that Anna Magdalena Bach died in Leipzig. These properties
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don’t pick out individuals that form groups which cut across possible
worlds. Rather, they always pick out either all the things or none of
them in a given possible world.We could say that these properties have
a lower resolution than the simple properties above because they aren’t
as finely grained. They can’t pick out individual things but only groups
of things which correspond to propositions. As a result, a subject can
only locate herself in logical space on the level of possible worlds by
self-ascribing such a property. Again, we could put this metaphorically
by explaining that a subject who believes (12) is identifying herself
with a certain kind of possible world: a containing-a-happy-Beta one.
Accordingly, self-ascribing such a complex property amounts to a de
re belief—a ‘false’ de se belief.
Having identified a logical difference between these two kinds of
properties, we could now say that we’ve clearly marked the difference
between thinking de re and thinking de se. The former consists of the
self-ascription of a property that individuates on the level of possible
worlds while the latter consists of the self-ascription of a property that
individuates on the level of individuals.
That sounds fair and square, but there’s an unfortunate oversight
which will teach us an important lesson. Remember that the belief
(12) was introduced as the Lewisian paraphrase of the de re belief Beta
is happy. But we should refrain from assuming that the subject literally
thinks that she herself has the property of being such that Beta is happy
when she believes that Beta is happy. What she does is she ascribes a
property to some other thing—namely, Beta. The paraphrase in (12) is
merely a logical translation with which Lewis and Friends explain why
thinking de re that Beta is happy is nothing but a self-ascription of the
property of being such that Beta is happy. In this way, they can unify
everything under one common banner and justify their reductionist
programme: every belief is a de se belief because every belief is a self-
ascription of a property and locates a subject in logical space.
What, now, if a subject actually entertains the real de se belief (12)?
In other words, what if Alpha is really thinking about herself and really
wants to self-ascribe that weird property? How would the property
theory account for that de se belief ? Well, obviously, the subject self-
ascribes a certain property. What property could it be? The obvious,
and really the only, candidate is the property of being such that Beta is
happy—the very same property that Lewis thinks is being self-ascribed
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in the de re belief Beta is happy. But if that’s the right way to go about
it, we have two distinct beliefs which are analysed identically. That’s
an unfortunate consequence which should be avoided.
Contrary to earlier, there’s no way to distinguish between the two
properties which are self-ascribed in this new case. They’re obviously
identical and no philosophical spin will get us out of that trouble. The
proposal of distinguishing between different kinds of properties isn’t
available in this case. We can’t claim that one and the same property
can have a different nature depending on the way it’s self-ascribed.
That would severely beg the question because the difference in the
kind of belief is supposed to be accounted for in terms of what kind of
property is self-ascribed.
Let me quickly summarise the argument behind this serious prob-
lem and offer a solution afterwards. We—including Lewis, Chisholm,
and Friends—want to distinguish between thinking de se and think-
ing de re. However, we’ve now reduced all thinking to de se thinking
understood as self-ascription of properties.This again muddles the dis-
tinction between thinking in the de re and the de se way. Our weapon
of choice against this problem is to distinguish between two kinds of
properties: properties that pick out individuals and properties that pick
out possible worlds—or rather: properties that always pick out all or no
individuals within a possible world. When a subject self-ascribes the
former, she thinks in the de se way, and if she self-ascribes the latter,
she’s in a de re mental state. However, sometimes subjects entertain de
se beliefs like (12) where they literally self-ascribe the latter properties.
Hence, there are cases where a de re belief and a de se belief have to be
analysed as self-ascription of one and the same property. And there-
fore, the self-ascribed property isn’t enough to distinguish all cases of
thinking de se from all cases of thinking de re (A.3.4).
The only way to save the property theory from the repercussions of
this argument is to shift the focus away from the property that’s being
self-ascribed to the act of self-ascription that’s involved. The source
of this shift is the following observation: It’s easy to comprehend de
se thinking as the self-ascription of properties. When a subject thinks
(11), she just ascribes happiness to herself. But when Alpha thinks
that Beta is happy, she doesn’t really ascribe a property to herself. She
ascribes a property to some other thing. Now, it’s possible to philo-
sophically translate this in the Lewisian way to be logically equivalent
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to the self-ascription of some complex property. But that’s missing
the important point. The kind of ascription that’s constitutive of de
se thinking—i.e. self-ascription—is epistemically special. It’s a way for
the subject to ascribe a property to herself in the intimate way that’s
typical of de se thinking.
This insight is especially pronounced in Chisholm’s own term for
self-ascription: ‘direct attribution’.There’s something epistemically dir-
ect and immediate going on in the case of de se thinking. We could
express this by saying that a subject attributes a property to herself
directly. In contrast, when Alpha thinks de re that Beta is happy, she
merely attributes a property to Beta in an indirect way. There’s an epi-
stemic intermediary involved in the ascription of a property to some-
thing other than ourselves. Chisholm puts it in the following way:
How does one succeed in making other things one’s inten-
tional objects? In other words, how is it possible to refer
to individuals other than oneself ? For example, how do I
make you my intentional object? I would say that the an-
swer is this: I make you my object by attributing a certain
property to myself. The property is one which, in some
sense, singles you out and thus makes you the object of an
indirect attribution.
Chisholm 1981: 29
Without going too deep into the interpretation of Chisholm’s own
theory of de se thinking—which is similar, but not identical to the
Lewisian model we’re focusing on—we can easily see that he draws a
sharp contrast between the epistemic relation that subjects and their
intentional objects stand in when they think in the de se way and the
one we have in cases of thinking about other things.While it’s possible
to attribute properties to oneself directly, we can only ever do so indir-
ectly when other things are the intentional objects of our thoughts.
Chisholm himself emphasises the need for Alpha to self-ascribe
some relation that she’s standing in with regard to Beta in a case where
Alpha’s trying to ascribe the property of being happy to Beta. Because
she can only attribute that property to Beta in an epistemically indir-
ect way, she needs to think about the way in which she is related to
the intentional object of her thought. In the most neutral case, she can
achieve this through the self-ascription of the overarching property of
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being such that p. This covers the case where the subject merely believes
that it’s a fact that p is the case. But she might stand in a different epi-
stemic relation to Beta. Let’s imagine that Beta and Alpha are talking
to each other. In such a case, Alpha might think about Beta as the
thing she’s talking to. And as a result she might come to believe that
Beta is happy through the self-ascription of the slightly more com-
plex property of being such that the thing talked to is happy. Chisholm’s
point can be understood as invoking the requirement of self-ascrib-
ing the epistemic relation one stands in with regard to the intentional
object over and above the property one wants to ascribe to that thing.
Thus, we introduce a specific epistemic relation into the property the-
ory. This supplements the idea that we can distinguish mental states
only through the property that’s being self-ascribed in thinking.
We now have the two required puzzle pieces in order to explain
why we need to focus on the epistemic aspect of self-ascription in or-
der to clearly mark the territory of de se thinking and distinguish it
from de re thinking. First, the blind focus on the property that’s being
self-ascribed results in the possibility of having distinct beliefs which
are analysed as self-ascriptions of one and the same property. And
secondly, a glance at the epistemic difference in how we ascribe prop-
erties to the intentional object in the case of de se and de re thinking
reveals that self-ascription has to come with some directness that’s not
present in the case of thinking about other things.
Against this background, Lewis points to the fact that there’s a spe-
cial acquaintance with the intentional object in the case of thinking
about oneself in the de seway.WhenAlpha talks to Beta, she’s acquain-
ted with Beta through the fact that she can see, talk to, feel, and hear
her. And we’re all acquainted with Valentina Tereshkova through the
fact that we can read about her on websites and in this book. But noth-
ing comes close to the kind of acquaintance we have with ourselves.
There’s nothing else we’re acquainted with in this intimate and direct
way. Lewis explains that this is because we’re identical with ourselves
and nothing else. He then uses this as the defining epistemic relation
underlying self-ascription in the case of de se thinking.
This, then, is the proposed version of how the property theory ac-
counts for the distinctiveness of de se thinking. It’s because we self-
ascribe properties under the epistemic relation of identity. In other
words, the guiding relation we bear to the thing we ascribe the prop-
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erty of being happy to in (11) is the fact that we’re identical to the inten-
tional object of the belief. We’re thus left with the following general
account of de se thinking:
the property theory of de se thinking
Whenever a subject thinks about herself in the de seway, she ascribes
a property to herself under the epistemic relation of identity.
How do we determine the success of that account? Most import-
antly, it should be capable of doing justice to the five characteristic
features of de se thinking, which were identified in chapter 1. Partic-
ularly, it needs to provide satisfactory answers to the following ques-
tions: Why are de se mental states always about the thinking subject?
Why do the satisfaction conditions of de se thoughts depend in a sys-
tematic way on the thinking subject?Why are some of our de semental
states immune to error through misidentification? How can de se be-
liefs provide a foundation for self-knowledge? And finally: Why are
de se thoughts so essential for intentional action and behaviour?
The first two questions are easily answered. The thinking subject
can only be identical to herself. She can’t stand in that relation to some
other thing.Therefore, de se thinking will always be about the thinking
subject if that subject ascribes a property to herself under the relation
of identity. There’s just no room for error here. The intentional object
of an ascription to the thing that’s identical to oneself is always the
thinking subject herself.
Similarly, the conditions of satisfaction of a de se belief will depend
systematically on who’s self-ascribing the property. More precisely,
who the thinking subject is identical to is determined by who the
thinking subject is. The relation of identity is a reflexive relation and
naturally takes into account who’s ascribing a property under that re-
lation. Hence, we can only determine the conditions of satisfaction if
we know who the thinking subject is. Once this is known, we know
which thing is identical to the thinking subject: she herself. Let me
illustrate this: If a subject believes that she’s tall, she ascribes the prop-
erty of being tall to herself under identity. And if we want to know the
conditions of satisfaction of that de se belief, we need to know who the
identical thing is. And that, of course, will depend on who’s thinking.
If Alpha believes that she’s tall, it’s Alpha who’s identical to the think-
ing subject. Thus, it will be Alpha who needs to be tall in order for her
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belief to be true. And the same logic applies to the case where Beta
believes herself to be tall.
With the first two features out of our way, we now come to an ex-
planation of immunity. I argued that the basis for immunity to error
through misidentification lies in the fact that a subject needn’t identify
herself with a certain intentional object of her thought. Rather, de se
mental states can be free of identification. For instance, this is the case
when Alpha thinks I’m in pain on the basis of experiencing the pain in
her arm directly.There’s no need for her to identify a thing in the world
as the thing in pain before ascribing pain to that thing. The way the
pain is given to her doesn’t leave room for the question concerning the
subject of that pain. It seems that the way the property theory handles
de se thinking is well equipped to account for the possibility of think-
ing about oneself without the need for identification. There’s no first
person concept or pronoun involved. Rather, it’s a simple case of self-
ascribing a property. And because we can’t self-ascribe a property to
some other thing, it’s only natural that the subject needn’t identify her-
self beforehand. Self-ascription is always ascription to oneself. Hence,
the question of misidentification doesn’t emerge. This fact is also re-
flected in the conceptual proximity between the concept of direct attri-
bution we found in Chisholm and the concept of epistemic directness
we observed in the elucidation of immunity to error through misiden-
tification.
If you’re now skeptical about the success of the property theory in
that regard, your skepticism will be rewarded shortly when I’ll go on
to discuss some problems for Lewis’s account which will lead to its
partial dismissal.There’s a real question about the epistemic addendum
we had to provide. If a subject ascribes a property to herself under the
relation of identity, isn’t that a case of identification? And isn’t then
all de se thinking poisoned with an identification element? If you’re
worried about these questions, I ask you to stay patient until the next
section where I’ll discuss this objection in more detail.
What about the possibility to serve as a foundation for self-know-
ledge? A first issue is the earlier confession that subjects can potentially
self-ascribe any property they like. The property theory remains mute
on the epistemic grounds on which a subject ascribes a property to
herself. So, there’s no special guarantee that self-ascribing a property
leads to self-knowledge. However, this issue sounds more problematic
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than it is. In fact, the connection between de se thinking and self-know-
ledge we want to explain isn’t very tight or even constitutive. We don’t
expect every case of de se thinking to constitute a case of knowledge.
The only requirement is that de se thinking can potentially, under the
right circumstances, result in cases of self-knowledge which might be
of a distinctive kind.
The obvious question for the property theory is then: Which as-
pect of the theory matches the peculiarity of self-knowledge? Or, to
put it differently: What part of the property theory explains why self-
knowledge is potentially special? Let’s take the case where a subject
self-ascribes the property of being happy on the basis of her feeling
good. In such a case, she’s entertaining the de se belief (11). Earlier, I
explained that one possible explanation of the peculiarity of self-know-
ledge is through alluding to the distinctive epistemic path which leads
to a subject knowing her own mind. Because subjects have a direct
and immediate access to their own mental states, they’re epistemically
well positioned and authoritative with respect to the contents of their
minds. In contrast, a subject ascribing happiness to some other sub-
ject has to rely on some indirect epistemic path to the mental state
she’s trying to ascribe. She might have to ask the other subject or ob-
serve her behaviour. The epistemic directness present in the case of
observing one’s own mind produces the possibility of self-knowledge.
Accordingly, if a subject gains a true belief about herself via some dir-
ect epistemic route, she’s in a distinctive state of self-knowledge.
Now, the property theory is very much capable of representing this
contrast. The solution is to point to the different forms of acquaint-
ance which underlie de se and de re beliefs. I explained that Alpha’s
de se belief (11) is formed on the basis of a self-ascription under the
acquaintance relation of identity. In such a case, we can say that the
self-ascription is direct and immediate. By contrast, Alpha’s mock de se
belief (12) is formed on the basis of a self-ascription under some indir-
ect relation of acquaintance. She has to observe Beta, read about her,
or ask her. Distinctive self-knowledge is therefore formed if a subject
correctly ascribes a property to herself under the relation of identity
from an epistemically direct source. Hence, if the self-ascription hap-
pens under the right direct circumstance and is correct, the subject can
achieve self-knowledge. We thus see that the property theory has the
potential to explain the possibility of self-knowledge through the dis-
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tinct epistemic relation that underlies de se thinking. You might think
that this leads to the false claim that all true de se beliefs are forms
of distinctive self-knowledge. This isn’t necessarily the case. In those
situations where the property is self-ascribed on the basis of some inter-
mediary information—such as seeing oneself in the mirror—the path
of the self-ascription, but not the self-ascription itself, is indirect and
thus doesn’t give rise to a distinctive kind of self-knowledge.
Last but not least, let’s discuss the relation between de se thoughts
and intentional action.The property theory can neatly account for this
connection. In order for a subject to be motivated to act on a reason,
she has to take that reason as her own reason. For instance, Alpha’s
hunger is a reason for her to get something to eat. However, she will
only act on that reason if she takes it as her own reason. What better
way than to self-ascribe it? Self-ascription achieves exactly what’s re-
quired in that a subject ascribes the hunger to the thing that’s identical
to herself. In this way then, thinking in the de seway amounts to taking
oneself to have certain properties. And having these properties might
present a reason for the subject to behave in a certain way. Alpha takes
her hunger to be a reason for herself to get something to eat because
she self-ascribes that property and thereby takes herself to be hungry.
And that again is directly relevant to her intentional action.
This survey shows that the property theory seems well equipped to
account for the five characteristic features of de se thinking—as long
as we bracket a proviso that popped up in our discussion of immunity.
It gives a picture of the distinctiveness of thinking in the de se way and
it explains how de se thoughts are always about the thinking subject,
how immunity is possible, how it might be a basis of self-knowledge,
and the essential connection to intentional action. But typically, there
are certain problems which have been glossed over for the sake of in-
telligibility and easy understanding. Let’s turn to these issues now and
see whether they require a substantial revision of the theory or not.
3.3 problems abound
As we’ve seen, the relation of identity plays a crucial role in the prop-
erty theory. It’s needed to distinguish the kind of self-ascription which
results in proper de se beliefs from the self-ascription that’s involved in
de re thinking. Only in the case of a de se belief like (11) is the sub-
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ject ascribing a property to herself under the relation of identity. The
subject exploits the unique relation she has to herself in her self-ascrip-
tion. In contrast, a de re belief results in the self-ascription of a prop-
erty under some other acquaintance relation to the intentional object
of the belief. In this case, the subject exploits some other relation of
acquaintance—such as seeing or hearing—in her self-ascription. So,
identity plays the crucial role of isolating de se thinking from other
kinds of thinking. But how do we have to understand the claim that
proper self-ascription is ascription under the relation of identity?
Let me start with the observation that identity is usually understood
as a metaphysical relation. It’s a relation that obtains between things
in the world. It isn’t a relation that materialises on the basis of our
ability to think about the world. As a metaphysical relation, it’s inde-
pendent of our perspective on the world. Two things are identical or
not solely based on how they really are. Accordingly, we might say that
two things are identical when they have the same properties or when
they’re literally one and the same thing. In the stronger, latter sense,
which is relevant here, I’m identical to myself and nothing else. And
this fact about me is wholly independent of any subject thinking about
me or knowing anything about me.
Now, what does it mean for a subject to ascribe a property to her-
self ‘under the relation of identity’? We might be tempted to take the
metaphysical sense of identity as constitutive of de se thinking. How-
ever, this approach immediately gets us into trouble because a sub-
ject can ascribe a property to the thing that’s actually—and therefore
metaphysically—identical to herself without thereby entertaining a de
se belief. We’ve already witnessed this possibility many times. Alpha
can believe of Alpha that she’s happy without believing that she herself
is happy simply by entertaining the de re belief Alpha is happy. In such a
case, she thinks of the intentional object which is identical to her that
she’s happy. But she’s thereby not entertaining a de se belief yet. That
would require some grasp of the fact that she herself is Alpha. Hence,
the mere fact that the subject ascribes a property to the thing which is
identical to the thinking subject doesn’t yield a de se belief. We need
something more substantial.
Sometimes, the relation of identity gets a certain epistemic touch.
Think about the case where you believe that Wonder Woman is the
superheroine wielding the Lasso of Truth. In this instance, you think
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that the person whose name is ‘WonderWoman’ and the person who’s
a superheroine and wields the Lasso of Truth are identical. In other
words, you think of them as being identical. Now, this identity that
you establish might obtain on a metaphysical level or it might not.
What’s important is that identity is an epistemic relation in this case
because you think of Wonder Woman as the superheroine wielding
the Lasso of Truth. And it’s this sense of identity that’s employed in
the definition of the property theory of de se thinking. A subject who’s
entertaining a de se belief ascribes a property to herself as the thing
identical to her. In other words, she ascribes something to the thing
she takes herself to be identical with.
We can elucidate this epistemic process by coming back to the idea
of indirect attribution we found in Chisholm. There, we saw that sub-
jects are perfectly capable of ascribing a property to things other than
themselves. For instance, Alpha can think that Beta is happy by ascrib-
ing happiness to Beta. If we paraphrase this according to the scheme
of the property theory, we want to say that Alpha’s ascription involves
some relation of acquaintance to the thing she’s thinking about. For in-
stance, when Alpha is talking to Beta, the relevant relation of acquaint-
ance is that of ‘talking to’. Accordingly, she thinks of Beta as the thing
being talked to and Alpha takes the relation of ‘talking to’ to obtain
between herself and Beta. This point can be generalised: Whenever a
subject ascribes a property to an individual, she ascribes that property
under some epistemic relation of acquaintance which she takes herself
to stand in with regard to the intentional object of her thought.
Now, if we transfer this model to the case where the subject ascribes
a property under the relation of identity, we simply get a special in-
stance of the general idea that a subject always ascribes a property to
a thing under some acquaintance relation or other. In the reduction-
ist spirit of Lewis, Chisholm, and Friends, thinking in the de se way
is just the special case where a subject takes herself to be acquainted
with the intentional object of her thought in the identity way—as op-
posed to the talking to way or the reading about in the newspaper way.
Hence, we get the following picture for Alpha’s belief (11): When Al-
pha thinks that she herself is happy, she thinks of Alpha as the thing
identical to herself. In such a case, we would say that she ascribes hap-
piness under the epistemic relation of identity which she takes to ob-
tain between herself and Alpha. In other words, she takes the rela-
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tion of identity to hold between herself and the intentional object of
her thought. But presumably and unfortunately, such an account has
troubles explaining the possibility of immunity to error through misid-
entification (A.3.5).
Why’s that? Think back to Evans’s claim that immunity arises from
a lack of identification in the mental state. In those cases where we’re
presented with immunity, the mental state only involves an ascription
of a property but no identification of the intentional object. For in-
stance, when Alpha judges that her own legs are crossed based on
her proprioception, she needn’t base this belief on a prior identifica-
tion of these legs as her own. Such a belief, then, is immune to error
through misidentification because the intentional object isn’t identi-
fied. Rather, the belief is such that only one intentional object comes
into consideration—Alpha herself. Similarly, in the case of believing
I’m in pain, there’s no possibility of misidentifying because there’s no
identification involved. The feeling of pain which serves as a basis for
the subject’s belief is such that it can only arise from herself.
On the property theory of de se thinking elaborated above, an iden-
tification of an intentional object is constitutively present. It maintains
that every instance of thinking in the de se way is an instance of self-
ascribing a property. And conversely, every instance of self-ascribing a
property is a case of ascribing a property to an intentional object under
a certain epistemic relation. In the case of thinking about oneself in the
de se way, the epistemic relation under consideration is that the subject
takes herself to be identical to the intentional object of her thought.
Accordingly, when Alpha thinks that her own legs are crossed, she
takes the relation of identity to obtain between herself and Alpha. We
saw that we have to understand the aspect of the subject ‘taking the
relation of identity to obtain’ in an epistemic way, which involves the
identification of a subject as the one being identical to oneself. In an
analogue way, Alpha identifies Beta as the one being talked to when
she ascribes happiness to her under the epistemic relation of ‘talking
to’. Hence, a subject taking the relation of identity to obtain is tan-
tamount to identifying the intentional object of her thinking. And this
obviously annihilates the possibility of immunity for de se thinking.
By characterising de se thinking via some relation of identity that
the subject takes to obtain, we introduce a source of error. While the
metaphysical relation of identity can’t fail to obtain, the epistemic rela-
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tion is certainly fallible. I can err about the fact thatWonderWoman is
identical to the superheroine wielding the Lasso of Truth. And Alpha
can also be mistaken about the presumed identity between herself and
the intentional object of her thought, as in the case of self-ascribing a
property on the basis of seeing what she takes to be herself in the mir-
ror. This is very bad news for the property theory. Where there is the
possibility of error, we lose the desired immunity. If we understand Al-
pha’s self-ascription of happiness as an ascription of happiness to the
thing she takes herself to be identical with, we can’t explain the possib-
ility of immunity to error through misidentification because every case
of self-ascription—even the most epistemically basic ones—would be
subject to error.
Let me summarise this argument from immunity. One of the key
premises and characteristic features of de se thinking was the conces-
sion that some de se mental states exhibit immunity. I then adopted
Evans’s account of immunity according to which this feature arises
from freedom of identification. Now, the property theory delivers us
the idea that thinking in the de se way amounts to ascribing a prop-
erty under the epistemic relation of identity. This amounts to a subject
ascribing a property to the thing she takes herself to be identical with. I
argued that such an ascription involves identification of an intentional
object. Hence, it precludes the possibility of immunity. Therefore, no
de se mental states are immune to error through misidentification in
the property theory. This final conclusion stands in direct contradic-
tion with one of our characteristic features and has to result in the
dismissal of the property theory as it stands.
The upshot of this rather complex discussion about identity and
acquaintance is the following. In whichever way we understand the
Lewisian supplement ‘under the relation of identity’—either meta-
physical or epistemic—it doesn’t generate the desired result. If it’s
merely understood as a metaphysical relation, it’s too weak to accentu-
ate the special way of thinking in the de se way. And if it’s taken as a
more demanding epistemic relation where the subject takes herself to
be identical to the intentional object of her thinking, it’s too strong to
be capable of allowing for the possibility of immunity. Unfortunately,
we can’t just erase that problematic supplement because I argued that
it’s necessary to clearly distinguish de se thinking from other kinds of
thinking. Without such an epistemic supplement, all thinking would
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be ‘proper’ de se thinking and thus anything special about our ability
to think about ourselves would be blurred or lost.
Maybe the description of these problems doesn’t move you to give
up the idea that some form of identity has to play a role in setting
apart de se thinking.Maybe you think that it’s neither the de factometa-
physical identity which is relevant nor a more epistemic assumption of
identity but rather something mysterious in between the two—strong
enough to distinguish de se thinking but weak enough to still account
for immunity. However, it’s doubtful whether such a middle ground
can be established. It’s certainly true that identity plays a crucial role
in de se thinking because of the semantic fact that the intentional ob-
ject of de se thoughts is necessarily identical with the thinking subject.
But we have to tread warily to not overrate its explanatory and distin-
guishing capabilities. Rather, it might be a consequence of the ability
to think in the de se way without being in any way illuminating.
In order to convince you that identity has to be constitutive of de se
thinking without playing an epistemic role, we might draw a parallel
to cases where a subject is reasoning in the first person. In these cases,
identity plays a crucial role without coming in an epistemic garment.
Let’s imagine Alpha believing I’m happy and also believing I’m in love.
She can now reason from these two de se beliefs and arrive at a new
belief I’m happy and in love. Why is that inference valid? John Camp-
bell argues in his Past, Space, and Self (1994) that it’s because Alpha
‘trades on the identity’ between the ‘I’ in her belief I’m happy and the
‘I’ in her belief I’m in love in her reasoning:
This inference is valid as it stands. It is not enthymematic;
there is simply no need for an identity premise. (…)What
we now want to understand is how one manages to keep
track of oneself through the course of the inference, how
one’s grasp of the first person entitles one to conclude that
one and the same thing is both F and G.
Campbell 1994: 84
Why is it that these kinds of first person inferences are valid without
requiring a suppressed identity premise? First off, the inference can’t
depend on Alpha’s assumption that the first instance of ‘I’ refers to the
same thing as the second instance of ‘I’. Why not? Suppose the infer-
ence was based on such an implicit identity premise ‘I’ in ‘I’m happy’
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and ‘I’ in ‘I’m in love’ refer to the same thing. It certainly looks as if such
a premise would make the inference formally valid. But this is only a
deceiving appearance. Couldn’t the subject then inquire again about
the identity of ‘I’ in this new premise and the previous occurrences of
the first person? This can’t be necessary because it would land us in
an infinite regress. If there’s no guarantee of referential stability of the
first person between I’m happy and I’m in love, then there can’t be any
such guarantee for additional identity premises involving the first per-
son. Rather, the subject has to take it for granted that her employment
of the first person is referentially constant in her reasoning.
This kind of ‘taking for granted’ isn’t supposed to be an epistemic
leap of faith. It rather tells us something important about the epistemic
role of the identity relation in first person thinking. A subject doesn’t
have to empirically keep track of herself in order to self-ascribe proper-
ties and reason in the first person. She needn’t ask herself which thing
is identical to herself in order to believe that she herself is happy. For if
it were necessary for the subject to keep track of herself in this empir-
ical way, she could always be wrong about which thing she’s identical
to. Nothing guarantees that subjects are better at keeping track of
themselves than at keeping track of the contents of their purses. Both
are empirical and fallible ways of thinking about an object. And if this
error-prone way of keeping track of oneself were constitutive of first
person thinking, our de se thinking couldn’t get off the ground. We
could never be certain that we’re thinking about ourselves. Campbell
argues accordingly:
If there really were such a thing as keeping track of oneself
through the course of the inference, then it ought to be
possible for the inference to go wrong because of a failure
to keep track. But there is no such possibility, so long as
the first person is in use.
Campbell 1994: 91
These considerations are supposed to tell us that the inference from
I’m happy and I’m in love to I’m happy and in love is valid because it
doesn’t involve any identification of an intentional object. If such an
identification were involved, the subject might bemistaken in thinking
that the first occurrence of the first person is the same as the second.
But she can’t be mistaken about that, for otherwise reasoning in the
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first person wouldn’t be possible. Hence, in order to be a valid form
of inference, her reasoning has to trade on the identity that’s given
to her in the way she thinks about herself—the de se way—without
epistemically taking that identity to hold. One way to make sense of
this is to conclude that identity doesn’t play the illuminating and dis-
tinguishing role it’s supposed to play in the property theory of de se
thinking. Rather, identity is one aspect among others which has to be
present in order for de se thinking to take place. Moreover, our ability
to think about ourselves depends on the fact that subjects can trade on
that already present identity when they reason in the first person.
The connection between de se thinking and intentional action gives
us another vivid example of why the identity relation underlying self-
ascription can’t be taken as epistemic but has to be traded on instead.
The way the property theory accounts for the peculiarity of de se think-
ing requires inclusion of the Lewisian identity supplement. And this
identity supplement has to be understood in an epistemic sense; thus
thwarting the possibility of intentional action because it results in an
infinite regress of required de se thoughts—which culminates in the
impossibility of de se thinking.
Let’s start with a simple example we’re familiar with by now. The
fact that Alpha is hungry is a reason for her to get something to eat.
However, I argued that only a de se belief like I’m hungry can motivate
her to act on that very reason. The simple obtaining of the impersonal
fact that Alpha is hungry alone doesn’t suffice. She has to take the
reason as a reason for herself and this requires a de semental state. Now,
suppose that Lewis is right that thinking in the de seway is tantamount
to ascribing a property to oneself under the relation of identity. And
this again is nothing but a subject taking herself to be identical to the
intentional object of her thought. How then does Alpha come to take
the reason to get something to eat as her own reason?
Presumably, her belief I’m hungry is sufficient to motivate her to act.
It’s de se in nature and results in Alpha taking a reason as her own
reason culminating in her acting accordingly. If we now analyse her
belief further, we see that it’s an ascription of the property of being
hungry to a thing she takes herself to be identical with. How would we
break this down? Well, if the identity relation carries some epistemic
weight, it would involve some kind of ascription of the form being
such that the thing I’m identical with is hungry. And this again involves
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some kind of identity statement of the form I’m identical to awhere a is
whatever intentional object the subject thinks she’s identical with. It’s
clear that such an ascription or mental state is just a new de se state in
disguise. As such, it would require a similar analysis involving a further
de se state, and so on.
According to the interpretation of the property theory developed
in this chapter, a subject would be incapable of taking a reason as her
own simply because that would involve infinitely many ascriptions of
properties to oneself ‘under the relation of identity’. Every single self-
ascription would entail an identity ascription in the de se form, again
requiring further self-ascriptions. And this isn’t a mere psychological
impossibility. More seriously, it results in the fact that de se thinking,
and therefore the possibility of being motivated to act in a certain way,
could never get off the ground (A.3.6).
We saw that the elaboration of the property theory required an ana-
lysis of what Lewis and Friends mean by a subject ascribing a property
‘under the relation of identity’.We explored this idea and followed it in
several possible directions, only to see that problems abound on every
road, ultimately leading us to a dead end. There are two options here.
Either we give up on the idea that de se thinking can be analysed as the
self-ascription of properties, or we try to make the most of our little
trip to Property Land. I propose to take the second option in compli-
ance with the motto: ‘We are experiencing trouble on every side, but
are not crushed; we are perplexed, but not driven to despair’ (2 Cor 4:
8–9). So, let’s resolve our perplexity.
3.4 primitive relations
It might seem to you that the discussion so far revealed an utter failure
of the property theory of de se thinking. But such despair isn’t neces-
sary yet. Rather, I now want to argue that our discussion uncovered
only an apparent failure. In fact, we’ve learned a crucial lesson on our
way to this seeming impasse. I will now work out the exact details of
that lesson, which will ultimately lead us to the claim that we have to
understand self-ascription as an epistemically primitive relation which
isn’t dependent on any further and more basic epistemic constituents.
In this way, we preserve much of the original idea of the property the-
ory while abandoning some problematic aspects.
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We started our exposition of Lewis’s property theory with the in-
nocuous observation that subjects are capable of ascribing properties
to themselves as well as to other things—like Sherlock Holmes in his
quest to find the criminal. I then explored the development of this in-
sight into a fully fledged theory about the nature of thinking in the de
se way. Along the way, we made contact with the idea that de se think-
ing is characterised by involving the self-ascription of properties. As
such, the idea was still half-baked and required some further elabora-
tion. This lead to the final proposal that self-ascription is nothing but
the ascription of a property to oneself under the relation of identity.
Unfortunately, this proposal proved problematic because it involved
the requirement for the subject to epistemically assume that the rela-
tion of identity holds between herself and the intentional object of her
thought. I then argued that this can’t work in order to build a founda-
tion of de se thinking. Crucially, it involves an unwanted identification
of an intentional object—something incompatible with the required
possibility of immunity—and leads to a destructive infinite regress re-
garding the motivation for intentional action. We can now ask: At
what point in this journey did we take a wrong turn? My proposal is
that we should go back and have another look at the notion of self-
ascription.
The impossibility of making sense of the role of the epistemic rela-
tion of identity tells us something about the epistemic process under-
lying self-ascription and de se thinking respectively. We’ve seen that it
can’t depend on the identification of an intentional object. Rather, it
has to be more epistemically basic. It simply isn’t possible for a subject
to only gain basic knowledge of her own properties through know-
ledge of the properties of some other thing in conjunction with know-
ledge about the identity between herself and that thing. If a subject is
capable of self-ascribing properties at all, there needs to be a point at
which this self-ascription doesn’t depend on such a two step epistemic
process. Accordingly, if we want to understand and preserve the pos-
sibility of substantial de se thinking, we need to completely abandon
the idea that subjects acquire basic knowledge about themselves on the
basis of knowing something else. In other words, self-ascription can’t
be the result of a more basic epistemic process—like the ascription
to oneself under the relation of identity. Rather, we have to take self-
ascription as epistemically primitive.
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We can give a simple argument for this claim before we elucidate it
further. We start with two possibilities: Either self-ascription is prim-
itive, or it depends on some other more basic epistemic process. Now,
if self-ascription depends on some other epistemic process, it involves
the individuation and identification of an intentional object because
the subject has to know that her thought is about herself. Presumably,
every such case of individuation and identification of an intentional
object with oneself involves self-ascription. After all, something has
to be thought of as identical to oneself. Hence, any account of non-
primitive self-ascription is circular in depending on self-ascription it-
self. Therefore, self-ascription has to be primitive.
The argument as it stands is rough and simple indeed. But our dis-
cussion of the characteristic features of de se thinking, the different two-
dimensional approaches, and the property theory has provided us with
good reasons which support the individual steps. Most importantly, it
painted a very convincing picture according to which our capability to
think about ourselves is something epistemically basic which can’t be
reduced in any way. It rather seems that the ability to think about one-
self in the de se way is at the beginning of our epistemic journey—an
insight which is especially pronounced in Descartes’s Cogito argument
that we encountered.
Hence, the claim that self-ascription is primitive shouldn’t come as a
surprising result of our inquiry. Given what we’ve learned so far about
the characteristics of thinking about oneself in the de se way, it’s rather
something that comes very natural without the air of mystery. In this
vein, Shen-yi Liao explains why self-ascription has to be primitive:
This mystery is to be expected given the main lesson from
the problem of essential indexicals: the de se cannot be
reduced to the de dicto. There is something special about
learning who oneself is that cannot be captured in learn-
ing about what features one possesses, even if that list of
features is exhaustive. There seems to be a fundamental
conceptual distinction between ascribing properties to one-
self and ascribing properties to an individual possessing a
unique and exhaustive list of non-trivial properties.
Liao 2012: 314
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Let me explain his reasoning in the following way. John Perry ori-
ginally presented us with the problem of the essential indexical, where
he argued that the expression ‘I’—being such that it always refers to the
speaking subject—can’t be reduced to or exchanged by any other lin-
guistic expression and still retain its characteristic semantic, epistemic
and psychological features. In other words, the first-person pronoun
is an essential indexical, which results in the fact that we can’t reduce
de se sentences like ‘I’m tall’ to de dicto sentences like ‘The speaker of
this sentence is tall’.
In our little journey, we witnessed that this seemingly purely lin-
guistic phenomenon is mirrored in the mental realm. Thinking in the
de se way can’t be broken down to thinking in some special de re or de
dicto way. It’s something completely different to think about yourself
in the de seway than it is to think about something in virtue of it satisfy-
ing some description—as in the case of de dicto thinking—or in virtue
of it being a specific thing we’re directly acquainted with—as in the
case of de re thinking. Our capability of thinking about ourselves isn’t
dependent on some other epistemic ability that we have to activate
first. Rather, it’s epistemically basic. But what does that mean?
In the case of primitive self-ascription, it’s the ascription of a prop-
erty to oneself that takes place on an epistemically basic level. The fact
that one ascribes a property to oneself is thus independent of any prior
epistemic achievement. Rather, self-ascription is epistemically found-
ational. We can illuminate this by comparing the epistemic process of
primitive self-ascription with the process that underlies the ascription
of a property to some other object. In the latter case, our subject first
has to individuate and identify the intentional object of her thinking in
some way or other. She might do this demonstratively via an epistemic
relation of acquaintance. This happens in the case of Alpha thinking
about Beta in virtue of talking to her. Or the subject might do this
via some description she entertains as in the case of Alpha thinking
about Valentina Tereshkova in virtue of the description ‘the first wo-
man in space’. In both these cases, there’s an epistemic step prior to
any ascription of a property to the intentional object. The subject has
to achieve some kind of identification of an object in order to success-
fully ascribe a property in thought to that identified object. As such,
any ascription of this kind can’t be epistemically primitive because it
isn’t independent of some other epistemic achievement.
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In Liao’s terms, we can say that in the case of a subject ascribing a
property to some other thing, the subject thinks about an intentional
object in virtue of some feature that the thing possesses—be that the
feature of being talked to or being the first woman in space. Accord-
ingly, in cases of thinking de re or de dicto, a subject has to have some
epistemic means of identifying the intentional object of her thinking.
She might achieve this through picking out the intentional object via
some uniquely identifying relation she takes to obtain to it, or via en-
tertaining some description which she presumes to uniquely fit the
desired object. The result in both these cases is an indirect epistemic
process in which a subject ascribes a property to the intentional object.
But this kind of indirect epistemic route is neither necessary nor
sufficient to think about oneself in the de se way. Alpha doesn’t have
to know all the features she possesses in order to be capable of think-
ing about herself. In fact, no subject is able to know all her features.
And likewise, she doesn’t have to know which identifying description
is satisfied by her alone to think that she herself is tall. So, it can’t be
necessary to take this epistemic stepping stone we find in the cases of
thinking de dicto or de re. Furthermore, even if such an extraordinary
feat were possible—as in the case of our two goddesses—that kind of
extensive knowledge doesn’t suffice to produce de se thinking.The abil-
ity to think about oneself goes beyond knowing all the facts there are to
know about oneself—including all the relations that various subjects
and objects stand in. As Liao says, something epistemically ‘special’ is
happening when a subject gains de se knowledge of herself (A.3.7).
In this way then, thinking about oneself in the de se way at the same
time falls short of thinking about oneself in the de re way and goes bey-
ond it. It falls short of it because it doesn’t require some very detailed
and profound knowledge of the nature of the intentional object of the
thought. We can think about ourselves in the de se way without know-
ing anything particular about ourselves. And it goes beyond it because
it enables a whole new kind of knowledge about oneself. Thinking in
the de se way allows the kind of intimate knowledge about oneself in
which the subject is aware that she’s thinking about herself.
But how does the idea that self-ascription is primitive salvage the
property theory? That entirely depends on how much of the original
thought you want to preserve. Is it necessary to hold on to Lewis’s
metaphysical claim that properties are sets of possible individuals? I
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don’t think that’s necessary. A subject can self-ascribe a property inde-
pendently of the metaphysical dispute concerning the nature of prop-
erties. What we’re interested in is an epistemic question which has
only little bearing on the metaphysical details underlying the structure
of reality. After all, we can perfectly well understand what it means
for a subject to ascribe redness to the apple if she thinks The apple is
red without knowing exactly what the nature of properties is. So, the
same should apply to understanding what it means for a subject to self-
ascribe happiness.
A more daunting question is whether one can still subscribe to the
reductionist programme of Lewis, Chisholm, and Friends. Do we still
want to say that every case of thinking is a case of self-ascribing a prop-
erty and hence a case of thinking in the de se way. I would argue that
this depends entirely on the exact way you spell this out. Here’s what
we don’t want to say: A subject thinking I’m tall self-ascribes a property
in the same way as a subject self-ascribes a property when she’s think-
ing Beta is tall. If we want to call the latter a case of self-ascription
at all, it’s necessary to distinguish the two clearly from an epistemic
point of view. While the former is in some sense epistemically dir-
ect, the latter is only ever indirect. Here’s what we might want to say
instead: A subject thinking I’m tall is in a mental state which can be
logically characterised as a subject locating herself within the group
of tall things. In the same way, thinking Beta is tall is a mental state
which can be logically characterised as a subject locating herself within
the group of things which inhabit a world where Beta is tall. However,
this equivalence—call it ‘subsuming’ the de dicto under the de se if you
must—is merely located on a logical level and has no epistemic reper-
cussions (A.3.8).
And now, here’s what I advise you to say: A subject thinking in the
de se way is in a mental state which is constituted by her primitively
self-ascribing some property or other. This form of self-ascription is
epistemically basic and direct and results in the subject taking the prop-
erty to apply to herself and not some other thing. Furthermore, this
self-ascription is primarily characterised epistemically, which means
that it’s independent of the exact semantic nature of de se thinking.
This means that the idea might be compatible with a diverse group
of theories concerning the semantic contents of intentional attitudes.
You might hold that they’re properties, centred worlds, horizontal or
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diagonal propositions. The only thing that needs to be preserved is
that such a theory incorporates the special way of thinking which is
constitutive of primitive self-ascription.
More precisely, the main argument is that de se thinking amounts
to self-ascription of properties. But, this is just one strategy to elucid-
ate the peculiarity of de se thinking. We might trace our steps back to
the two-dimensional picture from chapter 2 and develop a new the-
ory with propositions in play. It might be more complicated and less
direct than the strategy of saying that de se thinking is self-ascription
of properties. But as long as it embeds the central insight that de se
thinking involves some epistemically primitive relation to oneself, it
gets the most important component right.
Now that we’ve established the importance of some notion of prim-
itive self-ascription, what’s left to do is to give a more detailed account
of what that amounts to. This will be the ambitious task of the next
and final chapter.
4
ORIGINS
Listen, Robert, going to another country doesn’t make any
difference. I’ve tried all that. You can’t get away from your-
self by moving from one place to another. There’s nothing
to that.
Ernest Hemingway:The Sun Also Rises: 9–10
Primitive self-ascription lies at the basis of de se thinking. It is the
key that unlocks the ability of subjects to think about themselves in
that peculiar and direct way. But what is primitive self-ascription? I’ve
argued that this kind of self-ascription is the way a subject is capable
of ascribing any property to herself directly. In that sense, primitive
self-ascription isn’t dependent on some other prior epistemic achieve-
ment. Rather, it’s the rock bottom way of coming to grasp that you’re
thinking about yourself.
On our journey to give an explanation of the peculiarity of de se
thoughts, we realised that there’s a specific necessity for an epistem-
ically basic relation which grounds a subject’s ability to think about
herself. No other, more demanding, account can escape this require-
ment because every subject has to have some grasp of the fact that she’s
thinking about herself in employing the first person concept, the word
‘I’, or some other more explicit tool of thinking about oneself.Without
such a grasp, she wouldn’t understand that she’s thinking or talking
about herself. Hence, whatever primitive self-ascription amounts to,
it has to be fit to play this crucial foundational role.
The necessity of primitive self-ascription for an account of de se
thinking thus established, we want to know more about it. So far, I’ve
merely provided a formulaic schema without any kind of content that
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could give us an insight into its nature. At the moment, we might
have a good grasp on what the job of primitive self-ascription is, and
what its general epistemic layout has to look like. But now we have
to paint the picture in more vibrant colours and fill in the gaps. Only
then do we achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the un-
derlying constitutive features of a subject’s ability to primitively self-
ascribe properties and ipso facto to think in the de se way.
Let me start this endeavour by providing an example of a case of
de se thinking. Imagine a painter who’s about to paint her first stroke.
She feels the movement of her left arm as she leans in closer to the
canvas. She wants to paint something in the top right and her arm
moves appropriately without her having to somehow interact with it
first. She needn’t command her arm to move in a specific way. She
also doesn’t have to think of her arm explicitly as her arm. Rather, she
interacts with the world through her arm. And similarly, she thinks
about the glass of water which is given to her as being to the left and
as containing drinkable water.
Why are these cases of interest to us? All these things obtain their
place, as perceived by the subject, through the way the painter thinks
about the world surrounding her. The canvas, the brush, the glass, the
water; they all bear a certain relation to the body through which she
interacts with them. Because of this layout, she can come to believeMy
arm is bent simply by primitively self-ascribing the property of having
a bent arm. In that self-ascription she doesn’t need to think about the
arm as an object out there in the world which she then takes to be
part of herself. Rather, she feels the bend in the arm with which she
holds the brush and is able to paint on the canvas.The arm—and other
parts of her body—is an integral part of herself and doesn’t need to be
identified first.
But why, you ask, is it that the arm is given to her as an integral
part of herself ?Why can she self-ascribe the property of having a bent
arm in this primitive way? To answer this question, we need to take a
bit of a detour and take a closer look at the way subjects think about
themselves and the world around them. Here’s an illustration of one
apparent way to describe the situation: Subjects live in a world sur-
rounded by objects with which they can interact in different ways. Our
painter sees the canvas in front of her and thinks of it as something
which can be transformed into a painting through her movement and
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suitable tools. She imagines and intends to paint a picture of what she
sees and feels when she takes a walk from her house into her garden
and looks at the industrial ruins from a certain point of view. She pos-
sibly understands that what she’s painting is but one way of looking
into the world around her—after all, it’s but a small excerpt of all the
possible pictures she could paint of her world.
But there’s more: Our painter isn’t a mere perceiving machine with
a particular point of view. Rather, she’s capable of moving through her
world, not just perceiving but also interacting with the things she en-
counters there. She sees the ruins now in front of her, now in the back.
She takes the brush now with her right hand and now with her left.
She knows that she has to paint the ruins in a specific way in order
to reproduce the way she experienced them in her garden. This two-
way interaction—our subject’s ability to both perceive and manipulate
the world—takes place from a certain point in her world: its centre.
Everything’s related to that centre in some way or other by being per-
ceived by or by originating from it. So, in believingMy arm is bent our
subject comes to ascribe a property to the centre of her world: herself.
Of course, our painter can abstract from that centre and figuratively
‘move away’ from it. For instance, she can imagine the world from an
impersonal point of view, abstracting from what’s specific about her
own perspective. And she can think about things which aren’t directly
accessible from her centred world view. She might know how the back
of her house looks without seeing it directly, she might know how to
grab a handle which is still out of reach. Importantly, she can imagine
the way something looks like from a point of view which isn’t currently
her own. Finally, shemight even turn her ‘gaze’ inward and think about
the centre of her world from a point of view she can’t literally take up.
In other words, she might explicitly think about herself.
All these exercises of changing the point of view in her imagina-
tion or by walking around don’t change the fact that our painter ex-
periences her world from its centre and not from some other point
of view. Correspondingly, every attempt of ‘getting away’ from that
centre amounts to mere pretending.The epigraph of this chapter from
Hemingway’s novel beautifully expresses this impossibility. There’s no
way for our painter to literally get away from the centre of her world
to some other place in her world. She can move around, but she can’t
get away from herself. Why? Because every one of her moves simul-
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taneously moves the centre of her world with it.Where she moves, the
centre of her world moves. And so, there’s nothing to the attempt of
getting away from yourself by moving from one place to another. Even
in the imagination we can’t get away from ourselves by imagining being
somewhere or someone else.
This way of describing the situation of a subject in her world is re-
miniscent of a set of remarks by Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus (1922). In these passages, he briefly discusses the nature
of solipsism—the idea that only one’s ownmind can be known to exist.
If solipsism is true, then the nonexistence of everything else is com-
patible with our experience of supposedly existing things. In this con-
text, Wittgenstein provides us with some fascinating claims on the
epistemic and metaphysical nature of subjects:
5.632 The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it
is a limit of the world.
5.633 Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be
found?
You will say that this is exactly like the case of the
eye and the visual field. But really you do not see the
eye.
And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that
it is seen by an eye.
Wittgenstein 1961
We can either read these seemingly apodictic statements in a meta-
physical sense or an epistemological one. Since our project is of the
latter kind, let’s proceed thusly. What does it mean that the subject
doesn’t belong to the world but rather constitutes its limit? One way
to make sense of this claim is that subjects don’t strictly belong to the
world of objects from which they can gain information. They consti-
tute the innermost limit from which the world is perceived and estab-
lished. Hence, a subject can think about the body that’s hers or the
social persona that she is, but she can’t think about herself as an object
in the world she experiences.
This is surely a bit puzzling. Isn’t it weird to say that the world
around us is established and constituted by the subject’s specific per-
spective? If we talk about the metaphysical world—utterly independ-
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ent of a subject thinking about it—then such a claim sounds mad in-
deed. But we’re reading the remark in an epistemological sense now:
The world as found by the subject is constituted by her way of experien-
cing it—for instance with things being left or right of her—and what
she takes to be possibilities of interacting with it.This also implies that
the way she can gain knowledge of the world depends on her way of
being in and experiencing the world. Put this way, the claim doesn’t
sound mad at all.
But this isn’t the only thing that’s puzzling in Wittgenstein’s re-
marks. Doesn’t the idea that a subject can’t literally think about herself
as an object clash with the fundamental ability to think in the de se
way? Don’t we want to say that subjects are capable of thinking about
themselves? After all, what else is de se thinking than the ability to
think about oneself ? To dissolve this puzzle, Wittgenstein’s analogy
to the visual field is illuminating. We can understand Wittgenstein
here as holding that we, as subjects, are like an eye that enables us to
make visual reference to all kinds of things relative to it. But we can
never make direct visual reference to the eye itself. In other words, we
never directly see the eye. Even if we see our reflection in the mirror,
the visual experience of our own eye is only derivative. We don’t see
the eye where it’s actually located—after all, our eyes aren’t in the mir-
ror. Rather, we see it from a strange and atypical outside view. The
analogy is then supposed to show that the nature of subjects is quite
similar. They aren’t part of the world they experience in the same way
as other things are part of the world. Rather, they’re the origins of that
world and everything in the experienced world is ‘coordinated with it’
(Wittgenstein 1961: 5.64). The subject as the origin of her world can’t
experience the centre—the world’s innermost limit—in the same way
as other objects she finds around her. In other words: Subjects are the
limit of the world, but thinking about the limit of the world is funda-
mentally different from thinking about objects within the experienced
world (A.4.1).
How does that link up with our notion of primitive self-ascription
and the previous illustration of the painter? First of all, the way our
painter experiences the world has to be described from a specific first
personal perspective. But this perspective goes beyond the fact that
we can represent and picture a scene from various points of view, each
producing different ways of experiencing one and the same thing. The
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world is given to our painter in a very specific way—with herself at its
centre and with various ways of interacting with it being constitutive of
it. In other words, the world isn’t given to the painter as an allocentric,
third personal, ‘objective’ space. Also, the world isn’t just a perspectival
space, constituted by particular representational ‘lines of sight’. Rather,
our subject finds herself in egocentric space. This space doesn’t involve
the subject itself in the way it involves other objects, but it’s nonethe-
less intimately connected to the subject’s particular way of being in the
world.The experiencing and acting subject at first isn’t an object in the
world. Rather, it’s what establishes how things in the world are given
to her. Only in a second step might the subject turn her mental ‘gaze’
inward and think of herself as an object in the world.
Why is the notion of egocentric space connected to primitive self-
ascription? The answer lies in the fact that the subject is very clearly
located within egocentric space. If there’s anything like an egocentric
space, then the subject is always at its centre and can’t fail to be there.
This sounds trivial, but stands in stark contrast to the location of a sub-
ject in allocentric or perspectival space. Here, a subject can be located
almost anywhere.Whenwe look at the concept of egocentric space, we
find a clear conceptual and epistemic priority of this one central place
over any other place because everything is defined with reference to
that specific point. Accordingly, the glass is to the left of the book in
virtue of standing in a certain relation to the centre of egocentric space.
In contrast, allocentric space knows no such conceptual priority of a
place—every place stands on equal footing.
Secondly, both our painter and the subject in Wittgenstein’s pas-
sages are capable of interacting with the world from its centre. Our
subject isn’t a mere geometrical point at the centre of egocentric space.
Rather, she’s an acting thing with various ways of manipulating the
world around her. If she wants to move to a point in space, she may
use her legs in a way which doesn’t normally depend on some prior
ability. Accordingly, she needn’t first ‘find’ her legs in the world and
then command them to move in a specific way. Quite the opposite.
Her legs are an essential part of the centre of egocentric space and are
given to her in an intimate and direct way. Similarly, her judging the
wall to be high enough to jump over depends on her knowledge and
grasp of the athletic capabilities of her own body. To say that a specific
part of the body is part of the centre is to do justice to the idea that the
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centre isn’t a geometrical point. We’ll see that it’s determined by the
various abilities of perceiving and acting upon the world that subjects
have. As such, the subject’s legs are only one among other parts that
enable certain interactions.
This is relevant to the notion of primitive self-ascription insofar as
the body through which our subject experiences and interacts with the
world has some epistemic and pragmatic priority. This is because that
acting body is the primary means of being in contact with the world.
It’s in virtue of the fact that she can move her left arm directly and
feel the resistance of the canvas through her arm that she takes her
arm to belong to the centre of her world. Similarly, the fact that she’s
capable of moving her legs directly and feeling the sensation of the
soles of her feet makes it so that she takes them to be an integral part
of herself. I’ll call this phenomenological and behavioural centre the
origin of egocentric space and argue that a subject is constituted by it.
Given this picture, we can connect this in the following way to de
se thinking: When a subject thinks about herself in the de se way, she
ascribes a certain property to herself. And this depends on an ascrip-
tion of a property to the origin of egocentric space insofar as the de se
nature is established therein. In the case of our painter thinking My
arm is bent, we can explain her primitive self-ascription of the property
of having a bent arm in the following way: It amounts to ascribing that
property to the origin of her egocentric space—which leads to her tak-
ing herself to have that property. According to this idea, we can trace
back essential primitive self-ascription to ascription to the origin.
How does this help? The fact that even in complicated and fancy
science fiction scenarios there’s only ever one origin for a given subject
is a suitable explanation of the peculiarity of de se thinking. Hence,
there’s no question of identification involved with regard to the origin
and the subject can only ascribe properties to one singular origin: her-
self. In this way, the origin is given to the subject in an epistemically
direct way. It doesn’t require any prior epistemic achievement to know
which thing the origin of one’s egocentric space is. As such, it can play
the required role to provide a basis of de se thinking.
Of course, this is a programmatic claim which will need more elab-
oration and justification.This sets the primary task for this last chapter.
We want to understand what makes primitive self-ascription so special
in terms of ascription to the origin of egocentric space. And we want
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to understand how that explains de se thinking. Before moving to busi-
ness, we may summarise these introductory remarks about the relation
between primitive self-ascription and the way subjects experience and
interact with the world around them by repeating the tentative char-
acterisation of primitive self-ascription from chapter 1:
primitive self-ascription
A subject primitively self-ascribes a property P iff she ascribes P to
the origin of her egocentric space.
In this characterisation, the connections to egocentric space and its ori-
gin are made explicit and provide the keys to illuminating the crucial
notion of primitive self-ascription. Once we have a clear enough ac-
count of these illuminating notions, we should be able to understand
how primitive self-ascription can serve as the required fundamental
capability of subjects which grounds their ability to think in the de se
way. Moreover, they should provide a guide to account for the charac-
teristic features of de se thinking.
Accordingly, it’s now necessary to crystallise these notions and ex-
tract what has been implicitly alluded to in our short introductory and
speculative discussion of the painter and Wittgenstein. Only through
clearly shaping these notions will we be able to properly assess their
merit. In this context, we also want to know why the concepts of ego-
centric space and its origin are necessary to understand primitive self-
ascription. Hence, our task is specified and we can move to action.
4.1 flowing from the centre
I described the situation of the painter as that of a subject who finds
herself at the centre of what can be called egocentric space. This kind
of space was briefly contrasted with both allocentric and perspectival
space. Importantly, we have to draw the distinction in terms of how
a subject thinks about the world around her and not in terms of dif-
ferences ‘out there’ in the world—e.g. by assuming the existence of
two different kinds of space. As Soldati (1998: 122) argues, there’s ‘no
egocentric space to be opposed or added to public or objective space.
Rather, there is one sort of space, represented either egocentrically or
allocentrically’. But what exactly is constitutive of egocentric space?
What distinguishes it from these other possibilities of thinking about
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the world? And why is it necessary to describe the subject’s world with
which she engages in this way?
Let’s start with the following observation: In egocentric space, ob-
jects are given to the subject in certain terms which are relative to her.
The most colourful pair of such terms is maybe left and right. On the
basis of these terms, subjects can think about the objects in the world
around them as being to the left or right of other things. What role
do these terms play? In her experience of the world around her, our
painter might think of the industrial ruins as being to the left of her
garden. But this needn’t be constant. Once she moves around, this
way of thinking about the relation between the two objects is bound
to change. After a while, the ruins might instead be to the right of her
garden. Hence, it makes sense to claim that thinking about the world
in terms of things being to the left or right of other things is depend-
ent on the thinking subject engaging with the world from a certain
perspective—a certain point of view that she occupies.
A first approximation to define egocentric space is to point to its per-
spectival nature. However, this characterisation isn’t specific enough
to clearly mark the territory of egocentric thinking.This is because sub-
jects can think about space from a certain perspective without that im-
plying that the subject takes herself to be at the centre of this world—in
other words, without it constituting egocentric thinking. Hence, not
every way of thinking that involves terms like left and right is ego-
centric. Rather, a subject can think about space in a perspectival but
‘detached’ way. For instance, Michelangelo’sThe Creation of Adam pic-
tures God and Adam from a certain perspective. It shows Adam as be-
ing to the left of God and maybe located slightly below as well. Now,
you can imagine yourself at the origin of the perspective which pro-
duces this particular scene—maybe by standing at just the right spot
in the Sistine Chapel. But this doesn’t yet allow you to interact with
the objects you experience in this specific space. For, how would you
have to move in order to stand next to Adam or behind God? The
way things appear to the subject in a perspectival way in this particu-
lar picture doesn’t inform the subject about her position relative to the
things she thus experiences. A subject can take up the natural centre
for such a picture—the point in space from which it is intended to be
looked at—without thinking about Adam or God in an engaging way.
In other words, she can think about these objects in a perspectival way
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without taking a stance on her relative location. Quite the contrary,
she’s capable of taking an outside perspective on the painting.
Thinking in egocentric terms is thusmore distinct thanmerely think-
ing in perspectival terms. I want to argue that it involves some connec-
tion to our assumed possibilities of action in the world. Why is that
so? Imagine a situation where you think about some item of food in
a merely perspectival way as being located in the kitchen. In this situ-
ation, you’re thinking about your kitchen in merely perspectival terms.
You picture the food as being in the fridge which is to the left of you
once you enter the door, and in the bottom shelf once you open the
fridge. Clearly, such a kind of thinking—involving such terms as to
the left or at the bottom—is perspectival and thus depends on a certain
point of view. We might say that you imagine your kitchen from a
certain point of view when you think about it in perspectival terms.
But do you know how to go about reaching the food on the basis of
thinking about the objects in your world in this way? Not necessarily.
This is because you might be oblivious to your spatial relation to the
kitchen and thus incapable of finding the food in the world you’re ac-
tually in. You simply don’t know how to get to the kitchen. Only once
you think about the kitchen in relation to your own current location
will you know how tomove in order to get something to eat from there.
But this requires you to think of the kitchen in egocentric terms, loc-
ating it relative to where you think you are right now and relative to
how you would move about in order to interact with it.
Let me put this point in somewhat more general terms. We want
to establish that any way to think about space in terms which aren’t
egocentric is insufficient to coordinate the behaviour of the subject
with the things she’s thereby thinking about. Now, subjects come to
interact with objects around them by knowing where they themselves
are located with respect to these objects and what they think they
can do with them. Thus, the way they think about the world has to
provide them with a basis for this kind of knowledge. The claim is
the following: While thinking about the world in egocentric terms
indicates one’s own location relative to the things in the world, per-
spectival or allocentric thinking makes no such reference. Thus, only
egocentric thinking enables interaction with the things thus thought
about. In other words, only by thinking about objects egocentrically—
i.e. in terms which are relative to one’s own assumed possibilities of
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interaction—is a subject able to coordinate her perception of the world
with her behaviour in that world (A.4.2).
The kitchen example from earlier provides us with concrete support
for this claim. In this case, we witnessed that perspectival thinking—
thinking that involves a privileged point of view but no reference to the
behavioural centre—isn’t up for the job. It’s certainly true that a per-
spectival way of thinking about the world includes a particular point
of view and thus a specific location which constitutes the centre of
the world thought about in that way. However, that centre isn’t ne-
cessarily the point from which the subject acts. The subject needn’t
take herself to be located at that particular location. She’s capable of
thinking about the world in perspectival terms in a totally detached
way without taking up the central position.
This can be contrasted with the egocentric way of thinking which is
constituted by the two-way relation between thinking about the world
and engaging with it. Subjects take themselves to be the origin of their
world; they’re at the centre of egocentric space. And because subjects
engage with the world from that particular, epistemically and concep-
tually privileged location, the origin isn’t given to the subject in a de-
tached and neutral way. Rather, she necessarily takes herself to be at
the centre of the world thought about egocentrically. John Campbell
makes a similar point in his Past, Space, and Self (1994) when he writes
about egocentric frames of reference:
Any animal that has the relations between perception and
behavior needed to direct action at particular places, to
reach for things it can see, must be capable of this ego-
centric spatial thinking.
Campbell 1994: 5
Campbell’s claim here is that subjects who can interact with the
world have to be able to direct their behaviour at particular places in
the world which they perceive and think about. And for this to be
possible, a subject has to engage in egocentric thinking. This way of
thinking puts the objects in the world in a straightforward relation
to the thinking and interacting subject. In egocentric thinking, the
subject thinks ‘about the space from a particular point of view, as a
subject at the center of one’s world’ (Campbell 1994: 6). This point
of view is more demanding than the mere visual perspective we find
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in realistic paintings. In other words, a subject who thinks about the
world in an egocentric way takes herself to be located at its centre as
the subject engaging with the world (A.4.3).
So, we’ve worked out the following two claims: First, an egocentric
way of thinking about the world is necessary in order for a subject to
be able to interact with the things she encounters in the world on the
basis of thinking about them in that particular way. And secondly, the
egocentric way of thinking is characterised by the subject’s assumed
possibilities of interaction with the objects in her world. These two
claims are closely connected, but why should we accept them? Let me
attempt a defence.
Thinking back to Lewis’s story of the two omniscient goddesses
gives us the material to support the first claim. The goddesses’s om-
niscience can be understood as a case of thinking about the world in
an absolutely impersonal way and additionally getting the facts right.
In other words, their perfect knowledge doesn’t involve any particular
privileged point of view. They ‘see’ the world from no particular point
of view without there being a centre of the world. We may say that
their knowledge consists in a bird’s eye view on the world with the
facts ‘laid bare in front of them’. In this way, they know that Valentina
Tereshkova was the first woman in space. They know that Olympus
Mons is 21’230 meters tall. They also know that Alpha, one of the
two goddesses, lives on the coldest mountain. And they know that the
goddess living on the tallest mountain throws down manna.
We can now argue that this kind of knowledge doesn’t allow them
to interact with the things they have knowledge of. For instance, Al-
pha can’t know how she would go about climbing Olympus Mons
even if she had additional facts in her epistemic pocket—for instance
knowledge of the fact that Olympus Mons is on Mars at approxim-
ately 18.65°N 226.2°E, that Mars is at least 54.6 million kilometres
away from Earth, and so on. Why not? Because she wouldn’t be cap-
able of locating Olympus Mons relative to herself. She might have
knowledge of the relation between Olympus Mons and other things
in the world, including Alpha, but she neither knows that she’s Alpha
nor where she herself is.
As we saw, Alpha’s omniscience doesn’t come with a neat little tag
labelled ‘You are here!’ She lacks de se knowledge of her own location
in the world she thinks about. Hence, her omniscience and perfect
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impersonal way of thinking about space doesn’t enable her to locate
herself in her world. Her knowledge doesn’t include knowledge of her
own location in the required de se sense. But if she doesn’t know where
she herself is within the context of her thinking about space in this
impersonal way, she can’t use this kind of thinking in order to interact
with the things that are in that world.While she might know the exact
coordinates of Olympus Mons, she unfortunately doesn’t know her
own coordinates. Hence, an allocentric, impersonal way of thinking
isn’t sufficient to guide interaction with the world.
The same applies if we allowed the goddesses’s omniscience to range
over certain perspectival facts of the world. For instance, their know-
ledge could include perspectival relations between things in the world
such as one object being to the left or right of another from certain
points of view. So, they could know that K2 is to the right and behind
Gasherbrum II when viewed from the top of Gasherbrum I. Since
perspectival facts are perfectly objective, the gods’ omniscience should
incorporate knowledge of them. But, while this kind of knowledge
enables our goddess Alpha to know how to get from Gasherbrum I
to K2, it doesn’t help her to get to K2 from where she’s at right now.
That’s because she simply doesn’t know who or where she is. For all
she knows, she might already be on K2. Hence, thinking about space
either in the allocentric, impersonal way, which doesn’t include a priv-
ileged point of view, or in the perspectival way, which involves points
of view but no reference to one’s own location, is insufficient for the
subject to know how to interact with the things thereby thought about.
Let me formulate this in more general terms as a kind of argument.
The impersonal way of thinking about the world that’s constitutive
of the omniscience of our goddesses entails an equal footing of every
location in that world. Hence, such a way of thinking is constitutively
without a privileged point of view or centre. The world of allocentric
thinking doesn’t revolve around one point in space. However, for a
subject to be capable of interacting with the world she thinks about,
she has to know about her relations to the things she wants to interact
with. This is because she needs to know how to move in order to act
on objects in the world. Such kind of knowledge requires the subject
to locate herself in that world. But, to locate oneself in the world one
thinks about requires the materialisation of a privileged point—i.e. the
location of oneself, the acting subject. The acting subject’s world has
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to be centred. Hence, the impersonal allocentric way of thinking of
our goddesses isn’t sufficient to enable interaction with the world.
Moreover, even if the subject is equipped with some perspectival
knowledge about the world—such as knowledge of the fact that K2 is
to the right and behind Gasherbrum II when viewed from the top of
Gasherbrum I—such knowledge doesn’t entail that the subject knows
where she herself is located. Despite the fact that perspectival think-
ing involves some privileged point, not any point will do for successful
coordination between perception and acting. The subject has to take
herself to be located at the centre of perspectival space and not just any-
where within that space. But one can think perspectivally about space
without taking oneself to act from the centre of this perspectival space.
Hence, such a perspectival way of thinking about the world enables
interaction with the things thought about only conditional on a fur-
ther premise which is egocentric in nature—e.g. that the subject takes
herself to be on Gasherbrum I, the centre of that perspectival space.
These arguments support our first claim that an egocentric way of
thinking about the world is necessary for a subject to know how to
interact with the things she encounters in the world she thereby thinks
about. The merely perspectival way of thinking, involving such terms
as left, right, above, behind, doesn’t provide us with the desired two-
way interaction that we witnessed in the case of the painter. What we
need is egocentric thinking as the glue that holds together thought
about the world and interaction with it. Of course, this idea wasn’t
just conjured out of thin air. We can trace it back to at least Evans’s
The Varieties of Reference, who puts it very succinctly:
Egocentric spatial terms are the terms in which the con-
tent of our spatial experiences would be formulated, and
those in which our immediate behavioural plans would be
expressed. This duality is no coincidence: an egocentric
space can exist only for an animal in which a complex net-
work of connections exists between perceptual input and
behavioural output. A perceptual input (…) cannot have
a spatial significance for an organism except in so far as
it has a place in such a complex network of input–output
connections.
Evans 1982: 154
origins 143
This quote further consolidates the necessity of egocentric thinking
for action. The way we think about the world can only be of signific-
ance if it’s put in relation with our possibilities of interaction. Further-
more, the quote hints at an explanation of why we should accept the
second claim:The egocentric way of thinking is constituted by the sub-
ject’s assumed possibilities of interaction with the objects in her world.
Evans’s argument is along the same lines by establishing a constitutive
link between how a subject experiences the world around her and how
she would interact with the things she thereby thinks about.
If we accept this connection, a particular object we think about ego-
centrically only gets its characteristic properties on the basis of the two-
way relation between thinking about and interacting with the world.
That means that egocentric thinking is characteristically tied to our
possible actions. Accordingly, our subject thinks of K2 as being to the
right and behind Gasherbrum II because she has to move in a specific
way in order to reach K2 from wherever she is right now. For instance,
she has to first pass Gasherbrum II before she gets closer to her goal of
climbing K2. Similarly, an object is thought of as being within reach
because the subject takes herself to be able to grasp it without, say,
moving to a different location. This latter assumption about the pos-
sibility of interaction with the object thus constitutes how our subject
thinks about the world around her.
Given that egocentric thinking forges the link between a subject’s
experience of the world around her and her interaction with the objects
she thinks about, we may ask: How is it enriched through this active
aspect?The answer lies in the necessary requirement of some reference
to the subject’s assumed possibilities of interaction with the objects. A
mere perspectival image from a certain point of view isn’t sufficient
because it doesn’t present the world in a directly engaging way. The
presentation of something as being to the left does not entail that the
subject takes herself to be capable of interacting with that thing by
moving in a particular way. This is why it’s perfectly perspicuous to
perspectivally think about K2 as being to the right of Gasherbrum II
without thereby taking a stance on where these mountains are in rela-
tion to oneself—and ipso facto without thereby taking a stance on how
one could interact with these objects. In contrast, egocentric thinking
involves the subject’s grasp of how she can directly interact with the
things in her world.
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We may accept the following example as initial support for this
thesis. When I am playing tennis, I think about the ball as coming
towards me.This kind of thinking is egocentric only if I take myself to
be capable of hitting the ball on the basis of thinking about it in that
way.My assumed possibilities of interaction—e.g. my assumption that
by moving my right arm in a certain way I can drive the ball down the
line—are constitutive of how I think of the tennis ball. Without them,
I wouldn’t think about the tennis ball in an egocentric way. Without
them, I would merely think of the ball in the detached way that’s char-
acteristic of allocentric or purely perspectival thinking.
Naturally, there are borderline cases which depend on whether the
subject really assumes some possibility of interaction with the objects
surrounding her or not. For instance, if I watch a video of Roger Fe-
derer playing tennis from his own perspective, I might also think about
the ball as coming towards me. After all, it looks as if it’s coming to-
wards me. However, I usually don’t take myself to be capable of inter-
acting with the ball on the basis of thinking about the ball in that way.
Why not? To give but two examples, I don’t expect to be hit if I don’t
move out of the way of the oncoming ball and I don’t expect to be able
to drive the ball down the line if I move my right arm in a certain way.
These things are by no means necessary. A subject can take up Roger
Federer’s perspective in an egocentric way and assume that she can hit
a winner on the basis of her thinking about the tennis ball—and this
assumption would then be deeply disappointed because there’s no ball
to be hit. This example shows how close egocentric and perspectival
thinking are related. One and the same visual image can be egocentric
in one case and merely perspectival in the other. What distinguishes
the cases is only whether the subject assumes some possibility of inter-
action (A.4.4).
There’s a further dialectical reason why we should accept the claim
that egocentric thinking is constituted by a subject’s assumed possibil-
ities of interaction—and you might disagree on the conclusiveness of
that reason. Remember that we want egocentric thinking to be a key
to understand de se thinking. As such, it better help us explain some of
the characteristic features of our ability to think in the de se way. One
of these features is that de se thinking is necessary to move subjects to
action. It’s because a subject takes a fact in the world as a reason for her
to do something that she’s motivated to act on the basis of that reason.
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I argued that a mere impersonal reason in isolation—such as the mere
fact that Olympus Mons is 21’230 metres tall—doesn’t move a subject
to action because it doesn’t constitute a reason for her to do something.
Only by taking a de se stance on these facts or by conjoining them with
additional de se mental states will these facts promote behaviour.
If we take egocentric thinking as being constituted by a subject’s
assumed possibilities of interaction, we can nicely accommodate this
important feature.The reason is quite simple. Because a subject thinks
of objects in terms of what she herself can do with them, she takes what
she thinks about as potential reasons for her to interact in some way
with these objects. The painter thinking of the canvas as being in front
of her provides her with a potential reason to paint by moving her arm
in a certain way and not in another. Hence, there’s a neat explanatory
connection between the proposed concept of egocentric thinking and
a key feature of de se thinking. If egocentric thinking is constituted
by the subject’s assumed possibilities of interaction with the objects in
her world, she’s immediately capable of taking facts in the world as
reasons for herself to act in some way or other.
We’re now equipped with good reasons to accept the two crucial
claims about egocentric thinking that called for support. I argued that
egocentric thinking is the right way to account for how subjects find
themselves in the world because it’s the only kind of thinking that en-
sures the necessary two-way relation between thinking about the world
and interacting with it. Furthermore, we saw that egocentric thinking
has to be characterised through the subject’s assumed possibilities of
interaction with objects presented to her. This is partly because taking
facts in the world as reasons for yourself to act in a certain way is con-
ceptually and explanatorily closely connected to thinking of the things
in the world in terms of what you take yourself to be able to do with
them—an essentially de se way of thinking.
And after having explained and justified these claims, we’re now in
a position to answer the various questions about egocentric space that
we started with. The first question was about what constitutes ego-
centric thinking. The answer is that egocentric thinking is constituted
by the subject’s assumed possibilities of interaction with the objects
thus thought about. These assumptions needn’t come in the form of
explicit judgements such as This tennis ball can be hit by me in such and
such a way. Rather, they’re manifest in what a subject takes herself to
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be capable to do on the basis of thinking about the world in that par-
ticular way. Furthermore, we saw that egocentric thinking comes with
a clearly prioritised location from which the subject interacts with the
world around her.This is the origin of egocentric space: the conceptual
and behavioural centre of a subject’s world.
Our second question concerned the relation to other ways of think-
ing about the world. I argued that these constitutive features distin-
guish egocentric thinking from other ways of thinking about the world.
Neither perspectival nor allocentric thinking is characterised in terms
of the two-way relation between thinking about and interacting with
the world and includes a prioritised centre from which the subject
interacts. This distinction and clarification provided us with the argu-
mentative fuel to defend the thesis that subjects are capable of directly
interacting with the objects in the world only by thinking about space
egocentrically. And we thereby answered the final question: Why do
we have to characterise the way a subject thinks about her world as ego-
centric? If objects are thought about with direct reference to what the
subject takes herself to be capable of doing with them, these subjects
immediately know how to go about interacting with them (A.4.5).
Now, how is this related to de se thinking?Most of the examples and
arguments involved cases of thinking about the things out there in the
world and not about the thinking subject herself. But, of course, a
subject thinking egocentrically about the world can also thereby think
about herself. One of the discussed examples was the painter who
thinks about her arm and believesMyarm is bent on the basis of feeling
the bend in her arm. In such a case, we can say that the arm is given to
her in a different way than the brush or the canvas. Rather than being
an independent object with which she can interact, her arm belongs to
the origin of her world through which she interacts. This origin takes
up a unique epistemic role in her egocentric thinking. It constitutes
the thing through which she’s able to interact with the objects in the
world. The arm thus belongs to that primitive basis of how things are
given to her in egocentric thinking—as graspable, within reach, or an
arm-length away. But what exactly is the origin of egocentric space?
What’s this ‘thing’ with which the subject feels, grasps, sees, desires,
believes (A.4.6)?
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4.2 the lived body
The fascinating case of the rubber hand illusion provides a graphic
starting point to explore the nature of the origin of egocentric space.
It’s a rather easily produced illusion where the subject takes an artifi-
cial hand to be her own real hand. For instance, she feels touch and
movement ‘in’ the rubber hand, flinches if a hammer is brought down
on the rubber hand and points towards the rubber hand if prompted
to touch her own hand. The illusion was first produced and reported
by the psychologists Botvinick and Cohen (1998) and consists of a
simple setup. A subject’s left hand is placed on a small table and hid-
den from direct view by a screen.Then, a rubber hand is placed in front
of the subject and she’s instructed to fix her eyes on the artificial hand.
Finally, both the real hidden hand and the artificial visible hand are
stroked synchronously by two brushes for up to ten minutes.
What happens now is that the subject starts to associate the brush-
strokes she feels on her real hand with the ones she sees on the artificial
hand.This association produces the illusion of ‘feeling’ the touch of the
brushstrokes in the rubber hand. Furthermore, if the subject is asked
to point blindly to her left hand with the index finger of her right one,
she will point closer to the artificial hand than to her real one. The
result is an illusion in which the subject experiences her left hand as
being located where the artificial hand is.
Things get even more interesting in a slight variation of the illu-
sion which is a more recent development (cf. Kalckert and Ehrsson
2012). Here, the rubber hand is placed directly above the left hand on
a small platform. Then, both index fingers—the hidden real one and
the visible artificial one—are connected with a rigid stick. After strok-
ing both hands for a while, the subject reports to feel the brushstrokes
in the artificial hand just as in the original setup. But while the original
illusion is easily undermined and broken by moving the finger of the
hidden hand and not seeing the expected result in the rubber hand, the
alternate setup allows for an even deeper immersion into the illusion.
If the subject now moves her left index finger up and down, she sees
the rubber index finger moving accordingly and thus has the illusion
of moving the rubber hand through her will. In other words, not only
does the subject ‘feel’ touch in the rubber hand, she might also assume
that she can interact with the world through the artificial hand instead
148 being origins
of her own real hand. This produces an even more immersing illusion
of the rubber hand being one’s own.
How do we explain what’s going on in this interesting illusion? One
scientific possibility is to call upon the integration of information from
different sense modalities that occurs when subjects interact with the
world. We normally have to put together massive amounts of inform-
ation which we receive from ourselves and the objects surrounding us
into a coherent picture. For instance, we combine information we re-
ceive from smell, touch, and vision to form a coherent perception of a
rose under our nose. Now, in the case of our illusion, the subject has to
make sense of the different inputs she receives from vision, touch, and
proprioception. By carefully capitalising on the way we usually integ-
rate this input, we can produce the rubber hand illusion.The real hand
is blocked from sight while the feeling of touch and proprioception is
instead synchronised and thereby linked to the vision of the artificial
hand. This produces a deviant integration which fools the subject into
taking the rubber hand as her own. The synchronicity of the brush-
strokes and the movement of the fingers is thus capable of deceiving
us into wrongly unifying inputs which originate in different parts of
egocentric space.
There’s a problem with this explanation though. While it might be
scientifically well-established and accurately accounts for what’s go-
ing on while a subject undergoes the illusion, it doesn’t exactly ex-
plain what it means for the subject to take the rubber hand to be her
own. While it explains why and how the cognitive system builds the
‘hypothesis’ which can be expressed in the subject’s belief This is my
hand, we don’t know what it means for the subject to have that par-
ticular belief. The genesis of such a belief in the cognitive system is
one thing, the meaning and significance for the subject quite another.
While we know how that belief was generated in that particular in-
stance, we don’t know how a subject takes anything to belong to her-
self. So, maybe a less sophisticated starting point is better. We might
just want to say that subjects experience ‘the rubber hand as belonging
to themselves’ (Botvinick and Cohen 1998: 756).
Of course, this isn’t an explanation either. We have to give an ac-
count of what it means for a subject to take something as belonging
to herself. After our discussion of the origin of egocentric space, the
following proposal shouldn’t come as a surprise: To take something as
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belonging to ourselves is just to take something as belonging to the ori-
gin of egocentric space. What does this amount to? Human subjects
normally take their hands to belong to the origin of egocentric space.
They assume that they’re able to grab things with their hands, point
to objects with their fingers, catch objects thrown at them, and so on.
However, in the case of the illusion, the subject could be said to erro-
neously take the rubber hand to be the thing with which she’s capable
of doing all these things. She assumes that she can interact with the
world around her through the artificial hand while erroneously taking
her real hand not to belong to the origin of egocentric space. And this
just is what it means to take the rubber hand to belong to oneself. Be-
cause the subject accepts it as belonging to the origin of egocentric
space, it’s accepted as belonging to herself.
We see, then, that the rubber hand illusion can be taken as a prime
tool to illuminate the specific concept of origin which is in play in
the concepts of primitive self-ascription and egocentric space. In the
illusion, the subject assumes that the rubber hand constitutes a pos-
sibility of interacting with the world. For instance, if there was a fly
sitting on the artificial index finger, she would move her index finger
up and down to shy it away. This corresponds to how she would in-
teract with the world outside of the illusion. Moreover, if she would
want to grab a glass in front of her, she would move her hand as if
it were located where the artificial hand is. The rubber hand thus can
be said to belong to the origin of egocentric space: the epistemic and
behavioural centre of a subject’s world. In this context, it’s important
to distinguish between actual possibilities of interaction and the sub-
ject’s assumed possibilities of interaction. A subject can assume to be
able to grasp the glass with the artificial hand even if that’s not actu-
ally possible. How so? She might move her actual hand in such a way
that, were it located where the rubber hand actually is, it would end
up where the glass is. As such, she assumed that she can interact with
the glass through the artificial hand because her movement had its in-
tentional origin in the location of the rubber hand. If she had assumed
otherwise, she would have moved her actual hand differently.This tells
us that her assumptions shouldn’t be understood as fully conceptual-
ised judgements that she actively forms and sustains. Rather, we have
to understand them as being part of a network of possible and actual
inferences as well as possible and actual actions.
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How is this connected to the subject’s ability to self-ascribe proper-
ties and entertain de se beliefs? Let’s take the following specific belief
which the subject forms while undergoing the illusion:
(13) My finger is bent.
The crucial question is: How does the subject come to self-ascribe the
property of having a bent finger in believing (13)? The reason for her
self-ascription might be partly found in a specific proprioceptive feel-
ing of a bent finger. Additionally, that experience is coupled and in-
tegrated with her seeing the artificial finger as being bent. On that
complex epistemic basis, she takes the rubber hand to be a source of
her behaviour in the world, a thing through which she can directly in-
teract with the world. And this is exactly the role which is played by
the origin of egocentric space.
Thus, the origin plays an anchoring role for primitive self-ascription
and de se thinking. Her taking the rubber hand to belong to the origin
of her world produces the capability of primitively self-ascribing the
property in question. There’s no need for her to identify her finger as
her finger within the experienced world. Quite the opposite: the finger
belongs to the origin of egocentric space. And since there can’t be more
than one such origin, identification isn’t required. Rather, the finger is
given to her in an epistemically primitive and direct way as the thing
through which she acts. In other words, what it means for the subject
to take the finger as belonging to herself isn’t the identification of that
finger as her own but rather the finger constitutively belonging to the
subject’s origin—through the subject behaving as if the artificial hand
were a possibility of direct interaction with the world. A related point
is that the rubber hand illusion tells us something about the sense of
ownership. The reason the hand is experienced as one’s own isn’t that
the subject judges it to be hers. Rather, it’s the fact that it belongs to the
origin of her world which underlies any such possible de se judgement.
Putting this all together, we can conclude that the origin provides
the epistemic basis on which the subject comes to believe (13) by prim-
itively self-ascribing the property of having a bent finger. And this is
nothing over and above the ascription of that property to the origin
of egocentric space. This again is enabled by the subject taking the
finger to belong to that origin. Primitive self-ascription, which forms
the basis of de se thinking, is thus grounded in that particular concept
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of the origin of egocentric space. A subject’s experience of the world
from the origin of her world brings about the capability to primitively
self-ascribe properties and thus creates the possibility of de se thinking
in that it explains how subjects come to grasp that they’re ascribing a
property to themselves in the first place.
The case of the rubber hand illusion illuminates further that the
concept of the origin is connected to a subject’s assumed possibilities
of interaction with the world. It’s because the subject is fooled into
thinking that she’s able to shy the fly away with the artificial hand that
we can understand her as taking that hand to belong to the origin. We
might have initially thought that the physical body plays the role of the
origin of egocentric space. But this proves to be the wrong approach.
In the deviant case of the rubber hand illusion, the subject takes the
artificial hand to belong to the origin. She assumes that she can grab
the glass with that hand, she assumes that she feels a gentle touch on its
skin and so on.Thus, the origin doesn’t just correspond to the physical
body. Rather, following some philosophers in the phenomenologist
tradition, we should call it the lived body.
What is the lived body and what role does it play in our story? As
a first approximation, we might say that it’s the malleable, living, and
experiencing body through which a subject interacts with the world.
The lived body is phenomenological in nature and intended to play a
foundational role for de se thinking. To bemore precise, it explains how
primitive self-ascriptions are possible. This is because the account un-
der development claims that primitive self-ascriptions are ascriptions
of a particular unique kind: they are ascriptions to the lived body—the
origin of egocentric space. If we understand primitive self-ascription
in this way, it implies that there’s no reliance on any prior epistemic
achievement such as the identification of a particular body as one’s own.
Rather, something being taken as one’s own body is nothing over and
above something belonging to the lived body.
Of course, this is too broad to serve as a good account. So, how
can we further specify the concept of the lived body so that it can
play this particular foundational role? The concept of the lived body is
certainly nothing new, so we can look to established theories for help.
In the short synopsis of my account in chapter 1, we already witnessed
that Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, provided the
basis for the concept of the lived body. But it finds its maybe most
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pronounced discussion in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of
Perception (2012); for instance in the following passage:
I only foresee what this form [of stimulation] might be
by leaving behind the body as an object, partes extra partes,
and by turning back to the body I currently experience,
for example, to the way my hand moves around the ob-
ject that it touches by anticipating the stimuli and by itself
sketching out the form that I am about to perceive. I can
only understand the function of the living body by accom-
plishing it and to the extent that I am a body that rises up
toward the world.
Merleau-Ponty 2012: 77–78
The situation under discussion in this passage is the specific kind
of experience a subject undergoes when her arm is touched. Merleau-
Ponty argues that it’s one thing to describe the situation from an ‘ob-
jective’ outside perspective and quite another to specify the way the
subject thinks about her arm in an egocentric experiential way. He ar-
gues that we can only understand the general way in which touch is ex-
perienced by a subject by moving away from a third-personal scientific
explanation to a description in terms of the subject’s experienced lived
body. In other words, touch is a kind of experience that’s essentially
tied to a subject taking a particular first-personal stance on the world
through her lived body—a body which isn’t established as an object
among others but as a privileged living and experiencing thing.
But how can we establish such an argument? We have to focus on
and justify the idea that the experience of touch isn’t exhausted by
merely listing the physical processes which are involved when, say, a
feather is brushed against a human body. While it’s certainly possible
to explain something by providing such a story, we’re missing an im-
portant aspect without which that kind of situation isn’t an experience
of touch at all. We could say that the experience of touch is more than
the mere physical contact of a feather against human living skin.
But what is this missing aspect? It’s the seemingly simple fact that
the subject takes the touch to be experienced in her own body. The
merely scientific story—which treats the body as an object among
other objects—doesn’t provide this because it doesn’t clearly distin-
guish between the cases where a subject experiences something as hap-
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pening to herself and a subject that undergoes a certain experience
without attributing that experience to herself. Touch is the experi-
ence of feeling something brushed against one’s own body. And an ‘ob-
jective’, physiological story is bound to overlook this qualitative, sub-
jective aspect. This also shows that the phenomenon that Merleau-
Ponty wants to isolate isn’t the mere consciousness of the experience
of touch. Rather, it’s the experience of being touched that’s our point
of interest. We might consciously experience something in our phys-
ical body without necessarily taking the experience as occurring in our
lived body and thus as being an experience of ours.
This argument carves out the first important feature of the concept
of the lived body.While the physical body of a subject can be fully char-
acterised by giving a third-personal scientific explanation, the same
isn’t true for the lived body. The two kinds of bodies might often co-
incide spatially, but the lived body is constituted through the first-per-
sonal experience of assumed possibilities of interaction with the world
around us. In that sense, the lived body isn’t on the same conceptual
and phenomenological level as the physical body. The latter is primar-
ily given to the subject as one object among many others in the world,
while the former is given as the privileged body through which the
subject takes herself to be capable of moving around her world, experi-
encing it and interacting with the objects around her. It’s in this sense
that the lived body metaphorically ‘rises up toward the world’—the
subject engages with the world through the lived body—whereas the
physical body is a mere object among other objects.
Our discussed case of the rubber hand illusion clearly illustrates this
difference between the physical and the lived body. On the basis of
taking the artificial hand to belong to the lived body—independently
of taking it to be part of the physical body—the subject is capable of
self-ascribing a certain property. She assumes that she can grab things
with that hand, catch things, experience touch, and so on. And these
assumptions aren’t tantamount to particular explicit judgements but
manifest themselves in how the subject engages with her world. As
such, the lived body is the thing which is epistemically given to her in
a direct and primitive way. And this is why she needn’t pick out and
identify her hand as her hand in the objective world. But certainly, the
rubber hand isn’t part of her physical body. So, her lived body can’t
be the same as her physical body. At the same time, the actual hand,
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despite being a part of her physical body, shouldn’t be described as
belonging to the lived body while she’s affected by the illusion. It’s
located ‘outside’ of her assumed possibilities of interaction. In other
words, it isn’t taken as a thing through which she can manipulate and
experience the world and as such isn’t taken by the subject to belong
to herself.
We can thus formulate a first distinguishing feature of the lived
body, which corresponds to the subject’s origin of egocentric space.
The lived body is distinct from the physical body.Thus, a subject might
take something as belonging to the lived body without it constituting
a part of her physical body and vice versa. We have to understand the
lived body as a phenomenological notion which is grounded in a sub-
ject’s engagement with the world around her. On the other hand, the
physical body is a purely ‘objective’, scientific notion which is wholly
established through underlying physical processes (A.4.7).
Two further constitutive features of the lived body were already im-
plicitly mentioned. One of them is the fact that a subject’s lived body
is established through what she takes to be possible ways of interac-
tion with the world. This follows from the fact that the lived body is
an elucidation of the concept of an origin. I argued that the origin of
egocentric space is the node which ties a subject to her world. As such,
the assumed possibilities of interaction play a crucial role because they
establish the prospect of engagement with the world. Accordingly, if
something is taken by the subject as a direct means of interaction with
objects around her, it belongs to the origin of egocentric space. And
because the lived body just is the origin of our world, the same ap-
plies to it. Whatever is taken by the subject—through her way of in-
teracting with the world—as a way of direct interaction with objects
in egocentric space belongs to the lived body. For instance, my fingers
belong to the lived body through which I engage with the world. They
enable me to interact with the keyboard in order to type these sen-
tences. They are the medium through which I feel the pressure of the
keys and the warmth of the sun shining on them. I assume, through
my engagement with the world, that these fingers are a possible way
for me to interact with the world. And this is why they belong to the
origin of egocentric space and thus to the lived body.
The case of the rubber hand illusion is a deviant though analogous
example. While under the illusion, the subject might take herself to
origins 155
be able to grab things with the artificial hand but not with the real one.
The real hand might be the actual thing with which engagement with
the world is possible, but the subject assumes differently. Similarly, an
artificial limb might be experienced as belonging to the lived body
because it constitutes part of the node between the subject and the
world: It enables the subject to walk around, kick things, stumble, and
so on. The lived body is thus formed through the subject’s assumption
about how she’s capable of directly interacting with the world. Keep in
mind, though, that this assumption isn’t a conscious and active stance
towards the lived body and the world. Rather, it shows itself in the
engagement of a subject with her world. Hence, my assumption that
I’m capable of interacting with the world through my fingers shows
itself in my engagement with the keyboard and not necessarily on the
basis of my judging I can interact with the world through these fingers.
Merleau-Ponty provides us with a nice example which further il-
lustrates this important and constitutive feature of the lived body. By
looking at the curious phenomenon of the phantom limb, he argues
that we have to understand this case as a subject who ‘refuses’ to accept
the loss of some of her possibilities of interaction with the world. Des-
pite visually seeing and accepting the absence of her arm, she takes
it to belong to the lived body, the body through which she engages
and interacts with the world. Once more, this illustrates the distinc-
tion and potential divergence of actual and assumed possibilities of
interaction. Moreover, the phenomenon emphasises the underlying
and latent nature of these assumptions. Maybe the most conspicuous
expression of this analysis can be found in the following passage:
To have a phantom limb is to remain open to all of the ac-
tions of which the arm alone is capable and to stay within
the practical field that one had prior to the mutilation.The
body is the vehicle of being in the world and, for a living
being, having a body means being united with a definite
milieu, merging with certain projects, and being perpetu-
ally engaged therein.
Merleau-Ponty 2012: 84
Of course, this important feature of the lived body doesn’t come
as a surprise and is nothing new. We’ve already established that the
origin of egocentric space is defined through the subject’s assumed
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possibilities of interaction with the world. And since the lived body
is supposed to function as that which illuminates and constitutes a
subject’s origin, it has to be defined in the sameway. Because of that, let
me just briefly repeat the previous arguments for this feature without
further commentary. We witnessed that the requirement for the lived
body to establish a subject’s active engagement with the world makes it
necessary to incorporate the two-way relation of egocentric thinking.
And the claim that the lived body is established through a subject’s
assumed possibilities of interaction is a reformulation of this point.
Furthermore, this understanding of the lived body puts it conceptually
and explanatorily close to a crucial feature of de se thinking: our ability
to think of the things in the world in terms of what we take ourselves
to be able to do with these things.
The third feature of the lived body equally follows from our discus-
sion of the nature of the origin of egocentric space. We should under-
stand the lived body as essentially first-personal. Let me explain the
reason for and meaning of this feature. The general problem of de se
thinking is howwe account for the capability of subjects to think about
themselves in such an intimate way, allowing them to be aware of the
fact that they’re thinking about themselves. In other words, we want to
explain the essential first-personal nature of de se thinking. The argu-
ments for the requirement of primitive self-ascription showed us that
we have to accept a certain basic form of de se thinking—i.e primit-
ive self-ascription as ascription to the lived body. Every other way of
thinking about oneself in the de se way—such as our use of the first
person concept or everyday speech in the first person—has to be built
on this foundational first-personal capacity.
A short argument for this claim will freshen our memory. Our abil-
ity to think about ourselves using the first person concept is a first-
personal ability. That’s to say that we’re aware of the fact that we’re
thinking about ourselves on the basis of our knowledgeable use of that
concept. But why is that ability first-personal? If the arguments so far
have been correct, we have to look for something underlying our use
of that concept which plays the primitive first-personal role.This is be-
cause the referential rule governing our use of the first person concept
doesn’t account for the first-personal nature of de se thinking. A sub-
ject can understand that every application of the concept refers to the
thinking subject without thereby grasping that her own application of
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that concept refers to herself. We then established the required prim-
itive foundational basis to be the capacity of subjects to ascribe prop-
erties to the origin of their egocentric space. And this is tantamount
to an ascription of a property to the lived body.
But why should we think that the lived body is the wanted essen-
tially first-personal basis? Well, there are two possibilities. Either the
lived body is first-personal, or it isn’t. Let’s imagine it weren’t. If that
were the case, we would be left with the ascription of properties to
the lived body. However, nothing about this would be first-personal.
Neither the lived body would be first-personal nor the ascription to
it. Why not? Because our account explains the essential de se nature
of primitive self-ascription by claiming that it’s an ascription to a very
special thing: the lived body. What makes a self-ascription primitive
is the fact that it’s a self-ascription to the lived body. But if the lived
body isn’t first-personal, then neither is primitive self-ascription.Then
whence does the essential first-personality of de se thinking come from?
By characterising the lived body as essentially and basically first-per-
sonal, we have a natural basis of that feature. In other words, the lived
body’s first-personal nature explains why ascription of properties to
it amount to primitive self-ascriptions, which form the basis of de se
thinking (A.4.8).
Finally, the fourth and last feature is closely related to the previous
one and can be derived from the same considerations. The lived body
has to be given to the subject in a non-representational way. That’s to
say that the subject can’t think of the lived body in a certain way as
something or other. To better understand what that means, compare
the way a subject thinks of the lived body to the way Alpha thinks of
the tree in front of her as an oak. In that case, Alpha determines that
what she perceives has certain features and qualities and thus judges
it to be an oak. The claim is now that we can’t and shouldn’t tell the
same story about the lived body.
Let’s look at how we can justify this claim. There are two main reas-
ons against the idea that a subject has to think of the lived body in a
certain way—for instance as her own. The first one is that our account
shouldn’t leave room for the possibility of wondering whether the lived
body that’s given to the subject is her own or someone else’s. Remem-
ber that the lived body is the exact means to dissolve that doubt. It
has to enable a subject to interact with the world without any prior
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epistemic achievement. And thinking about the body as ‘one’s own’,
‘mine’, or ‘the body I inhabit’ exactly amounts to such an undesired
epistemic achievement.
Let me be clear. There’s a sense in which we have to express a sub-
ject’s engagement with the world through her lived body as her taking
the lived body ‘as her own’. However, this is only a superficial relation
between the subject on the one side and the lived body on the other.
There’s neither a real metaphysical nor epistemic relation correspond-
ing to it. It’s merely a perspicuous and necessary, but deceptive, way of
speaking and writing.The subject can’t literally think of the lived body
as her own. Rather, we explain what it means for a subject to accept a
given body as her own by saying that it constitutes her lived body.This
doesn’t mean that any belief of the kindThis body is mine is deceptive or
false. Quite the opposite. We have to understand her grasp of taking
a body as hers as being based on her lived body in a non-representa-
tional way. Furthermore, the body she’s thereby thinking about isn’t
the lived body but the physical one.
The second reason is that a subject would have to identify a particular
body as her own if she had to think of the lived body in a certain
way. But this introduces two problems: It opens up the possibility of
misidentification and it leads into a potential infinite regress.The lived
body is the rock bottom foundation for de se thinking and as such has to
provide themeans to account for the characteristic features of thinking
in the de seway.One of these features is the potential immunity to error
throughmisidentification. But if the lived body isn’t equipped with the
required basis for immunity, then it’s difficult to see how de se thinking
could be exempt from misidentification. Furthermore, if we assumed
that the subject had to identify the lived body as her own, wemight ask:
Doesn’t that require a further identification? For, what does it mean to
identify something as one’s own? We couldn’t muster the lived body as
an explanation anymore, hence something else would be required. But
what keeps us from asking the same question one level down? As long
as we think of the foundation of de se thinking in identificational terms,
this question arises again and again. Hence, these considerations speak
for the fact that the lived body is free from identification.
This concludes the elaboration of the proposed positive account of
primitive self-ascription. We’re now left with a good picture of the
nature of the origin as the lived body. In order to provide a founda-
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tion for de se thinking, we ventured into the concept of primitive self-
ascription. I then argued that primitive self-ascription has to be under-
stood as ascription to the origin of egocentric space. This again called
for a picture of what that mystical origin is. The lived body provides
a good basis which, if understood properly, is capable of playing the
foundational role for de se thinking. Let me summarise this in the form
of a definitive characterisation:
the lived body account of de se thinking
When a subject thinks about herself in the de se way, she entertains
a thought that’s partly constituted by her ascribing a property to the
lived body.
This characterisation is only meaningful if complemented with an ac-
count of the lived body. In the course of our discussion, we’ve iden-
tified four essential features. The lived body is (a) phenomenally and
conceptually distinct from the physical body, (b) constituted by the
subject’s assumed possibilities of interaction with the world, (c) essen-
tially first-personal, and (d) free from identification. However, not all
de se mental states can be analysed in terms of a specific primitive self-
ascription with which they correspond and hence, de se thinking is only
partly constituted by ascriptions to the lived body. As we’ll see, some of
our de se thoughts don’t directly concern the lived body and we might
be able to think in the de se way despite a temporary ‘absence’ of the
lived body. However, a thought’s de se nature has to be traced back to
some ascription to the lived body which makes it de se in the first place.
Now, we’re going to put all the puzzle pieces together (A.4.9).
4.3 primitiveness as original thought
One main objective that remains now is to spell out how the presen-
ted account explains various cases of de se thinking. Some of the dis-
cussed examples already indicated the connection between primitive
self-ascription, egocentric thinking, and the lived body as the origin.
But now it’s time to make these conceptual connections explicit. We
may think back to the opening question of this book, which was to ex-
amine the nature of our thoughts about ourselves. In the paradigmatic
case of Narcissus, we have a highly self-conscious individual who’s
capable of self-consciously thinking about itself. At some point he be-
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comes aware of the fact that he’s looking at himself. Now, it’s his ability
to think in the de se way which underlies that revelation. And simil-
arly, John Perry’s realisation that he himself is making a mess in the
supermarket capitalises on the general ability to think de se thoughts—
thoughts which are necessarily about the thinking subject herself.
On our journey to get a grip on this most basic and intimate way
of thinking about oneself, we stumbled upon Lewis’s and Chisholm’s
property theory. There, we became acquainted with the claim that de
se thinking is best understood as being grounded in the ability to self-
ascribe properties. Through our discussion of this claim, we specified
it further and argued that this has to be understood in an epistemically
primitive way. Some of our self-ascriptions have to be basic without
depending on any further epistemic achievement. Most importantly,
a subject’s awareness of the fact that she’s thinking about herself can’t
depend on a prior identification of a particular object as herself. These
considerations also formed part of the reason to reject other strategies
that were discussed earlier.
Finally, I argued that only a phenomenological notion such as the
lived body can ultimately illuminate the nature of primitive self-ascrip-
tion. The intimate tie between the lived body and a subject’s engage-
ment with her world makes it the ideal foundation for de se thinking.
According to the lived body account, a subject can think about herself
in the de se way because the lived body is given to her in the epistem-
ically basic way required for primitive self-ascription. This entails a
certain metaphysical claim which comes down to this: every subject
is constituted through her lived body—the origin of egocentric space.
It’s the nexus of her engagement with the world. And this privileged
position allows a subject to ascribe properties to herself in the epistem-
ically direct way that grounds our ability to think de se thoughts.
From all this, the following picture emerges: Whenever a subject
thinks about herself in the de se way, that way of thinking is at least
partly based on her primitively self-ascribing some property or other.
Primitive self-ascription, in turn, is nothing but the ascription of a
property to the origin of egocentric space. In addition, the fact that
we’re the origins of our worlds enables us to think about ourselves in
that epistemically direct way. We occupy a privileged position in our
world, which brings about the possibility to think in an intimate way
about this most exceptional thing: ourselves.
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A good way to illuminate and ponder the merit of such an account
is to confront it with some of the paradigmatic kinds of examples that
have been discussed in the book so far. By doing this, we will see how
the idea that de se thinking is partly based on primitively self-ascribing
a property accounts for these examples. Furthermore, this will deepen
our understanding of both the role of the lived body in de se think-
ing and the nature of primitive self-ascription and its relation to other
self-ascriptions. Maybe the most vivid and instructional contrast is
between the following two seemingly identical beliefs:
(14) My back is horizontal formed on a proprioceptive basis.
(15) My back is horizontal formed on a visual basis.
Here we have a contrast between two beliefs of the same kind which
are formed on very different epistemic bases. The belief in question is
that of a subject taking her back to be in a horizontal position. We can
assume an important similarity between the two: the believing subject
engages with the world through the lived body in either case.More pre-
cisely, this engagement includes some underlying assumptions about
how her back relates to the world around her. For instance, she as-
sumes that she can lie on her back in a flat position, that her back is
strong enough to lift the box, that she’s ticklish in the lower half of
her back, that it hurts under her shoulder blades, and so on. In other
words, her back belongs to her lived body, which is constituted by her
assumed possibilities of interaction with the world around her. How-
ever, there are significant differences too.
In the case of Alpha believing (14), she’s in a situation where she
experiences her back as being horizontal. Normally, human subjects
are pretty bad at determining when exactly their back is perfectly ho-
rizontal. But we can imagine Alpha as being rather good at yoga, and
thus having developed a good feeling for her own posture. Hence,
she’s capable of proprioceptively judging her back to be parallel to
the ground even in complicated bodily positions. In such a case, we’d
want to say that the basis of her belief lies in her specific experience
of the world through the lived body. Importantly, the possibilities of
interaction with the world depend on the specific position the lived
body currently occupies relative to other objects around Alpha. For in-
stance, she assumes that, were one to put a snooker ball on her back,
it wouldn’t roll away. In other words, she assumes that her back is
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capable of supporting a rolling object. And this is tantamount to her
believing her back to be horizontal.
The experience of the world through her lived body thus allows her
to ascribe certain properties to the origin of her world. Certainly, not
all properties can be thusly self-ascribed.While she might be in a posi-
tion to primitively self-ascribe the property of having a horizontal back,
she most likely isn’t in a position to primitively self-ascribe the prop-
erty of having a tattoo with the shape of a Pegasus on her back. The way
we imagine Alpha, such a tattoo doesn’t figure in the lived body and
thus can’t be taken as a basis for primitive self-ascription. In contrast,
her back’s posture is reflected in the lived body through the kinds of
interactions Alpha assumes are possible with the objects around her.
And thus, her de se belief (14) is partly grounded in her ascribing the
property of having a horizontal back to the origin of her egocentric
space by depending on the nature of the lived body.
If we now look at the belief (15) against this background, we’d tell
a quite different story. Imagine that Beta believes (15) on the basis
of seeing herself in the mirror. She might be engaging in the same
yoga exercises as Alpha. But, as a beginner, she lacks the acute sense
of her bodily posture and has to visually confirm that her back is in
fact horizontal. We can even imagine her as potentially believing her
back to be slightly sloping downwards were she to base that belief
on her bodily experience alone. However, the lived body only plays
a subordinate role in the case of (15) and the visual identification of
herself with the mirror image is in the foreground. We could say that
there’s a lived body looming in the background and enabling primitive
self-ascription. But the belief (15) is formed on the basis of the visual
experience of some back being in a horizontal position together with
the further identifying de se beliefThis is my back.
The upshot of this exposition is that the resulting de se belief (15)
is tantamount to the self-ascription of the property of having a ho-
rizontal back. However, in the case of (15), that self-ascription isn’t
primitive. Rather, it epistemically depends on a further de se belief
which, in turn, might correspond to a primitive self-ascription or not.
At some point in that game of tracing back, we’ll be left with a belief
that’s constituted by the ascription of a property to the lived body. In
our case, such a belief would most likely be to the effect of Beta con-
sidering her back to belong to the lived body. And this grounds her
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ability to think about her back in the de se way in contexts which aren’t
primitive.
The contrast between these two beliefs shows us three important
things. First, there might be cases in which a subject has two de se be-
liefs of the same kind which correspond to different self-ascriptions
of properties. For instance, Alpha’s self-ascription is primitive while
Beta’s self-ascription isn’t. We tracked down the reason for that in the
difference between the epistemic bases for the two beliefs. In Alpha’s
case, her basing the self-ascription on the direct experience of her own
body allows it to be of the primitive kind. Beta, on the other hand,
forms her belief on the basis of further self-ascriptions and beliefs in
order to arrive at the de se belief (15). Most importantly, some iden-
tificational belief has to be present. Hence, her self-ascription of the
property of having a horizontal back doesn’t amount to an ascription
to the lived body and hence isn’t primitive in the required sense.
This shows us, secondly, that there are some proper de se beliefs
which don’t correspond to primitive self-ascriptions of a property. Beta
doesn’t base her belief (15) on the direct experience of her back as being
horizontal. Rather, she comes to her belief indirectly via the combina-
tion of seeing the back in the mirror as being horizontal and the belief
that she herself is the subject in the mirror. This reliance shows us, fi-
nally, that all de se beliefs have to epistemically involve some ascription
of a property to the origin of egocentric space in order to be de se at
all. A subject’s ability to think of something as herself is ultimately es-
tablished in the lived body and thus through primitive self-ascription.
Without primitive self-ascription in the background, no belief can be
grasped by the subject to be about herself (A.4.10).
It’s because of this dependence of all de se beliefs on some form of
primitive self-ascription that even quite mundane beliefs really are de
se in nature without corresponding to primitive self-ascriptions. For,
most of our de se beliefs don’t directly correspond to some primitive
self-ascription. Let’s take the following belief as an example:
(16) I won the lottery.
There’s normally nothing about a subject’s lived body that would
provide her with a reason to believe (16). But of course, Alpha could
be in a situation where she’s holding her winning ticket while verify-
ing the correctness of the numbers and then coming to believe that
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she’s won the lottery. In such a case, Alpha certainly entertains a de
se belief. After all, her belief is about herself and she’s perfectly aware
that it’s about herself and nobody else. But her belief is dependent
on other epistemic groundwork—such as the belief that these are the
winning numbers, that the ticket she’s holding between her fingers is
the winning lottery ticket and that the fingers with which she’s feeling
the paper are hers. Hence, ultimately, her believing (16) depends on
some ascription of a property to the lived body. This epistemic basis
is responsible for a subject’s potential awareness of the fact that she’s
thinking about herself when she’s thinking in the de se way.
The connection between de se thinking and the concept of egocentric
space exposes us to kinds of beliefs that are more difficult to explain
and make sense of. These beliefs aren’t properly about oneself and
hence don’t seem to be de se in nature—after all, their intentional ob-
ject is something else. But they still only seem to make sense to the
believing subject when they’re put into relation with herself and her
own way of thinking about the world. Let’s look at one example of
this kind:
(17) There’s food in reach to the left.
On first sight, it seems obvious that such a belief isn’t de se. After
all, a subject who believes (17) isn’t thereby thinking about herself at
all. The intentional object of her belief isn’t herself but the food in
question. So, why should we still think that it’s de se? We can identify
two reasons. The first is semantic in nature and the second epistemic.
Let’s discuss them in turn. Semantically, the conditions of satisfaction
of believing (17) depend in the very same way on the believing subject
as in more typical de se beliefs. If Alpha entertains (17), the belief is
true if there’s food to the left of Alpha. Conversely, if Beta entertains
the same belief, her belief is true if there’s food to the left of Beta.
This tells us that while the believing subject isn’t clearly visible in our
linguistic expression of the belief, it’s nonetheless implicitly part of the
belief. In order to get the right conditions of satisfaction, we need to
make reference to a specific thinking subject. Hence, egocentric beliefs
like (17) are only semantically complete if we take into account who’s
entertaining that particular belief (A.4.11).
We can reinforce this conclusion by looking at the epistemic beha-
viour of these egocentric beliefs. This will lead to the claim that beliefs
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like (17) are in some sense epistemically based on the self-ascription
of a property. To put it more precisely, they’re dependent on a sub-
ject thinking about the world in egocentric terms. But a subject can
only engage with the world egocentrically if she thinks about objects in
terms of her own possibilities of interactionwith them.And this brings
the involvement of primitive self-ascription with it. The dependence
and involvement can be demonstrated by discussing two terms we find
in the belief (17). First, what does it mean for a subject to think about
an object in egocentric terms as being ‘to the left’? And secondly, what
does it mean for a subject to think about an object as being ‘in reach’?
Let me start with the latter question. Whether the food is actually
in reach for Alpha isn’t dependent on her thinking about the world
in a particular way. It’s a perfectly determinable relation which either
obtains between the two things or it doesn’t. But, as soon as Alpha
thinks of an object as being in reach, she assumes a certain possibil-
ity of interaction with that object. For instance, she assumes that she
can touch the food if she extends her arm. And this is a case of a sub-
ject self-ascribing a property. She’s implicitly bringing the lived body,
according to which grabbing the food is an assumed possibility of in-
teraction, into the picture. And this forms the basis for her primitive
self-ascription of a property. Hence, thinking of the food as being in
reach involves some de se element by epistemically depending on an
ascription to the lived body.
Now, the same applies to the first question. Either the food is to
the left of Alpha or it isn’t. That much doesn’t depend on any self-
ascription. But as soon as Alpha thinks of the food as being to the
left, she thinks of it as being to the left of her, which involves the self-
ascription of some property. Thus, even in those beliefs which aren’t de
se on the surface, but involve egocentric terms, there’s some underlying
self-ascription looming in the background. And therefore, we should
say that they’re only meaningful to a subject if there’s some de se state
lending its support (A.4.12).
There are two more kinds of de se beliefs which I want to discuss.
The first kind concerns cases of inserted thoughts, where a subject en-
tertains a belief about herself but doesn’t accept that she’s the source or
agent of that belief. The second concerns those self-ascriptions which
are simply false. Let’s examine the first class of inserted beliefs by look-
ing at the following example:
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(18) I can fly.
We should begin with a short message of caution.The psychological
phenomenon of thought insertion is extremely complex with concep-
tual and explanatory problems left and right. As such, this short dis-
cussion shouldn’t bear much argumentative and deciding weight on
neither the proposed account nor on the phenomenon itself. Rather,
it’s supposed to point into a possible direction in which the proposed
account can explore these special mental states. With that said, what
does it mean for a thought to be inserted? In the case of Beta experien-
cing her belief (18) to be inserted, she would claim a lack of agency or
authorship of that particular belief. Shemight explain that the thought
isn’t her own but instead popped up in her mind or was inserted there
by some other powerful subject. But certainly, she would deny that she
actually believes that she herself can fly—despite ‘believing’ (18).
Given this scenario, wemight ask whether that belief is de se at all. A
positive answer is suggested by the fact that the belief has the semantic
structure of a de se belief. There’s no obvious difference between Beta’s
belief andWendy’s belief that she can fly. Both are true if the believing
subject can in fact fly—which is true in Wendy’s case but not in Beta’s.
And why should the belief (18) in Wendy’s mind be de se but not in
Beta’s? They’re beliefs of the same type. Maybe looking at the specific
epistemic features underlying Beta’s entertainment of (18) can shed
some light on the matter. We can reasonably doubt that (18) exhibits
the characteristic features of de se thinking in Beta’s case. It isn’t im-
mune to error throughmisidentification because she doesn’t think that
the belief is about her at all. It doesn’t serve as a basis for self-know-
ledge and Beta doesn’t take it as a reason to jump off a high ledge.
Hence, several of the important features of de se thinking are absent
in our case. Does this settle the question?
I don’t think so. After all, these features aremerely characteristic and
need not occur in every instance of de se thinking. But, we can mount
a further consideration that speaks against the de se nature of these
inserted thoughts. It concerns the connection to the lived body. On the
basis of experiencing her own body, Beta would most likely primitively
self-ascribe the property of being unable to fly. She doesn’t assume to
be able to float around the room, safely jump from high buildings, and
so on.The way she experiences the world around her through her body
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speaks very much against her presumed ability to fly. In other words,
the possibilities of interaction with the world are in conflict with the
property she’s supposedly self-ascribing in her believing (18). Hence,
should we deny inserted thoughts the de se nature they might exhibit
on the surface? I haven’t and won’t establish a conclusive answer.While
some considerations speak against their being de se, it would require a
much more detailed discussion of the phenomenon itself to evaluate
the exact relation between inserted thoughts and the proposed account
of de se thinking.
Finally, what about de se beliefs which involve the self-ascription of
properties that the subject doesn’t actually have? It might come as a
surprise that this should pose a problem at all. After all, it’s perfectly
fine to have wrong de se beliefs. Many of our beliefs about ourselves are
close to delusional but still remain beliefs about ourselves. Accordingly,
if Alpha mistakenly thinks of herself as being generous, that amounts
to a self-ascription of a property she doesn’t have. No problem here.
Somewhere in that process, an ascription to the lived body ensures
that she’s actually thinking about herself in the de se way. But the fact
that she’s self-ascribing a property she doesn’t have doesn’t impinge
on the fact that her belief is de se in nature. Her belief being de se is
grounded in her ability to primitively self-ascribe properties, but what
she then believes about herself can be anything she dreams up.
What might be more troublesome are mistaken de se beliefs that are
directly anchored in an ascription of a property to the lived body. For
instance, imagine that Alpha doesn’t actually have a horizontal back
despite basing her belief (14) on her experiencing her back to be that
way. Again, the problem sounds more serious than it is.The lived body
isn’t and doesn’t need to be protected against epistemic errors. We wit-
nessed this possibility already in the case of the rubber hand illusion.
A subject might falsely assume that she can directly interact with the
world through an artificial hand she accepts as her own. But such a
misguided picture of the physical body doesn’t undermine her capabil-
ity to ascribe properties to the origin of egocentric space. It just results
in de se beliefs which are potentially false.The lived body isn’t supposed
to be an absolute epistemic Archimedean point like Descartes’s Cogito,
it’s merely the fallible basis for de se thinking.
This concludes the discussion of various kinds of de se thinking as
explained by the idea that primitiveness is original thought. Subjects
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are able to entertain de semental states of various kinds because they ul-
timately think in an ‘original’ way: by ascribing properties to the lived
body—the origin of their world. In this sense, all de se thinking in-
volves a subject self-ascribing some property or other. But only some
of these self-ascriptions are epistemically primitive and stand in direct
connection to the lived body. For all other kinds, the de se nature of
the belief is nonetheless fundamentally anchored in an ascription of
a property to the lived body. For this is the foundation of a subject’s
ability to think about herself as herself.
4.4 feature accounting
After this important test of the aptitude of the lived body account,
it’s now necessary to look back to the characteristic features of de se
thinking which were developed in chapter 1. Remember that these
features are somewhat of a touchstone for any viable theory of de se
thought since it’s highly desirable that they’re accounted for. All the
other theories which have been discussed in the book so far failed in
some respect to coherently accommodate all of these features into their
account. Does the defended account, which traces self-ascription of
properties back to ascription to the lived body, fare any better?
Since the account is amodification and advancement of the property
theory advocated by Lewis, Chisholm, and Friends, we should expect
similar merits and problems. After all, it still takes de se thinking to be
tantamount to the self-ascription of some property or other. However,
it differs in recognising the necessity of primitive self-ascription and
the subsequent characterisation thereof. According to the defended
account, the de se nature of every instance of thinking about oneself
in the de se way ultimately relies on the ascription of a property to
the lived body. This kind of ascription has to underlie every instance
of de se thinking because it’s needed to ensure that the subject can be
aware of the fact that she’s thinking about herself. As we’ll see, this
small, but fundamental, modification changes the explanation of the
characteristic features quite radically.
So, let’s start with the first feature: All de se mental states are about
the thinking subject. In other words, whenever a subject engages in
de se thinking, she’s necessarily the intentional object of that thought.
This semantic requirement is easily satisfied within the account. It was
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argued that de se states of any kind are tantamount to self-ascriptions of
properties. Because self-ascription is necessarily an ascription to one-
self, a subject can only self-ascribe a property to herself. This results
in the fact that de se beliefs are necessarily about the thinking subject,
thus accommodating the first feature.
You might contest the trivial sounding claim that self-ascription
is necessarily an ascription to oneself. The proposed account delivers
good reasons that support this seemingly trivial fact. I’ve argued that
self-ascriptions are ultimately anchored in the ascription of a property
to the lived body. Since a subject can only ascribe properties to the
lived body that constitutes herself, such primitive self-ascriptions have
to be about the thinking subject. For instance, if Alpha believes that
her back is horizontal, she ascribes the property of having a horizontal
back to the origin. And since Alpha’s origin is constituted through her
lived body, that belief can’t fail to be about herself. Hence, every prim-
itive self-ascription takes the thinking subject as the intentional object.
From this, we can infer that self-ascriptions which aren’t primitive are
also necessarily about the thinking subject. Because every self-ascrip-
tion is anchored in the lived body, the account ensures that all self-
ascriptions, by their very nature, are about the thinking subject.
The fact that self-ascriptions are necessarily about the thinking sub-
ject is closely connected to the second feature: The satisfaction con-
ditions of de se thoughts depend in a systematic way on the thinking
subject. For beliefs that amounts to the following: Whenever a sub-
ject entertains a belief of the type I am F, that particular belief will
only be true if the thinking subject has the property of being F. Again,
the idea that de se thinking amounts to the self-ascription of proper-
ties gives us an easy way to explain this second semantic feature. Every
belief of the type I am F is an instance of a subject self-ascribing the
property F. Whether or not such a self-ascription is correct naturally
depends on who is doing the self-ascribing. If Alpha self-ascribes the
property, her belief is true if Alpha is F because she’s thereby ascribing
that property to herself, i.e. Alpha. From the start, the concept of self-
ascription is equipped with the required self-reflexivity. We can thus
easily see how the satisfaction conditions of de se thoughts depend sys-
tematically on the thinking subject. It’s because the correctness of self-
ascription depends in a systematic way on which subject self-ascribes
the property in question.
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Things get more interesting as soon as we move to the epistemic
features. Maybe the most discussed and important feature is that de
se thinking is potentially immune to error through misidentification.
That means that in some cases, a subject can’t err about the object of
her thinking. To put it differently, it sometimes isn’t possible that she
takes her belief to be about herself while it’s potentially about someone
else.We can compare this to cases where the intentional object—what
the thought is supposed to be about—and the actual object of a mental
state can come apart. To take an example, remember that Beta bases
the belief concerning her own posture on seeing what she takes to be
herself in the mirror. Hence, her belief relies epistemically on the iden-
tification of herself with the yogi in the mirror. Unfortunately, since
there’s the possibility that the mirror image doesn’t originate from
her, she might misidentify who she’s thinking about. While the be-
liefMy back is horizontal is supposed to be about her—after all, that’s
the nature of de se thinking which is captured in the first feature—the
indirect epistemic provenance of that belief entails the possibility of
actually being about some other yogi.
We sided with Evans in claiming that the immunity which Beta is
lacking has its origin in the fact that some of our mental states don’t
involve the identification of an object at all. Because the more experi-
enced yogi Alpha doesn’t identify herself when she bases her belief on
her proprioceptive experience, she can’t misidentify the object of her
belief either. The result is that her de se belief is immune against that
error. Why doesn’t Alpha identify herself in the belief ? Because she
bases it on the epistemically direct ascription to the lived body. And I
argued that subjects needn’t identify the lived body because it’s essen-
tially first-personal. There’s only ever one lived body through which a
subject can interact with her world. And this epistemic uniqueness of
the lived body makes an identification superfluous.
The possibility of immunity to error through misidentification is
therefore explained by the nature of primitive self-ascription. Since
subjects don’t identify themselves as the object of their thinking in
ascribing a property to the lived body, these self-ascriptions are free
from identification. Therefore, de se beliefs are potentially immune to
error through misidentification because they sometimes simply corres-
pond to primitive self-ascriptions which don’t involve identification of
an object. And where there’s no identification, there’s no misidentific-
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ation. Hence, we’ve established the possibility of de se mental states
with immunity to error through misidentification.
This brings us to the intimate relation between de se thinking and
self-knowledge. The presented account delivers an explanation of two
different aspects of this connection. On the one hand, it explains how
subjects know that their self-knowledge relates to themselves. And
on the other hand, it unravels the possibility of substantial self-know-
ledge in the first place. Let’s start by looking at the less problematic
first aspect. Because knowing something implies believing something
that’s true, all cases of self-knowledge are cases of true de se beliefs. Fur-
thermore, self-knowledge entails a subject’s grasp of the fact that her
knowledge concerns herself.The question now is: How can we account
for this first-personal grasp? By intimately connecting de se thinking to
the lived body. Accordingly, subjects are aware of their beliefs concern-
ing themselves through the beliefs’ being grounded in the ascription
of a property to the lived body. Since subjects are the origins of their
world, ascribing something to that origin involves an implicit aware-
ness that you’re thinking about yourself. And this grasp is brought to
the surface in cases of self-knowledge. Thus, the structural peculiarity
of self-knowledge is accounted for by how the account understands the
nature of de se thinking. Self-knowing subjects are aware that they’re
thinking about themselves because every case of self-knowledge is a
case of de se thinking, which involves the ascription of a property to
the lived body.
The second aspect concerns the claim that self-knowledge is a spe-
cial and superior kind of knowledge with special properties. Even if
you doubt the truth of that claim, the proposed account could provide
a potential justification of it. Primitive self-ascription was argued to
be the distinguishing mark of de se thinking. Without the ability to
self-ascribe properties in a primitive way, subjects wouldn’t be able to
grasp that they’re thinking about themselves. Furthermore, the nature
of primitive self-ascription is epistemically outstanding in being groun-
ded in what a subject takes to be herself. It would be odd to inform
Alpha that she’s not actually in pain while she’s clearly experiencing it
through the lived body.This is because the ascriptions to the lived body
are epistemically direct and through their immediacy less susceptible
to epistemic errors. Thus, the claim that self-knowledge is somehow
secured against certain doubts can be accommodated within our the-
172 being origins
ory because some items of self-knowledge have their source in this
epistemically direct link to the lived body.
However, this result has to be qualified in two ways. First, it’s purely
conditional on the truth of the claim that self-knowledge is special
at all. If we hold that primitive self-ascription is epistemically spe-
cial, we’re not claiming that it necessarily has to amount to self-know-
ledge understood in this superior way. We can recede to the much
weaker claim that primitive self-ascriptions are a better source of know-
ledge than other self-ascriptions. Such a claim is much less ambitious
and contentious. That some epistemic sources are superior to others is
perfectly normal and needn’t result in a distinction between different
kinds of knowledge that correspond to these different sources.
Secondly, even if we accept that self-knowledge is a special kind of
knowledge, and additionally accept that this is accounted for by the
nature of primitive self-ascription, we can still allow primitive self-
ascriptions to be fallible. While the pain example might tip us into
the direction of embracing the infallibility of the lived body, the rub-
ber hand illusion tells a very different story. Our primitive self-ascrip-
tions are quite fallible indeed. But, as we saw in the first chapter, self-
knowledge doesn’t necessarily involve a claim of infallibility.We can be
content with the claim that self-knowledge is special because primitive
self-ascription is epistemically privileged. And this kind of privilege of
self-knowledge might be all that’s required for it to be special.
The fifth feature of de se thinking is the role it plays in motivating
intentional action and producing behaviour. I argued that a subject
has to take reasons that speak in favour of doing something as reasons
for herself if they’re supposed to be conducive to action. For instance,
the fact that there’s a charging honey badger to the left of Alpha is
a reason for her to run the other way. However, that reason will only
speak in favour of running away for Alpha if she believes A charging
honey badger is to my left. In other words, it only motivates action if she
takes it as a reason for herself by entertaining a de se belief. How does
the idea that de se thinking is grounded in ascriptions to the origin of
egocentric space account for this?
In fact, the lived body account tells a very harmonic and holistic
story about this. Remember that we characterised the lived body via
the assumed possibilities of interaction with the world. For instance,
my fingers belong to the origin ofmyworld because they’re an assumed
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means of experiencing and acting in the world. I can feel touch and
warmth of the objects around me through my fingers and I can use
them to type these words and sentences. But how does this transform
anonymous reasons in the world into reasons for me?
Imagine that the letter ‘R’ on my keyboard stands in such and such a
spatial relation to my left index finger. Accordingly, if I wanted to type
that letter, I would have to move my finger in a certain way. In such
a case, that particular spatial configuration would be a reason for me
to move in a particular way. But, being a mere fact in the world, that
reason is totally idle. The impersonal reason out there in the world is
no business of mine. What is required is that I apprehend that reason
in relation to me. How? By thinking about the letter in relation to my
assumed possibilities of interaction—or: in relation to the lived body.
Among other things, I ascribe the property of having an index finger
in such and such a position—for example, bent and not stretched—to
the lived body. This means that by thinking about the key from this
original point of view, I take the relation between the finger, which I
take to be mine, and the keyboard as a reason for me to act in some way
or other. In other words, thinking about the key in egocentric terms
provides it with immediate importance to my possible actions.
The proposed theory therefore provides a straightforward explana-
tion of how intentional action is brought about by de se thinking. It
traces our ability to think in the de se way back to how we think about
our world from its origin. Subjects think about the world around them
in an egocentric way that’s essentially tied to the lived body. The lived
body, in turn, is characterised through the assumed possibilities of in-
teraction. This naturally makes certain facts in the world connect with
my potential actions and thus produces potential reasons for me to act.
Thereby, these conceptual and epistemic links provide a simple explan-
ation of this last feature of de se thinking.
We can thus see that the lived body account is capable of doing
justice to all the characteristic features of de se thinking that we’ve
identified. Hence, it passes the second important test for any theory
of de se thinking. Not only is there a reasonable explanation of various
kinds of de se thoughts in terms of ascription to the lived body. The
account also ensures that de se thinking is always about the thinking
subject, comes with satisfaction conditions that systematically depend
on who’s thinking, accounts for the possibility of immunity to error
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through misidentification and the possibility of self-knowledge, and
explains the conceptual link to intentional action and behaviour.
4.5 answering objections
Of course, philosophy isn’t so easy and straightforward. The proposed
account might fit in fair and square with various desirable features and
examples but it certainly isn’t immune to objections. Some of these
have been discussed and accounted for in the process of developing
and explaining the account in the first place. But this still leaves us
with the rest. Let me now answer some of the more important and
potentially devastating ones before wrapping this book up.
The first objection concerns the way the lived body is characterised.
The account of de se thinking which I defended is very much tied to a
subject’s assumed possibilities of interaction with the world. Accord-
ing to this phenomenological theory, the lived body—the source of all
de se thinking—is established through the way a subject perceives and
acts in her world. But what if these possibilities vanish? What if a sub-
ject is incapable of experiencing her own body and the world around
her and incapable of any bodily movement? Does her capacity to think
in the de se way disappear as well?
Christopher Peacocke presents us with one version of this objection.
He imagines a subject in such a predicament. She has no propriocep-
tion and no way of moving her body. Presumably, she assumes no
possibilities of interaction in that situation of sensory deprivation and
impossibility of action. Accordingly, her lived body should evaporate
completely. And without the possibility of engaging with the world
from the origin, all de se thinking should vanish. However, Peacocke,
following similar remarks by Elizabeth Anscombe (1975), thinks it
doesn’t: ‘But this subject’s use of I still refers in these circumstances.
… [T]he subject may think to herself I will make sure I don’t get into
this situation again’ (Peacocke 2012b: 153).
Similarly, Lucy O’Brien argues that the absence of bodily aware-
ness, which partly constitutes a subject’s lived body, doesn’t result in
the impossibility of de se thinking. Like Anscombe and Peacocke, she
assumes that a subject can still think about herself even if she’s in a
state of sensory deprivation: ‘Now, even the subject immersed in the
sensory deprivation tank is able to refer to herself first-personally. So,
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however the subject is presented with herself, it cannot be via those per-
ceptual sources that are unavailable to her in such a situation’ (O’Brien
2007: 20).
In both versions of this objection we have the claim that a subject
who’s incapable of bodily experience and behaviour, but who’s still in
her right mind, is capable of entertaining de se thoughts.This is a prob-
lem for the defended account insofar as the subject doesn’t assume
any possibilities of interaction with the world and would therefore be
devoid of a lived body. And without a lived body, there are no prim-
itive self-ascriptions and thus supposedly no de se thoughts. Hence, it
seems that the account implies that a subject in sensory deprivation
can’t think about herself in the de se way, while the example suggests
it to be possible.
To be sure, the reasons why Peacocke, Anscombe, and O’Brien as-
sume this scenario to be an actual possibility are somewhat different,
but we don’t need to discuss them individually to dismiss the objec-
tion. We’ll just accept that such a scenario is possibly. Presumably,
the subject we’re talking about is a highly self-conscious and sophistic-
ated subject. As such, she’s capable of correctly using the first-person
pronoun and thereby expressing thoughts involving the correct applic-
ation of the first person concept. This already opens up a crack wide
enough to drive in an argumentative wedge.
The easy way to dispatch the objection is to argue that a subject who’s
still capable of linguistically expressing her thoughts has to assume that
she’s capable of uttering words. In other words, she assumes that she
can produce sound bymoving her lips and vocal chords in a certain way.
As such, she still retains a heavily constricted lived body to which she
can ascribe properties. Hence, if we allow our subject to be capable of
language, we at once bring back the lived body. But this reply is much
too easy. This is because we can interpret the objections to exclude
the possibility of linguistic expression. Rather, the subject is so heavily
immobilised and desensitised that her thoughts are all that remains.
This makes it much harder for the lived body to get into play. For
the sake of the objection, we may assume that the lived body is truly
gone in this particular scenario. Does that eliminate the possibility
of de se thinking? Remember that the approach I defended assumes
that every instance of de se thinking involves an ascription to the lived
body because this is what establishes a subject’s grasp of the fact that
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she’s thinking about herself. As a reply to the objection, we can specify
this requirement by adding that this kind of involvement need not be
contemporaneous. Rather, a subject’s de se thoughts can be based on
a prior ability to ascribe a property to the lived body. This allows the
subject to retain the epistemic base on which her first person concept
is built. How so?
First off, a subject can’t acquire the first person concept without the
ability to primitively self-ascribe properties.Without the general capa-
city to think in the de seway, she wouldn’t understand what it means for
the first person concept to refer to herself when she’s using it.Thus, our
sensory deprived subject used to be capable of ascribing properties to
the lived body. Otherwise, she wouldn’t now be able to think thoughts
involving the first person concept. This follows from our discussion of
the conceptual strategy. In her predicament, she can now epistemically
base her use of the concept on that prior ability to ascribe properties
to the lived body by simply applying the concept in question. Her full
grasp of the concept already involves grasp of the fact that her use of
the concept refers to herself. Absent any impairment which would des-
troy that grasp, she retains mastery of the concept. Her application of
the first person concept in the sensory deprivation scenario thus epi-
stemically involves a prior ability to ascribe properties to the lived body.
This still stays true to the idea that all de se thinking epistemically—not
temporarily—involves an ascription to the lived body.
Thus, the subject—being self-conscious—retains her mastery of the
first person concept despite the temporary ‘disappearance’ of the lived
body in the sensory deprivation scenario. As such, she retains her abil-
ity to use that concept to self-consciously refer to herself in de se think-
ing. That ability, in turn, is based on primitive self-ascriptions which
epistemically buttressed her acquisition of the concept in the first place.
This is why subjects can think de se thoughts even if they’re currently
incapable of ascribing properties to the lived body. Hence, the possib-
ility of de se thinking in a sensory deprivation scenario is compatible
with the lived body account.
A second objection tries to undermine the claim that primitive self-
ascriptions can be immune to error through misidentification. It ar-
gues that primitive self-ascriptions simply don’t have the right struc-
ture to be candidates for immunity. Why not? Because the logical and
semantic structure of primitive self-ascription doesn’t involve an object
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which could potentially be misidentified. Hence, it’s wrong to say that
ascriptions to the lived body can be immune to error through misiden-
tification in the same way that it’s wrong to say that clouds are immune
against chickenpox. It’s a simple categorical mistake.
The idea behind this claim is that some of our mental states have a
structure which distinguishes between the object that’s picked out and
the property that’s ascribed to that object. Other mental states don’t
involve such a structural distinction; rather, the information about the
object is merely implied. For instance, there’s a clear object and a clear
property in a subject’s belief that politicians should be honest. She’s
thinking about all the politicians out there and she wants them to have
the property of being honest. But, we might describe the visual exper-
ience of drinkable water in front of me as a mere positing of drinkable
stuff in my visual field. Such positing would only involve a property
at a certain location in egocentric space without a clearly designated
object having that property (A.4.13).
Kristina Musholt formulates this point in the context of the dis-
tinction between non-conceptual and conceptual thought. We can ad-
mit that some of our self-ascriptions aren’t based on the application
of concepts. As such, she argues, they don’t involve the explicit indi-
viduation of an object to which a state or property is ascribed. Rather,
the object of one’s mental state is implicitly provided by the nature
of the state in question. Being a self-ascription, the property is natur-
ally ascribed to oneself. Thus, the fact that we’re dealing with a self-
ascription of a specific subject delivers us the right object without that
object featuring in the self-ascription. She gives the example of feeling
irritated because of one’s hunger. Because a subject can’t self-ascribe
the property of being irritated to any other object than herself, ‘such a
self-ascription can “what”-misrepresent, but it cannot “who”-misrep-
resent’ (Musholt 2015: 69). In other words, self-ascriptions don’t have
a subject–object structure. And immunity only applies to states with
such a logical structure.
She takes this analysis of self-ascriptions—which we can take to
apply to primitive self-ascriptions as well—to speak against the pos-
sibility of immunity of these states. Obviously, where there’s no object
involved, no object can be misidentified. As a result, de se states which
amount to ascriptions to the lived body are not within the realm of
misidentification at all. Hence, they also can’t be immune against such
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an error. The question of identification simply doesn’t arise on that
level. For Musholt, this is why ‘it is a category mistake, so to speak,
to try to apply the notion of immunity at the level of nonconceptual
content’ (Musholt 2015: 70). If the objection goes through, we would
have to revisit the claim that the lived body account can accommodate
the possibility of immunity.
The general idea behind this objection can also be found in other
philosophers who write about immunity. For instance, Peacocke ap-
plies the notion of immunity only to conceptual judgements in which
an object is identified: ‘The relevant notion is that of a judgement with
the content Fa being immune to error through misidentification (a)
relative to the particular occurrence of a in the content, (b) when the
judgement is reached in a certain way W, and (c) in normal circum-
stances’ (Peacocke 2014: 107). Hence, immunity simply doesn’t figure
on the level of primitive self-ascriptions because they don’t amount to
conceptual judgements. How can the lived body account react to this?
I propose two different strategies and will defend one of them. The
first one is much more difficult to justify and attempts to question the
restriction of immunity to conceptual judgements where an object is
clearly identified in thought. We can reasonably ask why the concept
of immunity shouldn’t apply to those mental states where the object
is merely implicitly present. Self-ascriptions might not make explicit
reference to the object, but it certainly involves a clear reference to
some object or other. After all, the object to which the property is
ascribed is delivered to us by the fact that it’s the self-ascription of a
specific subject. In other words, such a de se state isn’t mute about who
the property is being ascribed to. Hence, there’s at least the possibility
of something going epistemically wrong in the process of ascription to
the lived body. And consequently, there’s a sense in which we can claim
those self-ascriptions to be immune to error through misidentification.
This strategy might be viable but it would require a more detailed
discussion of immunity in order to get off the ground. What’s more
important is that we’re not forced to go that way. The lived body ac-
count makes no substantial claims about immunity. It only needs to
be compatible with the possibility of immunity of de se thoughts in
general and explain how the phenomenon can arise. The good thing
is that this can be done while accepting the objection that the notion
of immunity can only be applied to conceptual judgements.
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Here, then, is the second strategy to defuse the objection. We can
argue that the immunity of judgements is precisely accounted for in
terms of the lived body. The reason why some first person judgements
are immune to error throughmisidentification is that they’re grounded
in a primitive self-ascription.Theway, to use Peacocke’s term, in which
the judgement is reached provides an epistemic foundation which is
secure in a way that makes the judgement established thereupon im-
mune to error through misidentificaion. We can’t ascribe a property to
the lived body and err about who we’re ascribing that property to. And
this fact—which might not imply that these primitive self-ascriptions
themselves exhibit immunity—epistemically secures that judgements
formed on that particular basis are immune to misidentification. In
fact, Peacocke (2014: 107) provides us with a short list of characterist-
icly immune judgements which are all ultimately formed on the basis
of an ascription to the lived body. Hence, the lived body account can
also accommodate this restricted notion of immunity.
The third and final objection I want to discuss is somewhat more
global and concerns the general strategy of the lived body account. It
goes back to Descartes’s attempt to secure all knowledge by basing it
on self-knowledge and therefore on some form of de se thinking. The
famous Cogito argument can be understood as the establishment of an
absolutely secure form of knowledge. And this kind of self-knowledge
is so epistemically immaculate because it’s completely independent of
any knowledge of the outside world—including anything like a body.
A disembodied spirit could go through the CartesianMeditations just
as well as you and would arrive at the same conclusions.
Given the influence of this idea—the knowledge of one’s own ex-
istence is probably as close to an undisputed philosophical fact as we
can get—there’s an obvious tension to the lived body approach. The
epitome of self-knowledge is supposedly knowledge that’s completely
epistemically independent of a subject having a body at all. In addition,
the Cartesian strategy is designed to explicitly annul all reference to a
dubitable and fallible empirical or phenomenological body in its quest
to build a foundation for knowledge. How can the lived body account
react to this general and potentially destructive objection?
One seemingly fruitless reply uses the strategy against the first ob-
jection to mount a defence of the necessity of primitive self-ascription
for de se thinking. According to this defence, the Cartesian argument
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to arrive at knowledge of one’s own existence only works for a subject
that’s already capable of de se thinking. And this would imply that the
subject comes to understand that her first person thoughts are about
herself by basing them on ascriptions to the lived body. However, this
strategy doesn’t seem as compelling against Descartes’s worry. We can
interpret theCogito as establishing that some form of self-knowledge is
completely independent of a subject having a physical body at all. And
this is a more serious predicament than the sensorily deprived subject
in O’Brien’s scenario. While it’s possible to argue that a subject’s mas-
tery of the first person concept is epistemically grounded in some prior
primitive self-ascription in the latter case, this strategy seems unavail-
able to us in the Cartesian scheme.
We need to look for another option then. One attractive reply is to
question the intelligibility of Descartes’s scenario in order to make the
previous reply viable. As such, it simply doesn’t accept the premise that
a disembodied subject can achieve knowledge of her own existence.
To be more precise, this strategy stresses that the general possibility
of self-knowledge only arises once a subject grasps that some of her
thoughts are about herself. And this requires the ascription of a prop-
erty to the lived body. For otherwise, how could the subject grasp that
she’s thinking about herself ?While the specific item of self-knowledge
that’s established in the Cogito argument is epistemically independent
of any particular empirical or phenomenological premise concerning
the body, her ability to think about herself in the first place isn’t inde-
pendent. As such, while we can imagine ourselves going through the
Meditations and arriving at that profound piece of self-knowledge, a
disembodied spirit can’t follow suit. Without a lived body, the spirit
can’t come to understand what it means to think about oneself in the
first place.
How plausible is this reply? First off, one shouldn’t mistake the
reply as going against the metaphysical theory of dualism—the idea
that there are independent mental things next to physical things. The
claim is merely that a pure spirit can’t arrive at self-knowledge of any
kind because it can’t primitively self-ascribe properties. And therefore,
it can’t entertain de se beliefs at all. Secondly, the reply somewhat begs
the question in resulting in the mere claim that the Cartesian scenario
of a disembodied spirit with self-knowledge, which we deemed pos-
sible, is actually impossible. Apart from the theory of primitive self-
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ascription itself, it doesn’t provide additional reasons that challenge
the possibility of disembodied spirits with self-knowledge. And this is
certainly problematic.
However, I argue that it’s the best we can do and it’s the best we
need do. Descartes doesn’t provide us with any reasons for accepting
that particular possibility. In fact, there are countless other reasons
speaking against it. So, why should we be under pressure then? From
the fact that the Cogito argument is epistemically independent of any
empirical knowledge, it doesn’t follow that disembodied spirits can
think de se thoughts or that such things are even possible. In fact, the
important point of the Cogito argument can be accommodated neatly
into the lived body account. As ordinary subjects with lived bodies, we
can arrive at self-knowledge that’s epistemically independent from any
particular empirical ascription to the lived body, but this depends on
the general ability to ascribe properties to the lived body. This cent-
ral result of the Meditation is totally independent of the further claim
that pure spirits can have the same kind of self-knowledge. And as
such, we can remain mute. The knowledge of one’s own existence is
thus just as dependent on the lived body as the subject’s capacity to
think in the de se way while sensorily deprived.
4.6 closure and loose ends
We’ve now answered some critical objections and thereby further con-
solidated the lived body account.This only leaves a few small tasks that
need to be accomplished. The first of these is a mission of peace. In
the course of the book, several opposing strategies were critically dis-
cussed and dismissed. Most of these dismissals were motivated by the
following consideration: While they provide an explanation of how
established de se thinking works semantically or epistemically, they all
fail to explain how subjects can come to grasp that their de se thoughts
are about themselves in the first place. In other words, the main ob-
jection was that they fail to give an account of what’s actually special
about de se thinking. But this shortcoming doesn’t make the accounts
wrong, they’re just incomplete.
In theory, then, the lived body account can be seen as an attempt to
complement and complete these very different accounts by explaining
the primitive nature of de se thinking. The essential elements of the ac-
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count can be transplanted into the linguistic, the conceptual, and also
the property theory to discharge their duty of explaining the possibil-
ity of de se thinking. Obviously, how exactly this is to be done remains
the job of proponents of these theories. Nonetheless, we can give some
hints as to how this might be achieved in order to kickstart such at-
tempts. However, it’s important to emphasise that the theory which
I’ve defended is intended to be complete and independent of the other
discussed alternatives. As such, it’s possible to accept it without feeling
the need to incorporate the other strategies.
First off, let’s take a look at the closest relative to the lived body ac-
count: the property theory defended by Lewis, Chisholm, and Friends.
The main problem was their failure to clearly distinguish proper de se
thinking from other kinds of thinking. More importantly, I argued
that the theory has to accept some form of primitive self-ascription as
a basis of genuine de se thought. Unfortunately, no explanation of this
necessary kind of self-ascription was provided. The analysis of prim-
itive self-ascription as ascription to the lived body can be used to fill
this gap in the property theory. For instance, this could yield the more
precise claim that what it means for a subject to ascribe a property un-
der the relation of identity is that she ascribes the property to the lived
body—the thing which constitutes her as a subject. Now, I don’t want
to claim that defenders of the property theory would accept this pro-
posal. In fact, the strong phenomenological coating of the lived body
might not fit in well with the underlying functionalism that’s advoc-
ated by David Lewis, to give but one example of a potential conflict.
Next up, the conceptual theory was illuminated through Peacocke’s
work. Its essential part is the idea that de se thinking can be explained
through a subject’s knowing use of the first person concept. As indic-
ated, Peacocke himself accepts a more primitive first-personal notion
that underlies mastery of the first person concept. Unfortunately, the
exact nature of this i notion remains somewhat vague and unclear. An
obvious way to reconcile the two quite distinct accounts would be to
interpret the lived body account as an illumination of that non-concep-
tual notion. After all, the replies to some of the objections against the
defended theory made the relation between primitive self-ascription—
understood as ascription to the lived body—and the acquisition of the
first person concept quite explicit and clear. That concept can only be
mastered by anchoring it in the ascription of a property to the lived
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body. This allows the subject to grasp that her use of the concept ap-
plies to herself. At the same time, we saw in the replies to the objec-
tions that once such a concept is learned, it can operate quite independ-
ently from primitive self-ascriptions. Therefore, the two quite distinct
ideas and accounts could potentially be merged.
Closely related to this is the linguistic approach. Again, we saw the
necessity to explain how a subject understands that her use of the first-
person pronoun refers to herself in speech. Primitive self-ascription
provides a very elegant way to do this. A quote from O’Brien won-
derfully clarifies the support that the lived body account gives to the
linguistic approach:
We need more than knowledge that ‘I’ refers to its produ-
cer in order for it to be the case that I know that a particu-
lar token of ‘I’ refers to me. (…)The missing element was
provided by the fact that I have a certain kind of awareness
of my actions. (…)The awareness of my actions, that I cre-
ate by acting, thinking and uttering, is of a different and
more primitive kind than the self-awareness constituted
by a capacity for first-person reference.
O’Brien 2007: 78–79
In other words, by linguistically engaging and interacting with the
world through the lived body, the subject becomes aware of her own
use of language. As she moves her lips, she becomes aware of being the
producer of that sound and thus, according to the meaning rule, its ref-
erence. This delivers the key to understanding that her own utterance
of the first-person pronoun—being governed by some linguistic rule—
refers to herself. As such, the engagement with the world through the
lived body anchors a subject’s use of language.
This brings us to the end of our quick tour of alternative approaches
and simultaneously to the conclusion of this book. Time to recapit-
ulate the various stages and insights that were developed. We started
our journey with the double-edged sword of Narcissus’s self-conscious-
ness. On the one hand, self-consciousness is a highly sophisticated and
marvellous form of thinking. It allows us to build complex societies,
laws, write interesting books, or fly to space. On the other hand, it un-
ravels the deepmystery of our place in the universe. By dwelling on the
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nature of our own existence, we come to explore the uncertain mean-
ing of life and our own purpose. A conundrum that is out of reach for
subjects without self-consciousness.
But what’s special about the ability to think about oneself ? Explor-
ing this question, we saw that several semantic and epistemic features
are characteristic of de se thinking. By comparing it to other ways of
thinking about oneself, such as thinking de dicto or de re, we saw that
only this intimate kind of thinking about oneself is necessarily about
the subject. But we also explored the connections to epistemic aspects
of thinking. In some cases, subjects can’t err about the object they’re
actually thinking of. Their de se thoughts are immune to misidentific-
ation. And, of course, self-knowledge, that profound insight brought
to perfection in Descartes’s Cogito, is intimately tied to our ability to
think in the de se way. Finally, and most controversially, our actions
are only motivated insofar as we apprehend reasons in the world as our
reasons. And that again requires us to take a de se stance towards them.
With these features unearthed, we were ready to explore some op-
tions of explaining the nature of de se thinking. We followed the ana-
lytical tradition and looked at the Propophile strategy. Here, we dis-
covered an important problem: The way we think about ourselves is
highly dependent on the context and can’t be easily captured by a rigid
tool such as a proposition—a possible way the world could be. Instead,
we have to build a multi-layered semantic building which can account
for the flexibility of de se thinking. While this was quite successful
in dealing with the semantic features, we exposed a fundamental and
fatal flaw. All these two-dimensional strategies couldn’t explain how
subjects grasp that their thoughts are about themselves. They explained
how reflexive self-reference worked, but they didn’t explain the under-
lying epistemic nature of self-conscious self-reference.
As a result, we traced our steps back and opted to go into a different
direction. The lesson of the Propophile failure isn’t to make the pro-
positional picture more complex and encompassing but to relinquish
it and break new ground. We discussed the omniscience of goddesses
and explored the property theory defended by Lewis and others. In
that context, we realised the potential of the seemingly trivial claim
that de se thinking just amounts to self-ascription of properties. How-
ever, I simultaneously manoeuvred the theory into a potentially dev-
astating impasse. It ran the risk of utterly blurring the line between
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de se and de re thinking—an unacceptable outcome. I argued that we
need to postulate a primitive kind of self-ascription that isn’t open to
the analytical attempts of reduction. Only such primitive self-ascrip-
tion can really explain how subjects grasp that they’re thinking about
themselves.
This move back to the primitive was the steppingstone to develop
a theory of primitive self-ascription that’s capable of completing that
crucial task. I borrowed the concept of the lived body from phenomen-
ological insights about how subjects engage with the world around
them. As origins of egocentric space, subjects apprehend themselves
as world-engaging subjects. And the lived body is the means through
which this engagement manifests itself. Primitive self-ascription was
then traced back to ascription to the lived body. Because the lived body
is given to the subject in an immediate and essentially first-personal
way, these ascriptions are fit to play the grounding role for de se think-
ing. And the rest is history. I examined how this approach deals with
several typical examples of de se thinking, how it accounts for all five
characteristic features of de se thinking, and defended it against poten-
tially devastating objections.
Of course, the jury is still out on whether such an approach is com-
pletely viable and consistent. Moreover, some interesting questions
and fields of research have been left untouched. Before bringing down
the curtain, let me explore a few of these uncharted realms. I shall start
with the question that originally motivated me to delve into the topic
of de se thinking: Can nonhuman animals be self-conscious? It’s a well-
known fact that some individuals of some species—such as chimpan-
zees, elephants, or dolphins—can pass the mirror rouge test. They can
recognise themselves in a mirror and interact with their mirror image
in very much the same way as humans do. But what exactly does it
mean to pass that test? What does it tell us about the cognitive capa-
cities of these subjects?
The topic of animal minds is a very broad and convoluted one.Many
different interests and methodologies are released on a seemingly ho-
mogenous thing. This creates interesting results but also a lot of dis-
agreement and conceptualmuddle. Nothing guarantees that the neuro-
scientist uses the concept of self-consciousness in her research in the
sameway as the philosopher and the cognitive anthropologist. Further-
more, it’s quite unclear whether the minds of animals are a monolithic
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kind—requiring just a single key to be unlocked. Consequently, all
these results have to be assessed very carefully and combined into a
coherent picture. And this is an enormous task which is still undone.
Maybe the theory of the lived body which was developed here can
shed some light on some of the results and questions concerning self-
consciousness in nonhuman animals. After all, the theory is supposed
to have a threshold low enough to allow for de se thinking even in very
simple subjects and organisms (A.4.14).
This leads us straight to another current field of research: artificial
intelligence. Many philosophers and other researchers are extremely
reluctant to grant consciousness and self-consciousness to current ar-
tificially intelligent beings. But how exactly do we need to understand
the seemingly cognitive processes underlying the behaviour of robots,
autonomous drones, and complex machines? Many of them are cap-
able of learning according to complicated algorithms. But what dis-
tinguishes this kind of learning from human and nonhuman animal
learning? Artificial intelligence is an interesting test case where we can
see how far we can push our conceptual theories.
The lived body account is heavily based on phenomenological data
such as the experience of one’s engagement with the world around us.
We, as conscious beings, have a good grasp of how this works in human
beings. But can we transplant this to the field of artificial intelligence?
It seems that the way self-driving cars represent their environment
is very akin to how we think egocentrically about the world. What
prevents us from saying that these cars are capable of de se thought?
Their supposed lack of consciousness? Might it be most parsimonious
to grant them the ability to think in the de se way?
Finally, it’s important to discuss a more conceptual shortcoming
which isn’t dependent on empirical uncertainties or science fiction
scenarios. It’s the simple fact that the discussion about de se think-
ing is almost exclusively framed within the context of cognitive states
like beliefs or perceptions. In these cases, it makes sense to use talk
of ascriptions. But can we easily extend this to conative states such
as intentions, desires or emotions like shame and pride? The belief
that I’m tall is accurately represented by claiming that I self-ascribe
the property of being tall. However, which property do I self-ascribe
when I intend to go hiking? Which primitive self-ascription underlies
an emotion?
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Many philosophical theories about the mind are supposed to be gen-
eral and encompassing. As such, they’re intended to cover not just
states like judgements and beliefs—states which aim to correctly pic-
ture how the world actually is—but also states that are directed at how
the world should be. The lived body account is no exception to this
ideal. However, the exact way to accommodate desires, intentions,
or emotions is not immediately clear and remains to be determined.
While I would argue that it’s possible to extend the idea that de se
thinking is grounded in the lived body to these states, I don’t present
a clear analysis or strategy of how this is fleshed out.
This concludes our short survey of yet to be charted scientific and
conceptual realms. As HermanMelville’s Ishmael so impressively con-
veys, a complete account of anything is neither within the scope nor
the possibility of any human endeavour. This book is no exception. It’s
but a small step into the direction of a more complete, accurate, and
encompassing theory of how we think about ourselves. Nonetheless,
I hope that some important messages and points have been made as
clear and convincing as possible. What remains is my invitation to you
to develop the story further and navigate the insidious seas of concep-
tual thought. 

A
AUXILIARIES & TECHNICALIT IES
a.1 addenda to chapter 1: being in the mirror
a.1.1 The relation between de re and de se thinking
The distinction between the three kinds of thinking about oneself can
and needs to be clarified further. First off, the primary contrast is
between thinking de re and thinking de dicto. Sainsbury and Tye (2012)
point to the difference between believing The murderer—whoever she
may be—has large feet and believing That woman has large feet, while
pointing to a particular woman in sight. They argue that the latter is a
de re thought because it can only be properly used if the thinking sub-
ject knows who the woman is. In contrast, the former can be thought
‘not knowing who the murderer is’ (Sainsbury and Tye 2012: 122). So,
thinking de re entails some direct reference in thinking to a specific
particular object. However, there’s significant disagreement concern-
ing the nature of this direct reference and how it’s mediated. For in-
stance, Sainsbury and Tye argue that de re attitudes are those attitudes
in which a de re concept forms part of the content. Burge (2007), on
the other hand, seems to require that at least some of the content isn’t
conceptualised.
Now, the case of de se thinking complicates matters slightly. This is
because it’s similar to de re thinking in a very important sense. Like
de re thinking, it involves the direct reference to a particular object
which isn’t necessarily mediated by a concept (cf. Burge 2007: 68).The
successful reference to a specific thing is instead mediated by demon-
strative, indexical, or other directly referential elements. So, there is an
important resemblance between the two kinds of thinking. However,
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the exact relation between de re and de se attitudes isn’t determined and
is open for discussion. It heavily depends on the specific scope which
is targeted—e.g. whether we’re talking about the third-person ascrip-
tion, the epistemic foundation, or the semantic content. This disparity
results in Lewis (1979) claiming that the de se subsumes the de re, while
Perry (1980) thinks it’s the other way round. Still others, like Récanati
(2009), hold that it depends on the exact nature of the de se attitude in
question: sometimes de se believing is also de re and sometimes it isn’t.
For the purposes of this book and the arguments therein we can
settle on the following claim concerning the relation between de re
and de se attitudes: Insofar as de re thoughts are mainly characterised
by referring to a specific particular thing—where this reference is un-
mediated by some conceptual or descriptive element—de se thoughts
are types of de re thoughts. Nonetheless, like de dicto attitudes, the ref-
erence of de se beliefs is sensitive to the context and can change from
one possible world to another.
a.1.2 What exactly is an intentional object?
The concept of an intentional object derives from the idea that inten-
tionality is the basis of mental states. This is especially prominent in
Brentano (2009) and Husserl (2001) where intentionality is character-
ised as the ‘aboutness’ of mental phenomena. Normally, when a sub-
ject believes, desires, or hopes something her belief, desire, or hope are
about something. It’s about the future of the world, where she hopes
that peace will finally prevail. It’s about the solution of a mathematical
problem, where she believes that it’s
R1
0 e
-x dx.
The famous quotation from Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical
Standpoint introduces the concept of intentionality in a livid way:
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the
Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or
mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call,
though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content,
direction toward an object (which is not to be understood
here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every
mental phenomenon includes something as object within
itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In
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presentation something is presented, in judgement some-
thing is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in
desire desired and so on.
Brentano 2009: 68
In the case of de se thinking we can say that the thinking subject
always features in the intentional object of the thought. When Alpha
thinks I am F she thereby thinks about herself. And hence she’s the
intentional object of her thought. We can generalise this insight into
the following theorem: For every subject S entertaining an instance of
de se thinking , S is the intentional object ! of .
However, this doesn’t imply that the subject of de se thinking is the
intentional object in the same way as the apple is the intentional ob-
ject of Adam’s desire. There might be different ways of thinking about
something. In some cases a specific thing might need to be identified
and picked out from a number of possible intentional objects. So, a sub-
ject might think about that particular red ball in snooker as opposed
to the other red ball next to it. And there are also different ways of tak-
ing oneself as the intentional object—even within different kinds of de
se thinking. In some case, the subject is the object of her thinking in
a very reflective way as when she’s introspectively thinking about her
character traits or how she treated a friend in a discussion. In other
cases no such reflection is needed and the intentional object of one’s
de se thinking is determined pre-reflectively in virtue of the de se nature
of that particular intentional state.
Furthermore, we have to distinguish different ways of procuring the
intentional object of a de se attitude. If a subject mistakenly believes
that she’s seeing her own reflection in the mirror and bases her belief
I am looking tired on that visual experience, the intentional object of
that belief is still herself even if she misidentified herself in thinking.
The claim that every instance of de se thinking entails that the thinking
subject is also the intentional object isn’t the same as claiming that all
de se attitudes are immune to error through misidentification or have
referential security.The former is true while the latter is obviously false.
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a.1.3 Truth-value of propositions
We can put the Propophile’s original statement intomore formal terms
by saying that for every proposition p and for every possible world w
the truth-value of p at w is determined. Or, in other words: for every
proposition p and for every possible world w, if p is true at w, then
it’s not possible that p is false at w.
This is of course not accepted by everyone. Depending on how ex-
actly you characterise either of the relevant terms in the definition
above—truth, proposition, possible world, truth at or in a world—you
can develop different claims about the truth-values of propositions.
For present purposes we stick with the Propophile characterisation be-
cause it’s easily understood and closely resembles classic theories about
propositions. Thus, it’s suitable to illustrate their inherent problems
with de se thinking.
a.1.4 More on propositions
The relation between a believing subject and the proposition believed
is another contentious matter.The standard Propophile way of putting
it is to say that a belief amounts to a relation of entertaining between a
subject and a proposition. This is of course mightily vague, but I won’t
comment further on that.
What’s more important to elaborate on is the relation between the
idea of belief, understood as the entertaining of a proposition, and the
concept of an intentional object. Some beliefs are properly about pro-
positions but we don’t always want to say that the intentional object
of a belief—what a belief is properly about—is a proposition. If I be-
lieve that Sydney is the capital of Australia, my belief is about the city
Sydney and not about some proposition or other. Soames (2014) sug-
gests that propositions can’t do the job the Propophiles signed them
up for. Instead, propositions are useful devices for theoretical purposes.
We can use them to categorise subjects’ beliefs according to types.
Thus, a proposition is a type of cognitive event. According to this
idea propositions are ‘pieces of information that represent things in the
world as being certain ways; thus they have truth conditions. Since the
proposition that o is red represents a certain object as red (while doing
no further representing) it is true iff o is the way it is represented to
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be—red’. And when a subject believes something she entertains a cer-
tain proposition. And that again is to do something particular—thus
propositions are types of events—e.g. ‘to entertain the proposition that
o is red is to predicate redness of o, and thereby to represent it as red’.
(Soames 2014: 95)
This kind of reasoning undermines the conception of a proposition
‘out there’ in abstract reality to which subjects ‘hook up’ to when they
entertain a proposition—i.e. believe something. In fact, such a picture
is far from trivial. And this fact can be established on grounds which
are quite independent of the problem of de se thinking. However, even
Soames’s notion of a proposition is problematic—for very much the
same reasons as the Propophile’s propositions will prove inadequate.
In de se thinking a subject doesn’t necessarily represent the world in a
way which directly delivers conditions of satisfaction. Rather, we need
some kind of indirect two-dimensional treatment of propositions if
they are to work for de se thinking as well. Soames’s theory doesn’t
preclude such a treatment, but it also doesn’t entail it.
a.1.5 Mental and physical properties
We need to be a bit careful when we’re dealing with the nature of
mental and other typically first-personal properties such as wishing,
feeling, contemplating, or remembering. Typically, I know best when I’m
remembering something or not; maybe because a remembrance has
a distinctive cognitive ‘feeling’. But, of course, it can be determined
by outsiders as well whether I’m remembering something or not. So,
we often say things like ‘Ah, now she’s remembering what happened
last night’. However, the way other people come to this conclusion is
quite different from the way that we come to the conclusion that we’ve
just remembered something. While others have to rely on a certain
form of evidence—what the subject says, how she behaves, and so on—
we can know directly from the first-person perspective whether we’re
remembering something or not. This is especially prominent in cases
of déjà vu.
However, the case of déjà vu also shows that this difference has noth-
ing to do with the question whether our introspective beliefs are al-
ways correct. We can be wrong with respect to the mental properties
we ascribe to ourselves just as others can be wrong about these things.
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But in the first-personal case the epistemic route can be direct whereas
it’s always indirect in the third-personal case. So, the important point
is that many mental properties can be ascribed to oneself on an epi-
stemic basis that is qualitatively distinct from the way we know about
the mental and bodily properties of others.
Perry (1990, 2002) accounts for this feature by explaining that many
mental properties can be ascribed on the basis of what he calls ‘self-
informative ways of knowing’. Here’s how he defines this special kind
of knowing:
A perceptual state S is a normally self-informative way of
knowing that one is  if the fact that a person is in state S
normally carries the information that the person in state
S is  and normally does not carry the information that
any other person is .
Perry 2002: 204
So, this way of knowing is cognitively built in such a way that it guaran-
tees to carry information from the very same agent that receives and
processes this information. In other words, this architecture ensures
that the beliefs formed on the basis of this information can’t be about
anyone else but the thinking subject. Since our beliefs about the men-
tal properties of others don’t have this cognitive architecture they aren’t
immune to error through misidentification relative to the ascription of
a mental property. Yet, they might still be demonstratively immune to
error through misidentification.
a.1.6 Does the Cogito result in self-knowledge?
There’s a long standing debate concerning the conclusion ofDescartes’s
Cogito argument. Lichtenberg (1990: 168) proposed that the only thing
we can know on the basis of our introspective awareness of thinking,
doubting, or wondering, is There is thinking. In other words, we can’t
reach self-knowledge on the basis of theCogito.We only achieve know-
ledge of the fact that some instance of thinking is going on. Campbell
(2012) illustrates the reasoning for this conclusion:
Let’s go back now to the cogito. Can it be regarded as ex-
plaining how you know of your own existence? The pic-
ture I would recommend here is that knowledge of your
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own existence is already required by the transition from (1)
having a particular conscious thought, to (2) knowledge
that you are thinking. The argument is that regarding the
mere having of a conscious thought, as grounding know-
ledge of the judgement that one is thinking, already pre-
supposes that one exists. The transition from (1) to (2),
therefore, cannot be thought of as grounding or explain-
ing one’s knowledge of one’s own existence.
Campbell 2012: 364–365
If you want to derive knowledge of the fact that you are thinking
from the awareness of a conscious thought, you have to already have
knowledge of your existence. He compares this to Moore’s famous
‘proof ’ of the external world. In this case the visual experience of your
own hands is intended to support knowledge of the fact that there
are two hands: ‘How? By holding up my two hands, and saying, as I
make a certain gesture with the right hand, “Here is one hand”, and
adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left, “and here is another”’
(G. E. Moore 1939: 296). Many think that this common sense argu-
ment doesn’t work as it simply begs the question (Coliva 2003; Pryor
2004). Knowledge of the existence of external objects is presupposed
as one moves from the visual experience to the judgement that there
are two hands. Supposedly, something similar applies in the case of
the Cogito.
In a direct exchange with Campbell, Peacocke (2012a) defends the
Cartesian conclusion. He argues that the disputed move in the argu-
ment is justified by ‘plausible conceptions of consciousness, the sub-
ject of consciousness, and the nature of first-person content’ (Peacocke
2012a: 109). According to these conceptions, the fact that a specific
episode of consciousness occurs implies that there’s a particular sub-
ject undergoing that episode. This much seems uncontroversial but it
doesn’t yet yield the desired support. How does the doubting subject
knows that it’s herself that’s undergoing this conscious episode? Pea-
cocke explains that ‘only the subject whose thinking it is can be aware
of the thinking in the distinctive way that stage (1) of the Cogito in-
volves’ (Peacocke 2012a: 112). And the reason for this is related to the
specific nature of de se thinking. In virtue of undergoing such a specific
episode the relevant thought necessarily refers to the thinking subject.
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And any subject that employs the relevant concept of thinking in the
right way has to be aware of that fact.
a.1.7 The relation between authority and privileged access
Not everyone agrees that the source of epistemic authority regard-
ing self-knowledge originates in one’s privileged access to one’s own
mind. Most prominent among the opponents of this connection are
those who pin down authority in the linguistic convention of avow-
als (Brandl 2014; Wittgenstein 1953). We usually have to take the
other’s word when she’s claiming to believe something. First-person
utterances are a kind of speech act that has to be taken at face value,
given there’s no contradicting evidence.
a.1.8 Self-deception
The possibility of deceiving oneself proves problematic for many ac-
counts of self-knowledge. If self-knowledge goes hand in hand with
authority, then self-deceptive beliefs seem to undercut that relation.
A subject who deceives herself into believing that p isn’t authoritative
with regard to her knowing that she believes that p. Bilgrami (2012)
tries to deal with this challenge by distinguishing beliefs as disposi-
tions from beliefs as commitments. The latter kind are important for
the authority of self-knowledge. It’s because subjects normatively com-
mit themselves—by refraining from consciously holding or forming
any incompatible beliefs—to certain beliefs that they’re authoritative
with respect to them. As a result, subjects with self-deceptive beliefs
can really be said to hold these beliefs—thus explaining their authority
and claim to self-knowledge.The supposed conflict between authority
and self-knowledge on the one hand and the self-deceptive belief on
the other is thus explained away. In the case of Beta’s self-deceptive
belief that she’s charitable, she really does believe that she’s charitable
and she has authority over that item of knowledge. When outsiders
then point to the uncharitable behaviour that doesn’t fit her supposed
charity we can explain her behaviour as being brought about by her
uncharitable dispositions. But since these attitudes are of a different
kind than her committed belief, there’s no conflict with the authority
in question. She really holds the belief that she’s charitable. She just
auxiliaries & technicalities 197
has other mental states that bring about her uncharitable behaviour
(cf. Coliva 2016: ch. 7).
However, this explaining away of the conflict between self-decep-
tion and authority isn’t uncontested. Since claims to authority occur
within the context of publicly communicated claims to knowledge, the
exact status of these kinds of avowals is relevant. Wright (2001) distin-
guishes here between attitudinal and phenomenal avowals.The former
concern claims about what a subject believes, desires, and so on. In con-
trast, the latter concern the phenomenological states that a subject is
going through—such as her pain, what she’s currently visually experi-
encing, and so on. Crucially,Wright argues that ‘attitudinal avowals do
not exhibit the strong authority of phenomenal avowals: to the extent
that there is space for relevant forms of self-deception or confusion,
sincerity-cum-understanding is no longer a guarantee of the truth of
even basic self-ascriptions of intentional states’ (Wright 2001: 324). In
other words, the phenomenon of self-deception only has a home with
regard to one’s intentional attitudes. And in these cases it does in fact
collide with the purported authority of self-knowledge.
With regard to the theory defended in this book, what should be
preserved is a form of authority relative to the primitive self-ascrip-
tions of a subject. These self-ascriptions are candidates for genuine
self-knowledge because they have the same epistemic base as the phe-
nomenal avowals that Wright distinguishes. This also has the con-
sequence that there doesn’t seem to be room for self-deception with
regard to these self-ascriptions. Considering the possibility of being
severely misguided with respect to one’s actual possibilities of interac-
tion with the world, this seems a strange claim. However, if a subject
is misguided about the way she can interact with the world, this will
be mirrored in her behaviour. She then might hold a false belief about
the relation between her body and the world—as in cases of the rubber
hand illusion or phantom limb—but not a deceptive one.
a.1.9 Wittgenstein’s attack on self-knowledge
The condensed version of Wittgenstein’s attack on self-knowledge of
course doesn’t do it real justice. However, since it’s only marginally
important to the general arguments of the book, I’ll use this appendix
entry to slightly expand on it and clarify some concepts.Wittgenstein’s
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main attack is on the idea that there’s something like privileged access
to our own mental states. From a naïve point of view, one could think
that our words for phenomenal events—such as pain—are meant to
describe and report these events. But Wittgenstein argues that this is
a misguided way of describing it. He claims that ‘the verbal expression
of pain replaces crying and does not describe it’ (Wittgenstein 1953:
89e). This is the expressivist idea that words don’t state or report the
sensations a subject undergoes but express them. There’s no relation
of representation between the word and the sensation in first-person
avowals—rather the word is an expression of the sensation.
Wright (1998: 25) explains that ‘it is the so-called private language
argument (…) which targets the idea of phenomenal avowals as inner
observation reports’. The main argument can be condensed as an ob-
servation of the fact that from the first-person perspective there’s no
distinction between what seems right to the subject and what is really
right. If a subject examines her sensations in isolation, it doesn’t make
sense for her to think something along the lines of It seems like I’m in
pain but I’m not. But if the expressions of our sensations are anything
like regular observational reports, such a distinction between appear-
ance and reality needs to be applicable. Hence, the verbal expression
of seemingly private sensations doesn’t amount to a report or assertion.
This is supposed to undercut the claim that we have a better ‘view’ on
our inner mental lives than others and that we’re privileged because
of that. Phenomenal avowals simply aren’t assertions and thus don’t
amount to something that could qualify as knowledge.
The second point pertains more explicitly to claims of self-know-
ledge with regard to our intentional attitudes. Again, while it might
seem that claims about what oneself believes or desires aremere reports
made on the basis of introspection, this doesn’t seem right. The main
difficulty for such a view concerns ‘the answerability of ascriptions of
intentional states, like expectation, hope, and belief, to aspects of a sub-
ject’s outward performance that may simply not be available at the time
of avowal’ (Wright 1998: 29). In other words, whether a subject can
be properly said to believe that the train has arrived depends not only
on the introspective world of the subject. It also depends on her beha-
viour because our beliefs are rationally connected with our intentional
actions. As such then, the rationality of a belief expression can’t merely
depend on some kind of privileged epistemic position that supposedly
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obtains. Consequently, such avowals aren’t in any way epistemically
distinguished—as the defender of a superior kind of self-knowledge
would have us believe.
Neither of these attacks, however, troubles the account of de se think-
ing given in the book. It accepts the similarity between knowledge of
the external world and knowledge of one’s ownmind. A subject’s claim
to knowledge about her own mental states is on par with other kinds
of knowledge. Accordingly, a subject’s self-ascription of the property
of believing that p comes with the same epistemic requirements as the
ascription of a property to some other object. One’s own introspective
access is only one more or less reliable source of knowledge of one’s
own mental states among others.
a.1.10 More on reasons and the first person
The claim that our action requires some de se attitude to the reasons
that speak in favour of the action isn’t universally accepted. Cappelen
and Dever (2013) argue that agency doesn’t require first-personal in-
tentions and desires. Their main argument rests on the case of an om-
nipotent being which can bring about states of affairs just by intend-
ing them to be so-and-so: ‘We think there could be a god, who can
bring about states of the world just by intending them or maybe just by
thinking them.The god thinks, “The door is closed,” and straightaway
the door is closed. On our view, this god’s actions can be rationalized
even if we don’t specify any kind of de se state’ (Cappelen and Dever
2013: 37). They instead propose what they call the Action Inventory
model which takes subjects to have third-personal beliefs and inten-
tions about states the world is or should be in. Furthermore, subjects
have an ‘action inventory’ which they want to match with their inten-
tions. Basically, if Alpha has the third-personal intention Alpha has soy
ice cream and furthermore the action pAlpha gets soy ice creamq is in
her inventory, then she will match these two and perform the relevant
action. No de se belief or intention is supposedly required.
There are a number of problems with this argument. First, it’s un-
clear how the case of the omnipotent god has any kind of relevance for
the way intentional action is motivated and explained in normally po-
tent subjects. Prosser (2015) argues along these lines that at least the
typical actions of subjects and possibly all actions of normally potent
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subjects require de se intentions. Hence, the fact that some omnipotent
subject can bring about states of affairs without having first-personal
intentions is irrelevant to our endeavour. Secondly, the Action Invent-
ory model fails to explain why the intended states of affairs bear any
motivational power and how they link up in the required way to the
action inventory of a subject.
Furthermore, there are quite potent arguments to the result that
subjects have to bring reasons for actions into some rational connec-
tion with their own attitudes. And that’s to say that they have to take
some kind of de se attitude towards the reason in question. Along these
lines, Burge (1998) argues that ‘to have reasons one must, I think, have
had some tendency to have one’s thoughts and attitudes be affected
by them’ (Burge 1998: 251). He holds that a subject can only have a
reason—such as the fact that the plant is withering—to act in a certain
way if the subject could be rationally affected by the reason’s motiva-
tional force to do something in a certain way. And this is tantamount
to standing in some kind of first-personal attitude towards the reason.
The peculiar nature of de se thinking ‘marks, makes explicit, the imme-
diate rational relevance of invocation of reasons to rational application,
or implementation, and motivation’ (Burge 1998: 253). The rational-
ity of action is connected to making subjects accountable for their reas-
oning and thus the reasons they invoke for their action. However, the
impersonal way in which actions are connected with reasons in the Ac-
tion Inventory model leave no room for these kinds of considerations.
Thus, if we want to hold on to the possibility of actions being rational,
they have to be accounted for in terms of de se thinking—even if not all
subjects that act for reasons are responsive to questions of rationality.
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a.2 addenda to chapter 2: divide and conquer
a.2.1 When are two beliefs identical?
It’s not quite simple to clearly determine when two beliefs are identical.
This is because that question can be understood in different ways. If
we want to look at the specific tokens of beliefs—the particular men-
tal states that a subject is in when she’s believing something—then it
seems impossible for two beliefs to really be identical. As such, it seems
nonsensical to understand the question in this way. However, we can
imagine science fiction scenarios where two subjects are hooked up in
certain ways to share their mental lives. Here, we might still want to
know whether they’re thereby in the same particular mental state or
whether they entertain two distinct particular mental states.
Normally, however, we take a different perspective on the question
of belief individuation. We want to know under which conditions two
particular belief tokens of two spatially or temporally distinct subjects
are of the same type. So, we want to knowwhether my belief I’m hungry
that I entertain on Saturday is the same as my belief I’m hungry that
I entertain on Tuesday or your belief I’m hungry that you entertain on
Friday. A definite answer to this question would need to delve into the
different ways of characterising beliefs in general. Are they occurrent
mental states? Can they be dispositions? Can they be both?
For the purposes of this chapter and the book the following more
narrow focus is relevant: If beliefs are individuated in virtue of a pro-
position, then the proposition that’s entertained in believingwill be im-
portant to determine whether two beliefs are the same. So, if we think
that Alpha’s belief I’m wounded and her belief Alpha is wounded are
both individuated by the proposition <Alpha, being wounded>, then
her beliefs are identical. But if propositions care about more than these
rock bottom conditions of satisfaction, we might say that the former
belief corresponds to the proposition <the thinker of this thought, be-
ing wounded> and the latter corresponds to <Alpha, being wounded>.
On such a view of propositions the two beliefs aren’t identical because
they’re individuated by two distinct propositions.
There’s a further way to look at how beliefs are individuated and
thus how to answer the original question. We can take them to be
characterised not just on the basis of these semantic aspects but also on
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both epistemic and phenomenological aspects. Hence, we might ask:
‘Does the subject draw the same inferences from this particular belief ?’
or ‘Does the world phenomenally appear to the subject in the same
way?’ Both these questions severely widen the scope of the question.
So, the way we draw inferences might determine how beliefs are
individuated (cf. Soldati 2016). Another aspect of the first question is
illustrated by Frank Jackson (1999) who puts it into relation with the
normativity of belief (Boghossian 2008; Brandom 1998):
Someone who believes that P, and that if P then Q, ought
to believe that Q. It is not simply that, by and large, they
do believe thatQ. It is that if they don’t, there is something
wrong.
Jackson 1999: 421
Because beliefs have specific normative properties, the individuation
of beliefs has to reflect that. Furthermore, we can also inquire about
the phenomenology of our beliefs (Bayne andMontague 2011; Chud-
noff 2015). Do some beliefs have a distinct kind of phenomenology?
There’s considerable disagreement about the question whether beliefs
and other cognitive states have some kind of phenomenal aspect—and
even if they had, whether that matters.
For our purposes the individuation of beliefs follows from a com-
bination of all these aspects: semantic, epistemic, and phenomenolo-
gical. More precisely, when Alpha’s in a particular mental state M1
that’s phenomenally sufficiently similar to a particular mental state of
Beta M2, and the inferences they draw from these mental states are
sufficiently similar, and the semantic content—understood in a con-
text-dependent way—is the same, thenM1 andM2 are the same. For
instance, if Alpha believes I’m going to miss the bus, this belief is char-
acterised by three aspects. The content of the belief is something like
<the thinker of this thought, going to miss the bus>. The epistemic
nature of the belief is connected to her then intending to run or call-
ing someone that she’s going to be late, maybe feeling ashamed, and so
on. And finally, the phenomenology might be related to some feeling
of dread or fear. Beta’s belief I’m going to miss the bus can be said to be
the same if these three aspects are sufficiently similar.
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a.2.2 Fregean and Russellian propositions
The two mentioned different ways of characterising propositions cor-
responds to a distinction between Fregean and Russellian propositions.
The latter—also called singular propositions—have as their constitu-
ents the objects and properties themselves, whereas the former are
constituted by the senses in which these objects are presented to us
in thinking.
One argument for the necessity of Russellian propositions comes
from the discussion about indexicals and demonstratives. Utterances
and mental states which involve these terms are supposedly hard to
capture with the Fregean notion of a sense. We’ll see some of these
arguments resound in the main text. Kaplan (1989) and Perry (1977)
argue accordingly that they require a treatment which involves singular
propositions. On the other hand, there are philosophers defending the
Fregean approach against these kinds of attacks (cf. Chalmers 2011;
Evans 1985; McDowell 1984). For our purposes, nothing important
hinges on this dispute because the question of the right model of pro-
position is secondary to the more important epistemic question. We
don’t have to decide the metaphysical and semantic question about
the right kind of proposition before we have clearly understood what
exactly is involved in the nature of de se thinking. Once this is done,
some theories of propositions might prove more or less fruitful than
others.
a.2.3 The relation between the first and second element of belief
There are different views about how the intentional object—i.e. the
real existing thing we’re thinking about—is related to the way we’re
thinking about that object. In the case of seeing Wonder Woman, it
seems that the intentional object itself, our superheroine, is presented
to us in our mental state in a certain way when we see her as the wielder
of the Lasso of Truth. In such a case, it makes sense to say that the
second element of belief is how the first element is presented to us
in thinking. It’s Wonder Woman herself that’s presented to us as the
wielder of the Lasso of Truth.
However, in other cases, we might want to refrain from saying that
the intentional object itself is presented to us in thinking under a cer-
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tain mode of presentation. So, in believing that the wielder of the
Lasso of Truth is smart, we might say that the intentional object of my
belief is a certain Russellian singular proposition. This might tempt us
to say that my thought is about the proposition which involves the
particular lasso wielding person who instantiates the property of be-
ing smart. However, the way I’m thinking about Wonder Woman in
that belief shouldn’t be characterised as thinking about a certain pro-
position in a certain way. Rather, we want to say that I think about a
certain woman in a certain way.
Hence, it’s not generally true that the second element of thinking is
characterised by the way we think about the first element of thinking.
Sometimes, we need to say that it’s characterised by the way we think
about certain constituents or parts of the first element. The mode in
which Wonder Woman is presented to us in believing The wielder of
the Lasso of Truth is smart determines the second element of thinking
and not the way that proposition is presented to us.
Furthermore, describing the relation in this way doesn’t imply a spe-
cific semantic or epistemic directionality. While it might seem that we
‘start’ from the second element of belief and then converge on the truth-
maker of that belief—our first element—this isn’t necessarily the case.
The only thing that’s implied is that we can differentiate these differ-
ent elements or aspects of a belief. A related question is then whether
we have modes of presentation ‘in mind’ or the actual objects. With
respect to perception, this debate is often lead under the labels of rep-
resentationalism (Siegel 2011; Tye 1995) and direct realism (McDowell
1996; Soldati 2012).
a.2.4 Contextualism and context
The examples given in the text might imply that there are two distinct
kinds of belief which can be clearly distinguished. One being inde-
pendent of context and another dependent. Furthermore, you might
think that only de se beliefs and others which involve indexicals like
‘here’, ‘now’, or ‘this’ are in the latter category. This doesn’t follow and
is highly contentious. In fact, both metaphysical and semantic contex-
tualists might hold that all kinds of beliefs are highly dependent on
their context.
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The exact extent of contextual influence on our beliefs is a highly
contentious and debatedmatter which can’t and needn’t be settled here.
However, it’s important to clarify some claims that can be made in this
area. On the one hand, there’s the idea that the truth of an utterance
or mental state is dependent on the context. According to this idea,
one and the same type of utterance can be true in one case and false
in another. Here we find the source of relativist claims about truth
and morality. On the other hand, one can bracket the normative ques-
tion and merely operate on the level of individuation of beliefs and
utterances. We might say something like ‘Some utterances can only
be understood if we know their context’. For instance, a subject can
only understand what’s meant by someone saying ‘She’s here’ when
she knows who’s referred to by ‘she’ and which place is picked out by
‘here’. Of course, this latter claim can be related to a claim about the
relativism of truth.
A further issue concerns the exact definition of a ‘context’. Aren’t
possible worlds just special cases of contexts? Couldn’t we also say
that contexts need to be included in the characterisation of what a
possible world is? Here, I propose to draw a distinction between pos-
sible worlds and contexts on the line of authors like Kaplan (1989),
Lewis (1998), and Stalnaker (1999). Accordingly, contexts are char-
acterised by parameters like place, time, and subject. On the other
hand, possible worlds are to a degree insensitive to these differences
and sum them up. We find different contexts in one and the same
possible world because a possible world can encompass many distinct
place–time–subject-triples.
a.2.5 More on the paradox of self-consciousness
It’s important to slightly qualify this argument in two ways. First,
does the acquisition of the first-person pronoun in fact presuppose
de se thinking? And secondly, is Bermúdez’ paradox actually intended
against the Kaplanian theory at all?
One could argue that a subject can learn the meaning rule of the
first-person pronoun without knowing that her own application refers
to herself. In other words, one might try to show that the acquisition
of the first-person pronoun isn’t dependent on a prior capacity for de se
thinking. The problem with such an attempt to salvage the linguistic
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approach is that it doesn’t explain how subjects come to think in the
de se way. Imagine a subject who knows the rule ‘“I” always refers to
the speaker’ but doesn’t know that her own use of ‘I’ refers to herself.
If such a subject is possible, it wouldn’t fall under the scope of the
linguistic approach which only cares about subjects thinking in the de
se way. Or, to put it into the words of Anscombe: ‘The explanation of
the word “I” as “the word which each of us uses to speak of himself ” is
hardly an explanation!—At least, it is no explanation if that reflexive
has in turn to be explained in terms of “I”; and if it is the ordinary
reflexive then we are back at square one’ (Anscombe 1975: 48).
Furthermore, one might take this as undermining the paradox be-
cause it shows that knowledge of the character of ‘I’ doesn’t presup-
pose the capacity for de se thinking. Unfortunately, the knowledge of
the character is only insofar relevant for de se thinking as it explains a
subject’s use of the first-person pronoun to express her de se attitudes.
And such an expression requires the capacity to think in the de se way
because it requires that the subject is aware that she herself is the pro-
ducer of that sound or the speaker of that utterance.
This should further illuminate how we should react to the second
question. While Bermúdez doesn’t construe his argument explicitly as
a reaction to Kaplan’s theory, it’s a direct response to what he calls
the ‘deflationary theory’ which is mainly characterised by the claim
that ‘once we have an account of the semantics of the first-person pro-
noun, we will have explained everything distinctive about the capacity
to think thoughts that are immune to error through misidentification’
(Bermúdez 1998: 11). This characterisation of the deflationary theory
is reasonably similar to how we characterised the linguistic approach
to de se thinking. As such, it’s reasonable to take Bermúdez’ paradox
as a suitable response to our target.
a.2.6 Frege on concepts
The way that Frege uses the term ‘concept’ is quite technical and not
always helpful. Coming from his treatment of logic—which he in-
tends to rid of all reference to psychological states—he introduces the
term ‘concept’ as a purely ‘objective’ notion and wants to distinguish it
sharply from the subjective associations that are present in the mind of
the subject. In this vein, he writes in hisThe Foundations of Arithmetic
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(1953) about the relation between subjective idea, objective content,
and the object of thought:
An idea [Vorstellung] in the subjective sense is what is gov-
erned by the psychological laws of association; it is of a
sensible, pictorial character. An idea in the objective sense
belongs to logic and is in principle non-sensible, although
the word which means an objective idea is often accom-
panied by a subjective idea, which nevertheless is not its
meaning. Subjective ideas are often demonstrably differ-
ent in different men, objective ideas are the same for all.
Objective ideas can be divided into objects and concepts.
Frege 1953: 37, fn 1
So, Frege presents us with the following theory. Every intentional
attitude involves a subjective idea, an objective concept and an object.
The part of this attitude that is communicable in language is fully ex-
hausted by the concept and the object. These are the things which
aren’t different from one subject to another and thus constitute the
meaning of a word. For instance, if a subject forms the judgement
There is a horse, she employs the concept of a horse—determined by
the conditions under which an object is the referent of that concept.
And she communicates this by using the word ‘horse’ with its perfectly
objective meaning.The specific way she pictures the horse in her mind
isn’t part of the concept and the meaning.
This also sheds some light on how to understand Frege’s famous
remark on the first personwhich doesn’t really square well with the idea
that sense determines reference: ‘everyone is presented to himself in a
particular and primitive way, in which he is presented to no-one else’
(Frege 1956: 298). If the sense of the first person concept was guided
by this primitive way of being presented to oneself, then it couldn’t
play the objective role it’s supposed to play. After all, the primitive
way is supposedly private and not communicable. Instead, we have to
distinguish the subjective idea—the primitive way we’re presented to
ourselves in thinking—from the sense of the first person concept.
It’s only the objective first person concept that’s relevant in determ-
ining the content of an intentional de se attitude. And this concept,
in turn, is fully exhausted by the sense which determines the rules
of reference: Whenever it’s applied, it refers to the thinking subject.
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However, this still allows that a subject comes to know that she her-
self is the thinking subject on the basis of her subjective, particular, and
primitive idea of herself. So, the subjective idea is a way of epistemic-
ally connecting one’s application of the first person concept with one’s
grasp of oneself in the de se way.
This clearcut distinction between the ‘subjective’ phenomenal state
and the ‘objective’ concept which is communicated isn’t without crit-
ics. For instance, Michael Dummett speaks of the ‘false dichotomy
between mental images as subjective and incommunicable, sense as
objective and communicable’ (Dummett 1973: 158). Another external
critique comes from the empiricist and representationalist traditions.
These argue that concepts have to be concrete things—as opposed to
abstract Fregean senses—in order to play certain roles that concepts
need to play in thinking (Margolis and Laurence 2007). Neither pro-
positions nor concepts are independent eternal entities which subjects
‘latch’ on to in their thinking. Rather, these things are first and fore-
most constituted through the intentional states that subjects are in.
This ‘intentionality first’ view of propositions and concepts is also of-
ten associated with Frege’s most dire antagonist Husserl (1983, 2001).
To illustrate the conceptual approach to de se thinking, we won’t
take Frege’s theory as a template but rather focus on strategies that
have been inspired by this focus on concepts and their fundamental
rules of reference.
a.2.7 One or many first person concepts?
Why should we think that there are individual first person concepts
which are distinct from person to person? One reason is that the public
concept, which is individuated by the reference rule ‘the referent of “I”
is the subject of the thought containing the application of the first
person concept’ (cf. Burge 1998: 246), can’t guide the application of
the concept. As we saw, the understanding of this rule presupposes
some form of de se thinking. Frege wanted to do justice to this problem
by introducing the ‘particular and primitive way’ (Frege 1956: 298) in
which everyone is presented to herself.
This has lead some people to the claim that we need to have some-
thing like an individual first person concept to account for this ini-
tial grasp of the concept. Along these lines, Kapitan (2016) argues:
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‘the I concept is instrumental in the initial self-identification and the
apprehension, not something employed subsequent to a first-person
thought. It is primitive in the sense of not containing another singular
sense as a component’ (Kapitan 2016: 315). So, it’s wrong to say that
the first person concept is applied only once the subject employs the
reference rule. If we take the first person concept as described by the
reference rule, we’re clearly confronted with a complex concept which
isn’t primitive in the required sense. It’s rather the other way round:
We need an individual mode of presentation—a private sense—that
guides the application of the public concept. Of course, Frege was ex-
tremely reluctant to accept such a private sense.
Another route to individual first person concepts was established
by Hector-Neri Castañeda, who argued for the now widely accep-
ted view that first-person thinking is irreducible to some kind of de-
scriptive thinking (Castañeda 1999a,c). Most strikingly, in discussing
Chisholm’s view that there are individual essences, so-called haecceit-
ies, which are associated with the way subjects are presented to them-
selves in de se thinking, Castañeda argues that ‘first-person individual
concepts seem to be private to each person, and cannot be thought
by others in the way Chisholm envisioned’ (Castañeda 1999b: 120).
So, contrary to what Chisholm (1976) thought, we can’t at the same
time hold on to the idea that there are individual concepts and that all
concepts are necessarily intersubjective. One or the other has to go.
a.2.8 Mental states and functionalism
Functional approaches have quite the tradition in the philosophy of
science and the philosophy of mind of the 20th century and I can’t do
that tradition full justice here.Much of the tradition goes back to Ram-
sey (1931) who has inspired so-called Ramsey sentences which are exist-
entially quantified sentences that describe only the relations between
the related terms. These sentences are intended to distinguish clearly
between observable and non-observable things (cf. Carnap 1950). It’s
not so clear whether this attempt was successful, with its most pro-
nounced critic being Quine (1953).
Within the question of the individuation of mental states, the rise
of computing machines has given additional drive to the quest of func-
tionalism. The general idea is that a mental state isn’t characterised by
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its internal structure—such as the proposition that’s believed or de-
sired or the non-observable phenomenology in question—but on the
basis of its functional role. Two cognitive states are identical just in
case they have the same functional profile. And two states have the
same functional profile if they produce the same output with the same
input. Lewis (1966) has aptly characterised this general strategy:
The identity theory says that experience-ascriptions have
the same reference as certain neural-state-ascriptions: both
alike refer to the neural states which are experiences. It
does not say that these ascriptions have the same sense.
They do not; experience-ascriptions refer to a state by spe-
cifying the causal role that belongs to it accidentally, in vir-
tue of causal laws, whereas neural-state-ascriptions refer
to a state by describing it in detail. Therefore the identity
theory does not imply that whatever is true of experiences
as such is likewise true of neural states as such, nor con-
versely.
Lewis 1966: 19
a.2.9 Do we need direct importance?
One might argue that the characterisation of the functional approach
against Perry’s background is slightly misguided: Not all instances of
de se thinking are of ‘direct importance’ to the thinking subject. How
is this objection supported?We’ve already seen that Perry develops the
concept of a self-informative way of knowing (A.1.5). A given men-
tal state S is a self-informative way of knowing for the subject that
she is  if being in that state ‘normally carries the information that
the person in state S is ’ (Perry 2002: 204). Certainly, information
that’s gathered through this channel is normally about the subject—if
we bracket science fiction scenarios—and thus usually of direct import-
ance for the subject. But, so the argument continues, not all forms of de
se thinking coincide with this way of knowing. Some de se intentional
attitudes are formed on a different epistemic basis. Remember that
Perry needs self-informative ways of knowing to account for immunity
and not for all kinds of de se thinking. And since not all instances of de
se thinking are immune to error through misidentification, not all de se
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beliefs are of direct importance to the subject. Hence, the functional
approach is ill-defined in its reliance on direct importance.
This argument against the chosen characterisation of the functional
approach fails for two reasons. First, the fact that not all instances of de
se thinking are based on a self-informative way of knowing doesn’t im-
ply that other de se attitudes aren’t of direct importance to the subject.
Even if a subject forms her belief My legs are crossed on an epistemic
basis which doesn’t come with immunity, her belief is nevertheless of
direct importance to her. For instance, she takes that as an immediate
and direct reason to uncross her legs before standing up. And this is
exactly the functional role of de se attitudes.
Secondly, conceding that only some de se attitudes are formed on
the basis of these first person methods of knowing doesn’t yet imply a
general functional difference between those de se attitudes which are
formed thusly and those which aren’t. We shouldn’t be fooled into say-
ing that only the former kind are equipped with direct importance for
our behaviour. For instance, Récanati (2012) builds his theory of men-
tal files on what he calls ‘epistemically rewarding relations’—inspired
by Perry’s framework. The relevant self file is supposedly formed on
the basis of something like the self-informative way of knowing. It
gets all its characteristics from this specific epistemically rewarding re-
lation. And this includes the feature of being of direct importance to
the thinking subject. However, once the file is established, other kinds
of information—which might be gained in a different way—can also
be stored there. The fact that the information is stored in that particu-
lar mental file equips it with that particular kind of cognitive function.
As Récanati writes: ‘There is much information about myself that I
cannot get in the first person way (…). That information goes into
my self file, however, because I take it to concern the same person
about whom I also have direct first-person information, namely my-
self ’ (Récanati 2012: 36, fn 8). My beliefMy legs are crossed is of direct
importance to me because I therein employ the self file. And this file
was created to store information that’s supposed to be about me.
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a.3 addenda to chapter 3: back to the primitive
a.3.1 What’s an ascription of a property?
There’s a certain unease concerning the way I described a newborn as
ascribing a property to the stick. In particular, it concerns the ques-
tion whether we really want to allow non-conceptual thought to be
described in terms of ascription of properties. Several questions are
of relevance here. First, does the newborn really ascribe a property to
an object in seeing the stick as being bent? Secondly, what’s the re-
lation between the ascription of a property and the instantiation of a
property? Thirdly, is there any epistemic import in the ascription of a
property? How does it relate to knowledge? And finally, what does it
mean to say that ascribing a property to oneself amounts to ‘placing
oneself into a group’ of objects?
I’m not going to give a complete answer to all these questions since
I hope that it’s possible to remain somewhat neutral on some of them.
Nonetheless, the nature of property ascription needs to be made a
bit more concrete. There are two worries looming in the background
which bring about the four questions above. The first worry is that
non-conceptual thought isn’t properly described as having an object–
property structure. Accordingly, we shouldn’t describe the newborn as
ascribing a property to an object. The second worry concerns the pos-
sibility of thinking in terms of properties at all without conceptual
abilities. In other words, we might want to say that a subject ascribes
a property just in case she uses the relevant concept. Since the new-
born doesn’t have the concept of a bend, it can’t ascribe the property
of being bent to the stick.
The reason why it’s difficult to give clearcut answers to the ques-
tions above is that the notion of non-conceptual content—fromwhich
much of the foundation for the worries derives—is itself not clearly
defined. For instance, Levine (2016) explains that ‘for an experience to
qualify as having nonconceptual content, it must have representational
content, content in which features of the world are represented by an
experiencing subject’ (Levine 2016: 856). This suggests that property
ascription—understood as potentially non-conceptual—involves the
representation of the world involving objects. On the other hand, we
might characterise property ascription as ‘structure-implicit, which is
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to say that it contains no explicit representation of subject/objects and
predicates’ (Musholt 2013: 653). This presents us with the opposing
idea: there’s no object involved in the ascription of properties.
Against this background of disagreement, I propose the following
answers to the questions. First, we can describe the newborn as ascrib-
ing a property to the bent stick insofar as she interacts with the stick
as if it were bent. In other words, saying that the newborn ascribes
a property to an object is a way of describing the situation in func-
tional terms. The newborn would interact with the stick differently if
she saw it as being straight. And this would amount to her ascribing
the property of being straight to the object. This way of putting it re-
mains neutral regarding the question whether the infant thinks about
the world in terms of objects and predicates, in terms of affordances
(Pettit 2003), or in terms of placing a feature (Strawson 1959).
Secondly, ascription of a property resides in the realm of appear-
ance since a subject can behave as if a property were instantiated even
if that property isn’t actually instantiated. Saying that a subject ascribes
a property to an object doesn’t commit us to the claim that the property
is really instantiated or can be instantiated in that object at all. Hence,
in a hallucination, I might ascribe the property of flying to an elephant
despite the fact that elephants can’t fly in the actual world. In this,
then, ascriptions of properties are similar to the applications of con-
cepts. In both cases, the cognitive state is prone to misrepresent how
things really are. However, since we can reasonably say that newborns
ascribe a property—in the sense elaborated above—without applying
the concept, we don’t have to claim that the possibility of property
ascription presupposes the possession or application of concepts.
Thirdly, ascribing a property to an object is something that can be
put into rational connection with other mental states. This means that
ascribing the property of being poisonous to the spider warrants the
ascription of the property of being dangerous to that same spider be-
cause poisonous things are usually dangerous. This epistemic reading
of property ascription also applies to the weak implications of the func-
tional ‘redescription’. Interacting with an object as if it were poison-
ous is a good reason to interact with that thing as if it were dangerous.
Hence, the ascription of properties can be subject to rational and epi-
stemic norms and give rise to knowledge in those cases where it’s viable
to speak of a subject as knowing something.
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Fourthly, since properties are logically understood as sets of objects,
I sometimes speak as if subjects believe the apple to belong to the group
of tasty things or that the subject thinks that the apple instantiates the
property of being tasty. Of course, this is an overintellectualisation par
excellence. Subjects don’t need to entertain these complex intentional
attitudes in order to ascribe a property to an object. Rather, ascribing
the property of being tasty to the apple is logically equivalent to ‘pla-
cing the apple into the set of tasty things’ or ‘thinking of the apple
as instantiating the property of being tasty’. However, these logical
translations don’t correspond to actual cognitive translations.
a.3.2 Lewis on properties
These kinds of properties might strike you as quite weird and rather
far-fetched. However, it shouldn’t surprise you that Lewis didn’t care
about the fact that his properties are outlandish in that way. In his
most famous piece of philosophy, On the Plurality of Worlds (1986),
he writes that ‘the abundant properties may be as extrinsic, as grue-
somely gerrymandered, as miscellaneously disjunctive, as you please.
They pay no heed to the qualitative joints, but carve things up every
which way’ (Lewis 1986: 56). Nonetheless, Lewis is well aware of
the fact that some properties are more firmly rooted in the world of
thinking and causality. He therefore introduces a distinction between
sparse and abundant properties (Lewis 1983a). While the abundant
properties—as the quote explains—are running wild, sparse properties
are those which are needed to account for the similarity and causal re-
lations between various objects. For instance, being coloured is a sparse
property while inhabiting the actual world might not be.
Lewis is usually taken to be a proponent of nominalism about prop-
erties. This means that properties don’t correspond to actual mind-in-
dependent entities, as realists would claim. Properties aren’t real in the
sense of corresponding to individual independent things. Among the
more famous realists about properties are Plato and Aristotle. While
they disagree about the exact nature of properties—most importantly
about the question whether properties can exist uninstantiated—they
concur that properties are concrete individuals. In contrast, Lewis re-
duces properties to sets of all possible instances. Hence, properties
don’t exist as independent entities but are agglomerates of other things.
auxiliaries & technicalities 215
Because this way of understanding properties is intimately tied with
Lewis’s realism about possible worlds, it inherits many of the problems
which vex this unusual view (Egan 2004).
Finally, we also have to distinguish Lewis’s view on properties from
conceptualism about properties (cf. Cocchiarella 2007). While concep-
tualists also hold that properties aren’t mind-independent, they ar-
gue that the expressions we use for properties—such as ‘dampness’ or
‘strength’—actually just refer to the concepts we use in thinking. Ac-
cordingly, properties are in a sense reduced to concepts. It’s clear that
Lewis doesn’t hold such a view because concepts aren’t sets of possible
individuals and are therefore distinct from Lewis’s properties.
Does the theory defended in this chapter depend on any particu-
lar view of properties—most importantly Lewis’s? I don’t think so.
Two reasons speak for a less committal theory of properties working
in the background. The first is that I don’t have to buy the story about
abundant properties. Since the lived body account doesn’t attempt a
reduction of all thinking to de se thinking, we can rest content that
only sparse properties are self-ascribed. Moreover, it’s even possible to
refer back to propositions for other theoretical jobs. The only import-
ant claim is that the ability of subjects to think in the de se way has
to be understood in terms of self-ascribed properties and not enter-
tained propositions. The second reason is that self-ascription of prop-
erties can be understood using quite different metaphysical theories of
properties—be they nominalist or realist in nature. As long as it makes
sense to speak of subjects as ascribing properties in thinking, we can
accept different plausible and compatible accounts of the the nature of
properties.
a.3.3 Additional criticism of the property theory
Given the overall dominance of propositional theories, it’s no surprise
that the property theory hasn’t been embraced with open arms by the
philosophical community. There are a number of reasons why this is
the case. Most of them derive from the property theory’s attempt to
unify the picture of intentional attitudes such that every belief cor-
responds to the self-ascription of a property. However, it’s doubtful
whether the property theory is up to this task. Let me just illustrate
two problems that originate from this and discuss some repercussions
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for my defended lived body account. The first problem concerns the
relation between de se beliefs and communication.The second is about
the fact that our beliefs are usually true or false.
Regarding the first problem, Robert Stalnaker (1999) presents us
with the following dilemma for the property theorist. Either the ob-
jects of assertions are self-ascribed properties or they’re propositions.
In the former case, people seem to talk about themselves when they’re
asserting something. This is bad, because some of our assertions are
about other things and thus their truth-conditions don’t concern us.
In the latter case, the property theorist needs to bite the bullet and
claim that assertions aren’t a direct expression of our intentional atti-
tudes. Let’s look at the relevant passage directly:
If assertions are always self-ascriptions of properties, then
people talk only about themselves. Alternatively, Lewis
might hold that speech acts, unlike attitudes, have pro-
positions rather than properties as objects. But then he
must deny that speech is a straightforward expression of
thought—that what a person says, when she believes what
she says, is what she believes.
Stalnaker 1999: 147
The second problem is that beliefs and other intentional attitudes
are usually either true or false. Since, according to the property theory,
the content of beliefs is a specific property and not a proposition, it’s
difficult to see how it can account for this semantic feature. If beliefs
are relations to propositions, then they can be said tomerely inherit the
truth-value of the relevant proposition. But since properties—contrary
to propositions—aren’t true or false, the property theory can’t claim
that beliefs inherit their truth-value in the same way from their con-
tent. Neil Feit, a contemporary proponent of the property theory, at-
tempts a rebuttal of this objection by claiming that ‘talk about truth is
appropriate for properties, insofar as we speak of properties as being
true of their instances, e.g., being clever is true of every individual who
is clever, and false of every one who is not’ (Feit 2008: 16).
Independently of the questionwhether these two problems and their
respective solutions are convincing, the lived body account is some-
what untouched by either. Since it doesn’t entail a necessary reduction
of all intentional states to the de se, it can accept that propositions have
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some role to play in the way that subjects interact with their worlds and
the people living in it. As such, communicationmight just imply some-
thing like a proposition that’s expressed when we utter de se sentences.
The bullet that needs to be bitten might not prove very hard. It’s not
necessary that our assertions directly express our mental states.
Additionally, we don’t need to make up a story of how properties are
in some sense true or false. We might just admit that there’s no sense
of talking about truth in the case of properties. At the same time, the
truth or falsity of beliefs is easily accounted for in other terms. Alpha’s
belief I am F is true just in case Alpha has the property F or just in
case the proposition <Alpha, being F> is true. There’s no need to ban
propositions from our picture.
a.3.4 Centred worlds
It’s sometimes argued that this analysis is too crude and doesn’t take
into account the full-fledged Lewisian theory. The standard interpret-
ation of Lewis’s theory is that we self-ascribe what are called centred
worlds whenever we’re entertaining de se beliefs. However, it’s unclear
which kind of centred world Lewis actually subscribes to. The ortho-
doxy on this matter is the idea that centred worlds are pairs of a pos-
sible world and a centre. It’s quite obvious that this explanation is
flawed because it neither tells us what a possible world is nor what
a centre is. The important point here concerns the question: ‘What is
a centre?’ Again, the standard answer is that the centre is a pair consist-
ing of an individual and a time (Liao 2012). So, when Alpha believes,
on October, 31, 2016, that she’s happy, the centre of her centred world
is the pair that consists of Alpha and the day October, 31, 2016.
Now, it’s obvious that this doesn’t give us a proper de se belief.This is
because Alpha can believe that she’s happy without knowing anything
about the date of her belief and while being oblivious to her own name
and appearance. There’s thus a need to identify oneself with a certain
centred world and not another. An answer which is plausibly suppor-
ted by the few things Lewis has to say is that this identification is
based on the notion of identity (cf. Liao 2012: 313). In fact, much of
the discussion about the role of centred worlds assumes that we can
simply treat them as the standard objects or contents of beliefs. This is
too simple. Properly understood, a centred world designates a certain
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individual with a property. For instance, Alpha believing I’m happy
amounts to her ruling out all the possible worlds where the centre
doesn’t have the property of being happy. However, she still needs to
self-ascribe that centred world if it should serve as a basis for de se
thinking. Or, as Richard Holton (2015) argues:
The first thing to note is that, as Lewis presents things, the
role for centered worlds is to stand in for properties. So we
still need the idea that they are self-ascribed.That is some-
thing that is obscured inmuch of the subsequent literature,
where centered worlds are often taken to play the role of
propositions, that is, as things that are straightforward ob-
jects of belief, rather than of self-ascription. Introducing
centered worlds does not change the fundamentals of the
account; it just changes the way we describe it.
Holton 2015: 403
In other words, for a centred world to play any role in de se thinking,
it has to be self-ascribed. Alpha might have identified all the worlds
where the centre has the property of being happy, but she still needs to
take herself as being one of these individuals. And that’s tantamount to
self-ascribing a centred world. Hence, a more technical redescription
of the Lewisian theory doesn’t change the general layout of the prop-
erty theory which is that subjects self-ascribe properties when they
think in the de se way.
a.3.5 Self-ascription under identity
You might argue that this reconstruction of Lewis’s idea isn’t quite
charitable. Let me try to convince you that it’s the only way we might
read the property theory such that it can explain the peculiarity of de se
thinking (Wüstholz 2018). I argued that de se thinking amounts to an
ascription of a property under the relation of identity while de re think-
ing amounts to an ascription of a property under some other acquaint-
ance relation.Thismuch can be supported by looking at howChisholm
(1981) distinguishes between direct and indirect attribution.
If we now compare the two beliefs I’m happy andBeta is happy, we see
that the content of these two beliefs is different. In the de se case, a sub-
ject ascribes the property of being happy while in the latter, she ascribes
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the property of being such that Beta is happy. But this isn’t enough to
give us a clear distinction because the content alone makes both of
these beliefs of the same type. They both look like de se beliefs because
they both amount to self-ascriptions. But this is clearly not what we
want. Furthermore, one and the same property could be the content
of a de se belief in one case and the content of a de re belief in the other.
Thus, the content alone isn’t sufficient for our purposes and we have
to move away from the content to the way that content is grasped—or
how the property is ascribed.
The suggestion is then that the relevant acquaintance relations are
capable of drawing the required distinction. Beliefs de se are ascriptions
of properties under the relation of identity while beliefs de re are ascrip-
tions of properties under some other relation of acquaintance. Now,
you might argue that the subject doesn’t have to think of herself as the
thing identical to herself in self-ascription. The metaphysical relation
of identity can be exploited in her self-ascription and doesn’t have any
epistemic import. So, the subject doesn’t need to judge I am such that
the person identical to me is F but simply I am F while exploiting the
fact that she’s identical to herself.
The problemwith this attempted rescue is that the mere fact of iden-
tity can’t be explanatory. For that fact obtains whether the subject self-
ascribes in the de se or in the de re way. Hence, we require an explan-
ation of how the exploitation of that fact can make some self-ascrip-
tions cases of de se belief. The only plausible way of spelling this out,
which results in de se thinking having the epistemic qualities it has, is
that subjects have to take an epistemic stance on the fact that they’re
identical to themselves. Hence, the subject has to ascribe a property
to an intentional object as the thing identical to herself. And this way
of explaining de se thinking and self-ascription obviously doesn’t work
because it introduces the well-known regress problem.
Furthermore, it would be amisunderstanding of the argument if you
took the claim to be that subjects really do think of themselves under
the epistemic relation of identity in de se thinking. They don’t; and
that’s exactly the point. The only way of making sense of the property
theory under the banner of Lewis and Chisholm is to assume some
epistemic relation underlying de se thinking. But the problems with
this way of describing de se thinking shows that the property theory as
such can’t be accurate.
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a.3.6 The infinite regress in intentional action
This regress is described in a similar way by Simon Prosser, who ar-
gues that what he calls ‘first-person redundant’ mental representations
are essential for intentional action. These mental representations are
nothing but irreducibly de se mental states. He argues that, in order
for a subject to act on a specific thing in the world, the subject has
to be aware of her relation to that object. Most importantly, the sub-
ject has to be aware of the kinds of relations between herself and the
object, which determine possible interactions with that thing. Prosser
calls these epistemic relations that are determined by the possibilities
of interaction ‘subject-environment’ or ‘s-e relations’. Without a sub-
ject’s awareness of these relations, she wouldn’t know which actions
she can perform with respect to a specific object in her surrounding.
However, merely knowing that Alpha stands in a particular relation
to the glass isn’t enough for Alpha to know how she herself can behave
in order to interact with that glass. Prosser explains this point in more
detail: ‘Knowing how to act is not the same as knowing how S can
act, even if I am in fact S. Ordinary knowledge that S stands in a s-e
relationR to o gives me the right information, but it does not give it to
me in the right form. Instead, for information aboutmy s-e relations to
enable me to act, their representation must be first-person redundant.’
(Prosser 2015: 226)
He then proceeds to give a regress argument for this claim. Basically,
Alpha can represent the fact that Alpha stands in a certain relation to
the glass either in a first-person redundant—i.e. irreducibly de se—or
in a non-redundant way. In the former case, she would express her
representation as ‘the glass is to the left’ while in the latter case, she
would express it as ‘the glass is to Alpha’s left’. Crucially, this latter
representation wouldn’t move Alpha to act on the glass without Alpha
representing the fact that she stands in some relation to Alpha—for
instance by being identical to her.
Now, this new representation can again be either first-person re-
dundant or non-redundant. In the latter case, Alpha ‘would be in the
same representational state, and the same epistemic situation, as any-
one else who wanted to make’ (Prosser 2015: 227) Alpha act upon the
fact that the glass is to Alpha’s left. Hence, if we don’t break the cycle
through accepting an irreducibly de se state, we would require a new
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representation of the relation that Alpha stands in with regard to this
new fact. He therefore concludes that action is only possible on the
basis of a first-person redundant representation.
a.3.7 Holton on primitive self-ascription
The argument for primitive self-ascription I developed raises some
questions. A first one is exegetical and asks whether Lewis and Chis-
holm aren’t themselves operating with a primitive notion of self-ascrip-
tion. A second one concerns the claim that self-ascription does the ne-
cessary epistemic work within the property theory and not the more
fancy, controversial, and attractive claim that the contents of mental
states are properties necessary to account for. And finally, we might
want additional support for the claim that self-ascription has to be
understood as an epistemically primitive relation in which the subject
takes herself to have certain properties.
It’s quite difficult to answer the question whether Lewis thought of
self-ascription as primitive or not. The standard reading is in terms of
centred worlds which doesn’t make any reference to either self-ascrip-
tion or the specific epistemic nature of de se thinking. However, Liao
argues that the standard Lewisian account was probably not Lewis’s
account: ‘Considering Lewis’s statements elsewhere and his other the-
oretical commitments, it seems that he in fact endorses the primitive
identification account, and not the Lewisian account’ (Liao 2012: 295).
According to this reading, we can take Lewis as accepting the centred
world reading of properties while at the same time requiring some epi-
stemically primitive identification with a particular centred world over
another. This might be tantamount to the primitive self-ascription ac-
count I’ve argued for, but, considering the rather big interpretational
diversity, it’s difficult to be sure.
The question of the epistemic role of self-ascription finds additional
support from Cappelen and Dever (2013: ch. 5). While the authors—
along with other de se skeptics such as Magidor (2015)—are rather
skeptical about the essentiality of de se thinking, they argue that the
central insight of Lewis was the fact that subjects have to self-ascribe
properties in de se thinking. So, despite the focus on the claim that
properties have to supplant propositions as the content of intentional
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attitudes, it’s actually the specific nature of self-ascription and its inher-
ent epistemic primitiveness that explains how de se thinking is special.
Finally, additional arguments for the primitiveness of self-ascription
are found in the already mentioned paper by Liao (2012) and also in
Holton (2015), who argues that only primitive self-ascription can do
the work required in Lewis’s theory:
As I have already stressed, taking self-ascription as prim-
itive is crucial to Lewis’s account. We normally think of
ascription as a two-place relation: one ascribes a property
to a thing. Self-ascription would then be the special case
where the thing is the self. But that won’t do the work here.
If the self is just thought of extensionally, then we would
have no way to distinguish the belief that one’s pants were
on fire from the belief that the pants of someone, who
is you though you don’t realize it, are on fire. (…) So we
have to think of self-ascription as a one-place relation: one
simply self-ascribes a property.
Holton 2015: 403
Self-ascription has to be understood in a primitive way because any
other epistemic relation would require an additional epistemic basis
that justifies the subject in her self-belief. This is because a subject has
to be warranted in believing that she’s thinking about herself. How-
ever, every extensional way of individuating the subject results in the
possibility of doubt concerning the question whether I’m the inten-
tional object of my thinking. But, this kind of doubt isn’t appropriate
in the de se case. Hence, self-ascription—understood as the basis of de
se thinking—has to be epistemically primitive.
a.3.8 On the reductionist future
There are a couple of things you could additionally say, if it’s important
to you. For instance, you could say that thinking de dicto is a case of
thinking de se in the sense that it requires some sense of self-location in
the logical realm. A subject thinking that Beta is tall has to understand
in some sense that the fact that Beta is tall applies to herself when she
believes it. The proposition <Beta, being tall> isn’t just entertained as
a mere possibility among others, but it is believed. Hence, the subject
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could be said to take herself to inhabit a world where that proposition
is true. So, you might want to claim that thinking de se is a prerequisite
for thinking about other things in the world because every belief self-
locates the subject in logical space.
While I sympathise with the general idea that thinking in the de
dicto way is somehow related to thinking in the de se way, I don’t have
a clear way of spelling out the dependency between one and the other.
There is certainly a primacy of the de se, but this doesn’t yet imply that
thinking de dicto is nothing but thinking de se in a special garment.The
dependence might be conceptual, it might be epistemic, it might be
logical, or it might be biological and therefore contingent.
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a.4 addenda to chapter 4: origins
a.4.1 Wittgenstein and the nature of the subject
What parts of Wittgenstein’s view on the nature of subjects are adop-
ted for the defended view? The important distinction that we’re poin-
ted to in the analogy to the eye is the difference in thinking about a
subject as a limit and thinking about a subject as an object. Thinking
of something as an object implies that one grasps it as belonging to
a world that includes other objects with which it stands in certain re-
lations. As Merleau-Ponty writes, thinking of something as an object
requires apprehending ‘that it exists partes extra partes’ (Merleau-Ponty
2012: 75). And the ability to think about oneself in this way requires
some awareness of oneself as being part of the objective world.
While it’s possible for subjects with self-consciousness to achieve
this, it’s unclear whether minimal subjects, which are capable of think-
ing in the de se way but incapable of making these thoughts explicit,
can think of themselves as an object. They’re given to themselves only
as the experiencing and interacting origin of the world and as such
aren’t a proper part of their world. While they might experience their
own bodies visually, such an experience shouldn’t be described as an
experience as of an external object in the world. Describing it in such
a way would require that the subject also apprehends some relations
between her own physical body and other objects in the world. But this
requires the ability to think about oneself in a self-conscious way. As
such, we should say that only self-conscious subjects are subjects and
objects at the same time, depending on how they think about them-
selves. Other subjects are merely given to themselves first-personally.
a.4.2 Perspectives and submarines
Some issues about the notion of perspectival space and its relation
to egocentric space could use more discussion. The first concerns the
seemingly clear notion of a perspective altogether. As a matter of fact,
it’s far from obvious whether we can clearly define perspectival space
as a distinct kind. Because the distinction between allocentric, ego-
centric and perspectival space is drawn on an epistemological level, we
might realise that the theoretical distinctions don’t correspond to real
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epistemic differences. For instance, Bennett (2009) intends to distin-
guish different varieties of visual perspectives. One main problem with
this attempt are the different epistemic imports that are relevant to the
varieties. As such, certain kinds of perspectives already make reference
to possible ways for the subject to interact with the world—bringing
it close to egocentric thinking.
This is closely connected to the question whether there are objective
perspectival facts—a question that is relevant both in the philosophy of
perception and in the philosophy of time (cf. Le Poidevin 2007: ch. 3).
The suggestion is that we draw the distinctions above on a purely epi-
stemological level in terms of how one and the same objective space is
represented. A. W. Moore (1997) argues strongly for this way of un-
derstanding the distinction between absolute and perspectival think-
ing. However, at the same time, we need to do justice to the idea that
some perspectival relations are perfectly objective (A.4.5). I suggest we
retain the best of both worlds. As such, there’s just one objective space
which is thought about either in perspectival, egocentric, or allocentric
terms. At the same time, this objective space can be said to incorpor-
ate ‘perspectival’ facts. This is because there are relations which obtain
between the objects in the world. And some of these relations can be
thought of in different ways depending on where the subject is located
relative to the related objects.
A second issue concerns the necessity of egocentric thinking to ac-
count for the nature of de se thinking. Why shouldn’t perspectival
thinking be enough? We can find several different arguments from
different theoretical projects supporting this claim. Next to the ar-
guments presented in this book, we find Perry arguing that our be-
haviour is intrinsically connected to this kind of agent-relative know-
ledge: ‘However complex our lives are, everything we do comes down
to performing operations on the objects around us—objects in front of
us, behind us, above us; objects we are holding; objects we can see. …
Practical knowledge then, the knowledge that enables us to do things,
forms a structure at whose base is information about the objects that
play relatively basic agent-relative roles in our lives’ (Perry 1998: 85).
Further support comes from theories of situated cognition and enact-
ivism (Rowlands 1999, 2010; Thompson 2007).
Finally, we can use a well-known case discussed by Evans to give ad-
ditional support to the distinction between egocentric and perspectival
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thinking. Evans wonders about the meaning of ‘here’-thoughts in the
context of thinking about a place from a certain perspective. In the ex-
ample, there’s a remote controlled submarine floating around the sea
bed. The operator is located at the surface in a ship from where she
can see the world from the submarine’s point of view. She comes to
think—on the basis of the video—things like It’s mucky here or What
do we have here? Now, is she thinking about the sea bed in egocentric
terms? In other words, does her use of the concept ‘here’ refer to the
centre of egocentric space? Evans argues that we don’t want to say
this in the normal case, but that there are possible situations in which
it makes sense to say that the operator’s ‘here’-thoughts refer to the
centre of egocentric space—i.e. the location of the submarine.
He argues that if the subject in this peculiar situation ‘knows that
the information does not concern her immediate environment, she will
not locate the place in egocentric space, and so some other mode of
identification will be in question. She will think of the place as where
the submarine is, or where these pictures are coming from’ (Evans 1982:
165). In such a case, we would say that our subject thinks about the
sea bed in a merely perspectival way without assuming to be located
at the bottom of the ocean. However, Evans then goes on to imagine
the subject being more immersed in her activity in the submarine. The
subject doesn’t move on the ship anymore and the smells and sounds in
her immediate environment aren’t of any direct importance anymore.
In such a case, ‘the centre of her world would be down on the sea
bed, and her utterances of “here” and “this” could go direct to their ob-
jects without the need for conceptual supplementation’ (Evans 1982:
167). This move from merely perspectival to egocentric thinking is
tantamount to a move to thinking of the objects in terms of one’s pos-
sibilities of interaction.
a.4.3 Campbell on egocentric space
There’s some connection between my proposal of egocentric thinking
as being constituted through a subject’s assumed possibilities of inter-
action and Campbell’s notion of egocentric space. A chief difference
is the claim that we can’t give an accurate definition of why thinking
in egocentric terms provides immediate reasons for the subject to act
in a certain way. Accordingly, Campbell thinks that ‘egocentric axes
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are “immediately” used to direct action. It may be that no very precise
definition can be given of this notion of immediate use, and that the
notion of an egocentric reference frame must to this extent remain a
rough and intuitive one’ (Campbell 1994: 15–16).
In contrast to Campbell, I think there’s a way to explain the notion
of immediate use. We’ve already made steps into that direction in the
context of characterising the functional approach to de se thinking in
terms of ‘direct importance’ (A.2.9). There’s no direct translation of
these ideas and arguments to an explanation of why egocentric space
can be ‘immediately’ used to direct action. At the same time, the con-
nections are strong enough to warrant the claim that there’s a possib-
ility of going beyond a ‘rough and intuitive’ understanding.
a.4.4 What kind of assumptions?
The idea that egocentric thinking and, by extension, de se thinking
have to be characterised and individuated in terms of the subject’s
assumed possibilities of interaction with the objects thereby thought
about needs some clarification. Before attending to three more specific
questions, it’s important to illustrate the connection to other related
phenomena. The first one is Campbell’s (1994) argument that reas-
oning in the first person neither depends on the mere metaphysical
identity of the reference of the various uses of the first person concept
nor on an explicit assumption in the form of a first person judgement.
Rather, the subject trades on the identity in question in her reasoning.
The assumptions about interaction, which are in play in egocentric
thinking, are similar to this kind of trading on identity.
The second connection is to Lucy O’Brien’s agency account of de se
thinking. There, she argues that the capacity for self-conscious self-
reference depends on the awareness of being an agent. However, this
kind of awareness needn’t be conceptualised: ‘Agent’s awareness is a
form of awareness that a subject has of her own actions, and that pre-
cedes her capacity to conceptualize it. It is a form of non-conceptual
awareness’ (O’Brien 2007: 88). Subjects who think in the de se way
have to be aware of the fact that their active mental states and their
behaviour are under their rational control. But this doesn’t require the
subject to actively engage with her judgements and beliefs. Rather, a
subject has agent’s awareness insofar ‘as the thoughts of a subject are
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objects of her rational agency—subject to her rational responsibility,
revision and acceptance’ (O’Brien 2007: 92). Again, the assumptions
about interaction are similar in that they manifest themselves in a sub-
ject’s disposition to believe and act in a certain way.
With these preliminary remarks in the background, it’ll be easier
to give answers to the following three questions: (i) Why does ego-
centric space need to be characterised in terms of activity? (ii) What’s
the nature of these assumptions? Are they judgements, expectations,
representational? (iii) What does it mean for a thought to be consti-
tuted by an assumption about practical abilities?
The philosophical tradition is full of arguments that purport to draw
a conceptual connection between visual space and perception on the
one hand and bodily activity on the other (cf. Smith 2014). However,
there are different ways of spelling out this constitutive relationship,
ranging from merely empirical and contingent to definitional or con-
ceptual. The important point for the view advocated in this book can
be put in the following way. For a subject to be capable of knowing how
to interact with the objects in her world, she needs to think of these
objects in a way which puts them into a directly engaging relation to
her own acting body. As such, the way the subject interacts with the
world through her body is constitutive of the egocentric space that’s
particular of that subject. Hence, activity is constitutive of the nature
of egocentric space not because that space is a space of activity itself.
Rather, thinking about the world egocentrically is intrinsically tied to
the lived body, which is usually understood in terms of certain possible
ways of interaction.
If we take the connections to Campbell’s and O’Brien’s arguments
sketched above into account, the answer to the second question should
become more apparent. First off, the subject’s assumed possibilities
of interaction can’t be judgements since that would lead to an infin-
ite regress as we saw in the case of reasoning in the first person. In-
deed, these assumptions shouldn’t be properly characterised as occur-
rentmental states at all.They’re manifest in what a subject takes herself
to be capable of doing on the basis of thinking about the world in this
or that way. In this sense, they’re similar to a form of dispositional ex-
pectation such as when the subject expects her room to be the same
upon turning off the light.There’s no explicit judgement or consciously
held expectation involved in the subject’s assumption concerning the
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relative location of her bed. But the fact that she securely moves about
her room in darkness shows that she thinks that the bed is still in the
same place.
This is also relevant to the questionwhether we should think of these
assumptions as representations. There are two arguments against this
way of understanding the relevant notion of assumption that’s in play.
First off, they’re supposed to ground the capability of de se thinking.
But, if they’re representational, then what’s being represented—the
possibilities of interaction—needs to be apprehended in a de se way
in order to be taken as directly important to the subject which leads
to a new infinite regress. Thus, they can’t be representations. Secondly,
thinking of them as representational gets the phenomenology and epi-
stemology wrong. If I’m under the illusion that I might catch the
ball, I assume some possibility of interacting with the ball. However,
I might, as in the case of virtual reality, look through the illusion and
consciously judge that I can’t catch the ball. If the assumption were a
representation, I should now form a new representation which deletes
or overrides the former one. However, this doesn’t seem right. Rather,
my new conscious judgement merely trumps my illusory assumption.
Hence, the relevant assumptions have different phenomenal and epi-
stemic properties than representational states.
The answers to the first two questions now provide us with enough
material for a reply to the third one. A thought being constituted by
an assumption about practical abilities means that there are certain
dispositions to make judgements according to these assumptions and
behave as if there’s a certain way of interacting with the world. Think-
ing of the glass as being in reach—understood as involving the assump-
tion that I can grab it by moving in a particular way—implies that I
would judge the glass as not being in my hand, that I would move my
hand in a particular way, and so on. Hence, the thought is embedded
in a certain network of possible and actual actions, possible and actual
judgements and beliefs. And this network is shaped by the possibilities
of interaction with the objects which the subject assumes.
a.4.5 Egocentric space and objectivity
There are two important questions about egocentric space whichmight
require some further discussion. First of all, we want to know in what
230 being origins
sense egocentric space constitutes a kind of ‘space’ which needs to be
distinguished from allocentric space. And secondly, we might wonder
about the objectivity of egocentric space. Concerning the first ques-
tion, we already saw Soldati (1998) and A. W. Moore (1997) arguing
that egocentric space shouldn’t be contrasted with objective space in
metaphysical terms but rather in representational terms. But, at the
same time there’s a sense to the idea that perspectival facts can be per-
fectly objective. Let me now give some more support to the claim that
egocentric space is characterised in representational terms while still
being in some sense objective.
Again, Evans provides us with a nice argument for the claim that
there’s just one space which can be thought about either egocentrically
or allocentrically:
Notice that when I speak of information ‘specifying a po-
sition in egocentric space’, I am talking not of informa-
tion about a special kind of space, but of a special kind
of information about space—information whose content
is specifiable in an egocentric spatial vocabulary. It is per-
fectly consistent with the sense I have assigned to this vo-
cabulary that its terms should refer to points in a public
three-dimensional space. (Indeed I shall be claiming that
that is what they refer to, if they refer to anything at all.)
Evans 1982: 157
Evans’s point has to do with reference and the possibility to commu-
nicate and share thoughts. If we want to say that Alpha’s belief I’m
being attacked by a bear and Beta’s belief Alpha is being attacked by a
bear are about one and the same object, we should treat their beliefs
as referring to one and the same public space. But if that’s so, then Al-
pha’s egocentric way of thinking about the bear can’t be understood as
thinking about a different kind of space. For, if that were the case, we
would have to explain how her belief could possibly refer to the same
object as Beta’s belief. Hence, egocentric space has to be characterised
in terms of a ‘mode of presentation’ of objective space.
The question whether egocentric thinking can be objective is closely
connected. Egocentric space and perspectival space are distinguished
by the questionwhether the subject takes herself to be capable of acting
from the centre of the respective space. Hence, we can try to tackle the
auxiliaries & technicalities 231
question of objectivity via thinking about the possibility of perspectival
facts. The relations which are constitutive of perspectival space can
be understood in a perfectly objective or intersubjective way. What
perspectival thinking claims is conditional on a certain point of view—
i.e. a certain centre in objective allocentric space—but not conditional
on a specific subject occupying that point of view. In this sense, K2
is to the right of Gasherbrum II when viewed from Gasherbrum I
for every subject who takes up that particular perspective. There’s no
variation here.
This insight can be traced back at least to Thomas Reid’s An Inquiry
into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense (1764), where
he argues for the objectivity of what he calls the visible figure of an
object—the object as presented to the senses with all its geometrical
properties. He argues that ‘the visible figure of all bodies will be the
same with that of their projection upon the figure of a hollow sphere,
when the eye is placed in the centre’ (Reid 1764: 6.7, 218–219). The
projection of the surface on the inside of a hollow sphere seems to be
a perfectly objective figure. If that’s the case, then the visible figure—
how an object appears perspectivally—is perfectly objective. Accord-
ingly, Reid claims that the visible figure belongs to the category of real
figures:
To what category of beings does visible figure then be-
long? …The different positions of the several parts of the
body with regard to the eye, when put together, make a
real figure, which is truly extended in length and breadth,
and which represents a figure that is extended in length,
breadth, and thickness.
Reid 1764: 6.8, 225–226
a.4.6 Is egocentric thinking de se?
Let’s imagine you accept some conceptual connection between think-
ing about space egocentrically and de se thinking. Then you might still
wonder about two theses that resonate in the description of egocentric
space. First off, do we want to say that a subject thinks in the de se way
whenever she interacts with objects in the world? Secondly, is every
case of de se thinking a case of self-consciousness? For the purposes
232 being origins
of the book, I accept a version of the first thesis and firmly reject the
second. Here’s the reasoning behind it.
As we’ll see in the context of discussing some examples of de se think-
ing, even cases of egocentric thinking about other objects involves the
self-ascription of some properties. Thinking that there’s food to the
left doesn’t strike us as a very de se way of thinking. After all, we’re
thinking about the food and not about ourselves. Hence, the inten-
tional object of the thought isn’t the subject. With Perry (1986) and
Récanati (2007), we might say that these thoughts ‘concern’ the sub-
ject but they aren’t ‘about’ the subject. Nonetheless, the subject can
only think about the food as being in a certain location in egocentric
space if she thinks of it in relation to herself. And this way of thinking of
the object involves the lived body and grounds a certain self-ascription
of a property. Hence, all thinking about objects in egocentric terms in-
volves self-ascription of a property.Therefore, it involves de se thinking.
Thinking about an object egocentrically is only possible when put into
connection with our own assumed possibilities of interaction.
On the other hand, self-consciousness should be seen as the kind of
ability that subjects reveal in the classic mirror test (cf. Gallup 1970,
1977). As such, it can be understood as a highly sophisticated cognit-
ive ability which isn’t exhibited by all subjects capable of de se thinking.
What many philosophers call primitive self-consciousness or non-con-
ceptual self-consciousness has to be explained via the ability to think
in the de se way without assuming that it already amounts to proper
self-consciousness.
a.4.7 The lived body, the body image, and the body schema
The distinction between the lived body and the physical body is re-
lated, but not identical to the distinction between the body image and
the body schema. Both the body image and the body schema are built
through the subject’s intentional states on her body.They take the sub-
ject’s body as an intentional object. However, the body image involves
a set of perceptions, representations, beliefs and attitudes towards the
own body while the body schema is more implicit in kind. Thus, the
body schema supposedly works on a more primitive and functional
level than the partially explicit attitudes towards one’s own body which
are constitutive of the body image. Gallagher and Cole (1995), who
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established this conceptual distinction, take the body image to com-
prise a subject’s perceptual experience and conceptual understanding
of her own body paired with different emotional attitudes towards the
body. In contrast, the body schema doesn’t have the ‘status of a con-
scious representation or belief ’ (Gallagher and Cole 1995: 371). It is
integrated with the subject’s environment and is determined through
‘prepersonal, anonymous processes’ (Gallagher and Cole 1995: 373)
which serve to establish the assumed boundaries of one’s own behavi-
oural body. As such, it may incorporate objects distinct from the actual
physical body—such as hammers, walking sticks, artificial limbs, and
so on. The body schema is very much tied to direct movement and
interaction and can even consist of several body schemas which are
subsumed under one general heading (Gallagher 2005: 24, fn 5).
Neither the body schema nor the body image are anything like the
objective physical body. Both involve some form of intentional stance
towards one’s own body.What about the relation to the lived body? Be-
ing constituted through partially explicit intentional attitudes to one’s
own body, the body image has to be sharply distinguished from the
lived body, which enables intentional attitudes towards one’s own body
and thus can’t itself be constituted thusly. At the same time, one could
be lead to think that the body schema is very closely related to the lived
body. However, the two are not identical at all.While the body schema
involves the system of motor abilities which is very much crucial in the
case of the lived body, the concept of the lived body is located on an al-
most exclusively phenomenological and epistemic level.The lived body
is neither consciously nor unconsciously represented at all. For other-
wise, the subject would have to think of the lived body as her own. But
this, of course, would require some prior knowledge of who she herself
is—a prerequisite that the lived body is exactly designed to fulfil.
There’s certainly a connection between egocentric space and the body
schema because the latter is determined with regard to the motor ca-
pacities of the subject and egocentric space has to be characterised in
terms of activity. However, we can’t take the body schema to be the
origin of egocentric space.This is because the kind of bodily awareness
that’s typical of the lived body is more fundamental than the implicitly
represented body schema. As Soldati (1998: 144) argues: ‘More is re-
quired for egocentric space than the centring of a spatial frame on the
subject’s body. What is needed, it might be argued, is some non-obser-
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vational knowledge of one’s own body, as it is generally said to be given
by bodily awareness’. And this non-observational knowledge can’t be
provided by the body schema because the subject would have to think
of a particular body schema as hers. But this doesn’t amount to a way
of thinking that’s potentially identification-free.
a.4.8 Is the lived body first-personal?
An account of de se thinking which is conceptually quite close to the
defended idea involving the lived body is Lucy O’Brien’s agency ac-
count which she defends in her Self-Knowing Agents (2007). On her
account, a subject is capable of self-conscious reference to herself us-
ing the first-person pronoun or concept via her understanding the self-
reference rule—a user of the word ‘I’ or the concept I refers necessarily
to herself—only if she thereby exhibits what she calls ‘agent’s aware-
ness’ of her use. In her use, she has to be aware of being the agent
in order to become aware of the fact that she’s thinking about herself.
Without such a primitive awareness of being the rational agent of her
thought or utterance, the subject wouldn’t be able to know that she
thinks about herself through using the first-person concept (A.4.4).
O’Brien’s arguments for the necessity of primitive agent’s aware-
ness mirror the arguments presented for the necessity of primitive self-
ascription. Furthermore, the notion of agent’s awareness is somewhat
close to the concept of the lived body. Both involve a primitive kind of
knowledge about one’s own behaviour and possibilities of interaction.
However, the two are not identical. Agent’s awareness has much to do
with a subject’s rational control over her mental and behavioural life.
For instance, a particular experience of anger, despite being passive
and overcoming oneself, is experienced as one’s own anger in virtue of
the fact that the subject is capable of fitting that anger into a picture
of a rational agent. For instance, the anger has a reasonable cause, is
appropriate and doesn’t just come out of thin air. By contrast, a case
of the experience of thought insertion—i.e. the experience of a mental
state which isn’t accepted as one’s own—doesn’t exhibit agent’s aware-
ness and thus isn’t taken as one’s own thought. There is no rational
control over the thought which just appears to be ‘in one’s head’.
In contrast, the lived body operates on a much more basic level
without the necessity for expansive rationality of the subject. A sub-
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ject with a lived body needn’t exert rational control over her mental
state in order to be capable of thinking about herself. This also con-
trasts O’Brien taking agent’s awareness to be essentially not first-per-
sonal. For an ability that is supposed to ground our ability to think
in the de se way, this is quite surprising. However, she assumes that
agent’s awareness being first-personal would require a further explan-
ation of that feature. She reasons that our use of the word ‘I’ is first-
personal because of the nature of the self-reference rule and agent’s
awareness. So, we can’t take the explanans of the first-personality of
self-conscious self-reference itself to be first-personal.
However, this worry is mistaken. In fact, what requires explanation
isn’t the first-personality of our ability to use the word ‘I’ in order to
express our de semental states.What requires explanation is that some-
thing which is governed by purely third-personal rules is capable of
expressing irreducibly first-personal attitudes. And the idea that the
lived body is the essential first-personal basis for de se thinking is ex-
actly an explanation of that. It’s the rock bottom first-personality of
the lived body which makes it the case that subjects are able to have a
first-personal stance on the world and themselves at all.
a.4.9 More on the lived body
The contrast between the physical and the lived body introduces some
problems concerning the spatial nature of the latter. We might ask
whether the lived body—as the origin of egocentric space—has an ex-
tension and in what sense fingers, hands, or cheeks are ‘parts of ’ the
lived body. Admittedly, we can’t describe the geometrical origin of ob-
jective space in divisible terms. But the lived body isn’t a geometrical
origin, it’s a phenomenological one. Thus, here’s a proposal: The phys-
ical and the lived body aren’t part of distinct metaphysical realms. In
this sense, then, the two can overlap spatially or even have the same
spatial extension. For usual subjects, their physical hands occupy the
same part of objective space as their lived hands. However, cases such
as the rubber hand illusion, phantom or alien limbs show us that the
lived body is much more malleable and susceptible to transformation.
We can metaphorically imagine the lived body as a kind of body-
shaped overlay that’s determined by the two-way relation between ex-
perience and behaviour. If a subject assumed that there’s a tall horn
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on top of her head with which she can receive information from outer
space and that can send information to extraterrestrials, then that phys-
ically non-existing horn should be understood as a part of her lived
body. In our metaphor, the subject’s ‘overlay’ is comprised of hands
and feet, a face, a tongue, and also the tall horn on top of the head. In
this sense then, there’s a way to comprehend the lived body as located
in physical space. However, the extension is determined phenomeno-
logically and not physically.
Another question concerns the claim that the lived body is free from
identification. Is there a way tomake this claimmore precise? I suggest
two clarifications: First, any thought that’s grounded in the ascription
of a property to the lived body is identification-free. Why? Because
‘we do not need to identify our body as one among those experienced’
(Soldati 1998: 144). Or, as Martin (1993: 209) argues: ‘Bodily aware-
ness is such because its proper and sole object is one’s own body and
not any other occupant of the objective world’. For thoughts that in-
volve primitive self-ascription, there’s no question about which object
one ascribes a property to in sense similar to introspection always being
about one’s own mind and not any other mind. Along the same lines,
Merleau-Ponty (2012: 93) argues that ‘I observe external objects with
my body, I handle them, inspect them, and walk around them. But
when it comes to my body, I never observe it itself ’.
This leads to the second clarification against a possible misinterpret-
ation of the claims above. The fact that there’s merely one lived body
to which subjects ascribe properties doesn’t imply that there’s no pos-
sibility to think about one’s own body as one amongst others. It’s per-
fectly possible to experience one’s body ‘as an object in a world which
can contain other objects’ (Martin 1993: 209). However, this way of
thinking of the physical body requires an awareness of oneself as being
part of the objective world. Hence, it requires the ability to leave one’s
first-person perspective and apprehend oneself as located in allocentric
space (A.4.1).
a.4.10 Is de se thought without a body possible?
There’s an obvious objection around the corner here. Aren’t there ex-
amples of possible disembodied subjects—such as the souls of religious
people in the afterlife, Descartes’s pure thinker, or something like a
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mind that’s only possible of calculation—which are capable of think-
ing about themselves in the de se way? It seems rather straightforward
that such subjects present direct counterexamples to the lived body ac-
count. Therefore, let me quickly discuss two strategies with which we
could reply to such an objection.
The first concerns the intelligibility of the objection either on empir-
ical or conceptual grounds. We could question the existence of these
disembodied subjects. After all, believing something to be true doesn’t
make it true. In order to avoid the inevitable squabble over such a reply,
we can also question whether it makes sense to attribute these subjects
with the ability to think in the de se way. As argued in the main text,
the Cogito argument doesn’t require the acceptance of disembodied
subjects. Rather, it tells us that the knowledge of our own existence is
epistemically independent from any kind of observational knowledge
about our bodies. But this is perfectly consistent with the lived body
account. However, this still leaves us with the supposed possibility of
a soul in Heaven thinking God loves me. How should we respond to
this?
I propose a second strategy that doesn’t commit us to any specific
metaphysical claims about the existence of souls or the capability of
these subjects to think in the de se way. Rather, it tries to show a way
in which these subjects could be understood as being constituted by a
lived body in the purely phenomenological sense. As long as this sub-
ject can be said to experience the world in terms of assumed possibilit-
ies of interaction with the ‘objects’ in her world, it could be said to be
a lived body. Since the lived body isn’t identical to a physical body, it
being disembodied in the physical sense is a conceptual possibility.
How plausible is that? I don’t know. But, I’ll present one very hy-
pothetical far-fetched way of making sense of a lived body—including
some sense of egocentric space—without any interaction with physical
objects. Imagine a subject without a body which is capable of calcu-
lating. However, that subject experiences numbers as abstract objects
which are located in her egocentric space. How so? Let’s think of a
conception of arithmetic as we find it in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason
and Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, where he argues that ‘even
arithmetic forms its concepts of numbers through successive addition
of units in time, but above all pure mechanics can form its concepts
of motion only by means of the representation of time’ (Kant 2004:
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4.283). Now, against this background, we might imagine our think-
ing subject as thinking about numbers in terms of how long it takes
her to represent them. Thus, in order to ‘interact’ with the number 5,
she thinks of it as taking two units longer to reach than the number 3.
In this way, her world of numbers can be said to be represented along
the stretch of time which it takes her to reach the relevant objects in
representation. This could be described as a kind of egocentric way of
thinking about abstract numbers. And our subject thinks of this world
in terms of how she could interact with the various objects it contains.
This would allow us to say that there’s a lived body of some sorts in-
volved. Admittedly, this is somewhat speculative, but it could be one
way of making sense of purely thinking subjects.
a.4.11 Implicit de se beliefs
Some accounts of first person thought make a more systematic distinc-
tion between implicit and explicit de se beliefs (Musholt 2015; Récanati
2007, 2009). The latter contain some element or constituent in the
content that makes them explicitly about the thinking subject. For
example, the occurrence of the first person concept would be a con-
stituent that makes the belief explicitly de se. What about implicit de
se beliefs? Récanati explains:
Thoughts that are implicitly de se involve no reference to
the self at the level of content: what makes them de se is
simply the fact that the content of the thought is evaluated
with respect to the thinking subject. The subject serves as
‘circumstance of evaluation’ for the judgment, rather than
being a constituent of content.
Récanati 2009: 258
It’s not quite clear whether cases of agent-relative knowledge (cf. Perry
1998) should be properly analysed in terms of implicit de se thinking.
They fulfil the essential criteria above in that their content needs to
be evaluated for its satisfaction with respect to the thinking subject.
However, because their intentional object isn’t the thinking subject, it’s
questionable whether we want to give them the status of de se states.
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a.4.12 Affordances and de se thinking
A commonway to put this point is to say that many of our beliefs about
the world around us are guided by what’s called the perception of af-
fordances. Objects in the world have certain characteristics that are rel-
ative to subjects engaging with them. For instance, grass is eatable for
many ruminant animals like cows, giraffes, and kangaroos while for us
it doesn’t afford to be eaten. James Gibson, who is associated the most
with the theory of affordances—despite having its roots in the much
earlier Gestalt psychology—explains that affordances are properties of
objects that are relative to the observing subject. They are relative in
so far as the subject is of a certain kind herself. Grass affords different
things to human beings than to giraffes. And an open window affords
something different to a thief than to a freezing subject.
In this sense then, affordances aren’t subjective, they’re just relational
properties of objects that depend on which subject engages with it.
Accordingly, Gibson writes in his ‘TheTheory of Affordances’ (1977):
The concept of affordance is derived from these concepts
of valence, invitation, and demand but with a crucial dif-
ference. The affordance of something does not change as
the need of the observer changes.The observermay ormay
not perceive or attend to the affordance, according to his
needs, but the affordance, being invariant, is always there
to be perceived. An affordance is not bestowed upon an
object by a need of an observer and his act of perceiving it.
The object offers what it does because it is what it is. To
be sure, we define what it is in terms of ecological phys-
ics instead of physical physics, and it therefore possesses
meaning and value to begin with. But this is meaning and
value of a new sort.
Gibson 1977: 138–139
What it means for a subject to think of food as being ‘in reach’ is
just for her to latch on to the affordance that the food item has in
virtue of standing in a particular relation to the thinking subject. The
relation of being in reach always obtains between that food item and
subjects capable of reaching and within a certain distance. But, while
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the affordance itself isn’t subjective, it carries an immediate call for ac-
tion to the subject with it. This is because a subject that perceives the
affordance of an object has to think of that object as in reach for her-
self. Thus, perceiving an affordance carries direct relevance for action
because affordances are such that they’re determined in terms of what
a subject can do with a certain object.
A similar way of describing our thoughts about objects in egocentric
space comes from enactivism about perception (Hutto andMyin 2012).
For instance, Alva Noë explains this theory of perception, strongly in-
spired by Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the lived body, thusly:
Perceptual experience acquires content thanks to our pos-
session of bodily skills.What we perceive is determined by
what we do (or what we know how to do); it is determined
by what we are ready to do. In ways I try to make precise,
we enact our perceptual experience; we act it out.
Noë 2004: 1
a.4.13 Strawson on feature placing
This way of putting things is derived from Peter Strawson’s concept of
feature placing that he first develops in his Individuals (1959).The idea
is that some sentences and mental states don’t designate an object and
a property or predicate. Rather, they place a certain feature—such as
warmth, rain, or colour—in one’s environment. Accordingly, he dis-
tinguishes ‘feature-universals’ from properties: ‘Snow, water, coal and
gold, for example, are general kinds of stuff, not properties or charac-
teristics of particulars; though being made of snow or being made of gold
are characteristics of particulars’ (Strawson 1959: 202).
How is this relevant for us? We could understand primitive self-
ascription as placing a certain feature ‘in’ the lived body. Correspond-
ingly, such a self-ascription wouldn’t involve an object. A subject that
has the de se thoughtMy back is horizontal merely places a certain fea-
ture in her lived body without picking herself out as the object of that
thought. It’s not quite clear if it’s possible to translate Strawson’s lan-
guage of feature placing directly to the lived body account. The reason
is that I didn’t develop a mature theory of properties to go along with
the account—having argued that this isn’t necessary to get the gen-
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eral point across. Accordingly, the idea of feature placing might only
be compatible with certain theories of properties and not with others.
But we would need a clearer theory of properties to test this.
a.4.14 Self-consciousness in nonhumans
Discussions on the viability of the mirror test to detect self-conscious-
ness in nonhumans tell us much about the complexity of empirical sci-
ence. First off, it’s quite unclear whether we can use a single criterion
like themirror test to determine whether some subject is self-conscious
or not (Wüstholz 2015). Because self-recognition isn’t a monolithic
thing but might be ‘conceived of as a gradual phenomenon’ (Brandl
2016: 2), we need to look for an encompassing paradigm to under-
stand self-consciousness. This is even more so, because the behaviour
exhibited in mirror self-recognition can easily be explained in terms
that don’t make reference to self-consciousness (Wüstholz 2013).
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